Dave, The syllabi were converted alright and should look alright. However, I forgot which section of Socratic Universe didn't send correctly. Just reply to me, and I'll work on it... sorry about that. (I think it was 7, 8, or 9... can't remember which one, though.) Anyway, just let me know here or call at 818 332 4608 See you again PAUL

Chapter Three

Which Philosophers Do You Admire?

Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): I admire most of the famous philosophers: 
Plato, Aristotle, Socrates. I admire most of the medieval 
philosophers like Aquinas. I have great admiration for Descartes. I 
have immense admiration for Kant. I admire Berkeley for his daring, 
clarity, style, and his creativity.

Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): I admire my wife [Patricia]. I 
think she's a very good philosopher, but that may not be the answer 
that you were looking for. Historically, I admire Aristotle because 
he was a philosopher who knew as much science as it was possible to 
know. I admire Descartes because he was a philosopher who knew as 
much physics and mathematics and physiology as it was possible at 
that time for a philosopher to know. I admire Bertrand Russell for 
the same reasons. There are many philosophers like this. I guess I 
don't admire all of them because some of them have come up with 
theories which I don't think are successful. Philosophers should know 
as much science as possible and that's science in a very broad sense. 
That includes psychology, sociology, and includes the human sciences 
and also the legal sciences--jurisprudence and political theory.

Cohon (Stanford): [Among living philosophers] there are many I admire 
without necessarily agreeing with them: Donald Davidson, G.E. Moore, 
Anscombe, Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, John Rawls. I admire them 
for the originality and depth of their thought; some for the clarity 
with which they express it as well (although this is not the case for 
Anscombe and Williams).

Copp (U.C. Davis): John Rawls. He attempts to deal with central 
philosophical problems. He provides a strikingly original approach.

Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I admire Heidegger and Merleau Ponty most. I 
admire, like anyone would, Aristotle because he is the great 
philosopher who managed to say many important things while staying 
close to common sense. I admire Kant because he is the greatest 
philosopher that ever lived, the most systematic and most original 
and certainly one of the most influential. But my [primary figure is] 
Heidegger because I think he is not only close to common sense, but 
deeper than Aristotle, righter than Kant. He has got the advantages 
of both of them but he has also got a deeper understanding of the 
human condition than either. 

Friedman (U.C. Davis): Socrates, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Russell, 
Quine, Kripke, and Van Krassen because all these were radical 
philosophical innovators and all are breathtaking.

Griesemer (U.C. Davis): I admire William Wimsatt (my dissertation 
advisor at the University of Chicago) because he is creative. He sees 
new and interesting philosophical problems about science that other 
people don't see. He probably doesn't produce the best answers or the 
most readable essays, but neither do I. I tend to value creativity 
and insight more than "correctness" or even "clarity." I admire 
Nelson Goodman and his work in art, representation, and individuals. 
His work is clear as well as creative. He's the sort of philosopher I 
find myself reading to get me jazzed up about a problem again after 
I've not thought about it for a long time. I admire Nancy Cartwright, 
a philosopher of physics. She's written a lot on abstraction, 
causation and laws on physical science. She is also very innovative 
as philosophers go. I especially like her collection of essays, "How 
the Laws of Physics Lie."

Jolley (U.C. San Diego): Spinoza, Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume; they were 
intellectually fearless, and (with the possible exception of Spinoza) 
clear, incisive writers.

Jubien (U.C. Davis): I admire most of the eight or ten frequently 
mentioned great philosophers of history. Among contemporaries, I 
especially admire Saul Kripke, David Lewis, W.V. Quine, and Roderick 
Chisholm. I admire all these philosophers because they have done very 
important work in what I think of as the most central problems of 
philosophy. Of course I often disagree with their views. (I admire 
lots of other philosophers as well.)

Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): I admire my teacher Rudolph Carnap. I 
admire Sal Kripke.

Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): Hegel and Aristotle.  I admire Hegel because 
he had such a strong sense of history. And I admire Aristotle because 
he had such a strong sense of the natural world.

Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Aristotle. Epicurus, for his fundamentally 
right world-view and his hostility to superstition. Hobbes, for his 
incomparable style and his feistiness. Spinoza, who outlined the 
essentials of a scientific view of the universe and of man and the 
human good. Hume, for his Christianity bashing. Nietzsche, ditto, and 
for reviving the Aristotelian ethic for self-realization.

McCann (University of Southern California): I can name a few. Locke 
is the person I am most interested in because Locke is one who I 
think did more than anyone else to lay foundations for a mechanistic 
theory of science. I also very much like Hume's work, another 
empiricist. I am also interest in Kant who has a problematic relation 
to both rationalism and empiricism. As for modern philosophers, the 
one I am most interested in is Wittgenstein. He has a complex 
relation to philosophical theorizing. I do not read him negatively as 
a lot of people do. I do not think his aim is to just say you can not 
have any appropriate philosophical theorizing about things at all. I 
think he performed an important service in reigning in some of the 
more ambitious speculations about the nature of mind and about the 
workings of language, showing that one had to be extremely careful 
and pay a lot of attention to detailed examples in arriving at 
general claims about mind and language. It is that tendency that I 
admire in Wittgens
ein. I am pretty much a hard empiricist. What you see is it. This is 
another thing which Wittgenstein has done a lot to bring out. What 
you see is very much controlled by conceptual presuppositions and 
things which you have that sometimes work to the good to help 
structure your experience. Other times it can work to the bad, to 
distort what evidence is.

McGray (University of San Diego): Wittgenstein, Mill, Kant, Hume, and 
Russell. They treat questions in a critical and ruthlessly honest way.


Needleman (San Francisco State): Plato, Maimonides, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, and Kant.
Shalinsky (U.C. San Diego): "Admiration" is probably too strong a 
word to describe my attitude toward philosophers. I think, personally,
 that it's important to be somewhat of an iconoclast: one shouldn't 
cower in the face of even the most imposing philosophers. In the 
first place, outright devotion tends to undermine (what I think is) 
the essentially critical spirit of philosophy. In the second place, 
students frequently find themselves paralyzed when confronted with 
the difficult text by a philosopher they idolize. I suspend my 
iconoclasm only in the case of Kant. His arguments are unbelievably 
complex (as well as, if you ask me, right) that one cannot help but 
feel admiration.

Smart (U.C. Santa Barbara): As I said before, Popper, because of his 
ability to see the importance of democracy and freedom. Buddha, 
because he was a very subtle mind; he was very intellectual. Indians: 
Shankara and Ramanuja. On the Western front, David Hume, the Scottish 
empiricist, who in some ways has beliefs similar to those of the 
Buddhists. And Immanuel Kant, who was concerned with the 
reconciliation of science and human freedom, gearing science towards 
human values.

Suppes (Stanford University): Among the modern philosophers I admire 
William James and John Dewey. James has a lot of flair that Dewey 
doesn't and Dewey has other virtues that James does not have. I think 
highly of Quine's writings.

Wollheim (U.C. Davis): Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, John Stuart Mill, 
Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein.
 
Woodruff (U.C. Irvine): Well, I have a license plate that has the 
name of a philosopher on it--Rudolph Carnap. He was [besides being a 
pioneer in logical positivism] a wonderful person.





	Which Philosophers Do You Admire?



	Which Philosophers Do You Admire?




										 
	page \* arabic

PAGE18






Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): I admire most of the famous philos€




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Û¥





	Chapter Four

Which Ethical System 
Do You Admire Most?


Arntzenius (University of Southern California): Utili-tarianism, 
mainly because you can distinguish between rights based attitudes and 
procedural based systems and happiness based systems. I'm more 
interested in happiness based systems because it seems to me that no 
matter what your rights based system is, according to it, it is 
always possible to find some situation which is justified [by rights 
based systems], e.g., where half of the world is starving  and you 
just can't see that it is. I can't accept a moral theory that in some 
circumstances it is okay that people in the world are starving; it 
seems to me that roughly speaking the thing that I really care about 
is unhappiness of people, because it is clear that people who are 
starving are not happy. The ultimate standard of a just society is 
how happy the people are in it.

Beckman (Harvey Mudd): Aristotle's; it avoids Christian moralizing by 
preceding it and it addresses the concept of living well in a general 
and well balanced way.

Blake (Loyola Marymount University): It's funny to talk about ethical 
systems as being admirable. I'm not quite sure how I'd answer that 
question, whether there is one I find most admirable. Aristotelian 
philosophy strikes me as profoundly common-sensible.  .  . I find 
that very admirable.

Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): I find the ethical views of 
Aristotle most admirable. Aristotle felt that to become a morally 
good person is to become practically wise, wise in the affairs of 
interacting with other people. I think becoming wise is a matter of 
learning to get along with your friends; learning to take care of 
your family; learning to help others to thrive; learning to depend or 
lean on others when you are in trouble; and it is part of a 
flourishing community and that is something that you cannot write 
down in a basic set of laws of what the universe is and where mankind 
comes from. I think that we will do better if we can disengage these 
things to a certain degree. Religion isn't the only institution that 
engages in this question. The legislature in any given state or the 
House of Representatives in this country, or the Parliament in 
England, these are the bodies designed to address moral and political 
questions, trying to lay down rules that we are all supposed to 
follow. And we have some
happy traditions there. I think the English history and the American 
history are positive and encouraging history. I think the English 
common law and the English legislative system similarly with the 
American have done rather better than some of the world's major 
religions in coming up with the system of rules by which to live. 
Whoever does it, religion or political bodies or clubs or 
universities, it has to be done, pursuit of moral questions is 
entirely consistent to the pursuit of science. I think the two will 
be with us for a long time. An interesting moral question and an 
interesting theoretical question are entirely compatible. 

Cohon (Stanford University): Well, I don't think any one system has 
the whole story right when it comes to the moral life. I like certain 
aspects of Kant's ethics and certain aspects of Aristotelian ethics,  
if we update them. But how can these be made compatible? I also 
believe that there are such things as moral rights, although I am not 
a complete Lockean about them.

Copp (U.C. Davis): Kant. I admire the sentiment behind the ends-in-
itself formulation of the categorical imperative.

Davis (Claremont Scripps College): I have always liked Kant's ethical 
system. [However] I don't think it's without difficulties; I think it 
can be criticized.

Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I find Aristotle admirable who thought that 
ethics isn't a theory or system, but it's learning how to behave 
skillfully so you can do the appropriate thing in your culture which 
means in effect to do whatever makes you and other people lead 
fulfilled lives. It is the only kind of skill that you  get gradually 
as you live; make choices, make mistakes, and have courage to learn 
from them. So, as Aristotle says, if you want to know what is right 
and wrong don't try to find a theory (he doesn't say that but he 
means that). He says ask a wise old man; it's people like Plato and 
Kant who try to have an ethical theory and I don't think that any 
ethical theory which tries to give you universal pictures for acting 
holds up. You have to learn to do in every particular situation 
what's appropriate in that situation and that's the kind of skill you 
can't derive from a theory.

Dumont (Mt. Saint Mary's College): It's not really a system, but what 
has inspired me the most in the last few years and led me to a better 
understanding of the ethical domain and the problem solving is the 
work of Carol Gilligan.

Fischer (U.C. Riverside): That is hard because I see problems with 
everything. I would probably have to say Kant's system because the 
importance of dignity and respect are owed to individuals on their 
own free will.

Friedman (U..C. Davis): Spinoza's naturalistic ethics and Mill's 
utilitarianism.

Griesemer (U.C. Davis): I don't know anything about ethics so I don't 
admire any ethical systems.

Jolley (U.C. San Diego): I am attracted by Spinoza's moral theory. 
For one thing I share Spinoza's implicit view that morality is a 
system of hypothetical imperatives. I am also attracted by the 
central role that Spinoza gives in his philosophy to the analysis of 
the emotions.

Jubien (U.C. Davis): I believe that some sophisticated version of 
utilitarianism has the best chance of ultimately winning the ethical 
systems sweepstakes. The most sophisticated effort to date that I am 
aware of is presented in Fred Feldman's Doing the Best We Can.

Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): I would call myself a secular humanist. I 
have no theistic view. I am Jewish so I am strongly culturally 
identified with Judaism as a cultural thing. I am not religious in 
the sense of having theistic beliefs and so on. I think of myself as 
being very humanistic; as my teacher used to say, everyone has the 
obligation to try to develop their own gifts to the maximum degree 
possible. I think we have obligations to ourselves, our families. 
Critics of secular humanism claim that it is a very relativistic 
point of view, without absolute ethical principles. [Nevertheless] we 
must realize our own potential.

Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): I guess I would find virtue ethics the most 
admirable. Well, because I think being a good person is its own 
reward. And I think that ontological views rely too heavily on guilt 
to really work well. And utilitarian views tend to be heartless.

Matson (U.C. Berkeley): The Aristotle/Spinoza idea of self-
realization. Its concept of the Good is the right one, and it is free 
of "moralic acid" (Nietzsche).

McCann (University of Southern California): I think the Kantian view, 
or some version of it, is the most promising theory. Utilitarianism 
has, in my view, insufferable problems dealing with questions of 
justice, personal integrity, and so on, whereas virtue theories do 
not provide enough in the way of philosophical foundations for 
morality. The Kantians, however, have a tough set of problems in 
making their views intuitive and plausible, and getting rid of the 
daunting metaphysics Kant connected to the view. Still, it is the one 
I would most like to be true.

Needleman (San Francisco State): Christianity.

Ring (C.S.U. Fullerton): I'm not terribly pleased with any system, 
especially of ethics. But if I had to answer, I would say Aristotle. 
He sees a moral life as embedded in a community and not as something 
transcendental or as individualistic.

Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside): I admire utilitarianism, because I 
believe it's practically implacable and provides the most morally 
balanced, reasonable conclusion.

Ross (Claremont Scripps College): Socratic, because it doesn't leave 
much out. Never repay harm with harm, and don't just say it--you 
argue it, etc.
Scott-Kakures (Claremont Scripps College): I'm going to assume 
admirable doesn't mean defensible. So, the one I find most admirable 
is one which may not turn out to be an ethical system or theory at 
all--it's virtue. That is what Aristotle makes fundamental: not what 
I could do, but what sort of person should I be. As I say, that may 
not even turn out to be an ethical theory.

Shalinsky (U.C. San Diego): I don't happen to be interested in ethics,
 and I find meta-ethics particularly tiresome. I must also say that I 
find the use of the word "admirable" even less reasonable in this 
context than I did with the respect to the other question which used 
the term. The choice of an ethical system, it seems to me, ought to 
be guided by distinctly philosophical considerations: the "best" one 
ought to be the one which is the simplest, the most intuitive, the 
most coherent, and so on. It ought not, I think, be the most 
"admirable." Use of this word suggests that one should have some sort 
of attitude toward the system with regards to that which is most 
plausibly based on philosophical grounds. This just strikes me as 
wrong. Having said all of this, I guess I would have to answer the 
question simply by saying the best ethical system, whatever it is, 
should be the one that best allows us to feed, flee, fight, and 
reproduce. [I hope this doesn't sound really flip; it's as much a 
reflection of the
despair I've always felt canvassing (what I regard as) the various 
implausible ethical systems that abound.]

Smart (U.C. Santa Barbara): Christianity and Buddhism both speak of 
love and compassion. Those should be the guiding attitudes. 
Negatively I believe, as do the Buddhists, that we as humans have 
deficiencies we must address: greed, hatred, and delusion. An example 
of greed would be cutting down on the money for the homeless and poor.
 Hatred is seen daily expressed through issues between groups, be it 
whites against blacks, blacks against hispanics. By delusion, I think 
our vision is clouded.

Suppes (Stanford University): Well, I am sympathetic to 
utilitarianism but I am pluralistic. I think utilitarianism has 
difficulty accommodating everything. [Utilitarians] do a good job for 
social questions, association of goods, handling of what are called 
public goods, theory of the market, but not as good when it comes to 
rights. And I think it's possible to work a theory of rights in 
utilitarianism but it may very well be that ultimately we will think 
of that as a separate system.

Wollheim (U.C. Davis): I do not believe that anything systematically 
written about ethics is really admirable. I believe that what 
philosophers talk about in "ethics" is partly an invention of 
philosophers cobbled up out of certain fragmentary attitudes we have, 
which are part benign, part malign. The moral philosophers I most 
like to read are: Montaigne, John Stuart Mill, Nietzsche, F.H. 
Bradley.

Woodruff (U.C. Irvine): Well, I don't think of the question in that 
way. I think of it as, "What is right?" I'm not an ethicist and I 
can't claim to have views on that subject quite the way I do on some 
other things we've talked about. My general views about ethics go 
back to those of Wilfred Sellars, as so many of my views do. . . .


	Which Ethical System Do You Admire Most?



	Which Ethical System Do You Admire Most?




	page \* arabic

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	Chapter Four

Which Ethical System 
Do You Admire Most?


Arntzenius (University of Southern California): Utili€


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Status: RO


   (Dave, this section isn't loading for some reason... I'll wrok on 
it later and list it as SU 8 revised)

   PAUL

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Subject: SU 6
Status: RO

Û¥





Chapter Six

Does God Exist?


Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): Yes. If the question is "Do we know that 
God exists?" or "What sorts of reasons would we have to have to 
believe in God?" well then the answers get pretty complicated. But 
the question is "Does God exist?" I believe that God exists.

Arntzenius (University of Southern California): I respond that I have 
no idea how you can decide such a question; you can have your opinion 
one way or the other. My [sense] is that I'm not exactly sure what it 
means to say that God exists. I just can't say how you could argue 
for or against it.

Beckner (Pomona): Well, my view is that God does not exist. So, I 
would classify myself as an atheist. However, I cannot prove that he 
doesn't exist.

Blake (Loyola Marymount University): Yes! Yes, he does and I think 
that there are grounds for believing that which are not simply 
matters of faith. I guess I do think there are good indications in 
human nature and physical reality to indicate there is a Creator. I 
think there are good indications here in the very nature of human 
history to [suggest] that there is some kind of personal God, who is 
benevolent. Now what might I believe beyond that I would attribute 
more to faith than reason, but I do think there are rational grounds 
for thinking there is a God.

Cohon (Stanford University): I don't know. It would be nice if God 
did exist. But I don't think there are any successful proofs of God's 
existence, nor are there other sorts of objective evidence, so the 
only grounds for belief are personal religious experiences, and I 
have not had any of these.

Copp (U.C. Riverside): No, unless the context and considerations of 
politeness dictate otherwise.

Davis (Claremont Scripps College): I will respond by saying yes; I 
believe God does exist.

Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I would say that the old God is dead, what 
Heidegger calls the Ontotheological God, which means a god which is 
outside of the world and is the  ground of the world and explains 
what caused it and makes it intelligible. 

Dumont (Mt. Saint Mary's College): I believe in God but not in the 
traditional Western European male sense. I think there is a power or 
force greater than myself. I think of it in very female and earthly 
terms.

Fischer (U.C. Riverside): I do not believe that there is a god. I 
don't know if he does exist;  he might. I just don't know. You might 
want to say that I am an atheist or agnostic.

Friedman (U.C. Davis): Agnostic toward Judeo-Christian God. Favorable 
toward God as Nature as God.

Griesemer (U.C. Davis): I respond by asking what is God? And why do 
you capitalize the word (if you're not even sure God exists, aren't 
you presuming an answer by capitalizing the word as if God were a 
person)? Also, there are various things one might mean by existence 
(physical objects and concepts might both exist, but not in the same 
way), so I'm not sure which sense applies to God because I don't know 
what sort of thing God is supposed to be.

Jubien (U.C. Davis): I don't know whether God exists but, unlike 
Pascal, I would bet against it.

Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): Well, the first thing I would say is that's a 
very difficult question. There are a number of different ways to 
decide. Some people think that whether God exists should be decided 
by reason; some people think it should be decided by faith. I think 
that reasons can't prove the existence of God, and I also think that 
that's not a reason to believe.

Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Negative.

McCann (University of Southern California): What I am interested in 
knowing is why somebody wants to know or what they think hinges on 
the answer. One of the reasons I am especially interested in Kant, 
one of the reasons why I think he is an important transitional figure,
 is that by contrast with Newton and Locke and others Kant was trying 
to lay the foundations for mechanistic science in a way which would 
not require any appeal to God, to God's actions and attributes at all.
 In fact, he showed that no such claim can be rationally defended. So 
let's say for the purposes of developing a metaphysical model that is 
going to be the foundation of natural science, you should not have to 
worry about the question whether God exists or does not exist. For 
any purposes in philosophy you should not ask or wonder about the 
question at all. It should not play a role in any kind of 
philosophical debates. If you want to get a good theory of morality, 
you better get one that does not depend on there being a God or not 
bein
 a God. If it is a matter of personal belief then I would just be as 
interested to know what the person who wonders about this, what they 
are looking for, or what need they feel they have that is settled one 
way or another by an answer to that question.  I find it interesting 
that a lot of people ask the questions without context, out of the 
blue. That does not, even to me, make sense to start talking about 
unless you know why you want to know and what difference it would 
make what the answer would be.

McGray (University of San Diego): Of course God exists. The 
interesting question is what kind of being God is.

Needleman (San Francisco State): Yes.

Pippin (U.C. San Diego): In my view the answer is no. But that can be 
confused with a commitment to scientism and naturalism which I 
disagree with. The right answer is probably something like: it 
depends on what you mean by God.

Ring (C.S.U. Fullerton): I am rarely asked, but if I were I would say,
 "Don't be silly."

Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside): I believe I would say no.

Shallinsky (U.C. San Diego): No. First, there's no empirical data; 
second, hypothesizing God's existence serves no explanatory end.

Sircello (U.C. Irvine): No. Just no.

Smart (U.C. Santa Barbara): God exists, but isn't at all what people 
think. It depends on who you listen to. If you listen to preachers on 
television it would seem as if they had a telephone line connection 
with God. God isn't as crude as that.

Wollheim (U.C. Davis): No


Does God Exist?



Does God Exist?




	page \* arabic

PAGE42






Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): Yes. If the question is "Do we know that 
God exists?" or€




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Subject: SU 7
Status: RO

Û¥




Chapter Seven

What Do You Thinks Happens
To Us After Death?


Aebischer (C.S.U. Los Angeles): No one can answer the question of our 
state after death, but I would like to think we could look forward to 
being reincarnated again and again--exploring many forms of being and 
consciousness. Failing this, I take solace from the past that my body 
is practically immortal, though it will undergo a million 
transformations, in that there is a conservation of all matter and 
energy. Likewise, I think one's mind, heart and character live on in 
the results they create in others and their environment. It matters 
little whether the "ego" known as "Scott Aebischer" continues or not, 
but one would hope that one's achievement of consciousness or love is 
not lost to the wider world.

Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): Well, I don't seem to know in any detail. I 
do believe in life after death. I think we just have to believe that 
it's good.

Arntzenius (University of Southern California): Nothing.

Beckner (Pomona): Nothing. When you die, you decompose. That can be 
proved.
Blake (Loyola Marymount University): I'm not sure about that.  I mean 
on religious grounds I think there is life after death. On the basis 
of faith, I believe in life after death. An interesting question is, 
"What's the form or character of life after death?" I guess a lot of 
people think of it in terms of some sort of spiritual non-physical 
existence. I'm not sure about that. There's an ancient Christian 
scripture that [states] there will be a resurrection of the body and 
the life after death is eternal. That seems to me to make sense. 
There seems to be nothing contradictory about that possibility.

Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): I think that we disintegrate. I 
think that structures which make up our consciousness and mind and 
our moral consciousness. . . these can survive in a sense that they 
are recreated to a degree in our children, or in our friends or in 
our students. But that isn't really a survival of me, merely the 
survival of something that I stood for or some features I had. I am a 
complex matrix of molecules and when that matrix falls apart and 
disappears, I fall apart and disappear, so I am determined to do as 
much good as I can while I'm still here.

Cohon (Stanford University): The evidence shows that we decompose. I 
admit it is hard to believe that a personality can abruptly cease to 
exist, but that seems to be the case. Our influence on each other is 
all that remains of us.

Copp (U.C. Davis): To us? Our bodies decompose.

Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I think nothing happens to us after death. 
Once we are dead we stay dead. But I think that like another one of 
my favorite philosophers that I forgot to mention, Soren Kierkegaard, 
that one can achieve eternity in time. That is you can get a meaning 
in your life that gives it stability and is remembered after you. And 
that I am afraid for better or worse is the only kind of eternity we 
get.

Dumont (Mt. Saint Mary's College): I'm  really not sure. Since my 
metaphysics is not dualistic the answer is not at all clear. I hope 
that some of the good that we all do and achieve lives on after us, 
even if only as it contributes to a force or positive power in the 
universe. I am leaning more toward reincarnation, though I would not 
explain it from a dualistic perspective of the migration of souls, 
but more as the rebirth of one's spirit.

Fischer (U.C. Riverside): I think my sense is that we go out of 
existence and experience a blank and our consciousness ends.

Friedman (U.C. Davis): Either death is a blackout for us, or else we 
are "housed" in mind-fields.

Griesemer (U.C. Davis): This is a trick question.  I think we rot 
after death. I don't believe there is a non-material substance (soul) 
that will persist after bodily death, but I don't have any better 
argument for my position than the dualist does for his/hers.

Jubien (U.C. Davis): We cease to exist.

Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): Nothing. I am an atheist and I think we 
are part of the natural world. I think the same thing happens to us 
after death as happens to dogs, cats, and frogs. When the body shuts 
down, we shut down.

Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): Basically, I think that we are animals that we 
die and that's it. Our chemicals go off into the world. They're 
either burned if we are cremated, or if we are buried the chemicals 
gradually change and we decompose and that's the end of the body. 
Spiritually I'm not sure; I guess I find it hard for me to believe 
that what remains of us spiritually will be identifiable as us. I 
don't think that what remains would be any kind of consciousness that 
would be particular to us.

Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Nothing. We're dead.

McCann (University of Southern California): Basically I would respond 
to this similarly to the question about the existence of God. I would 
be interested to know why this is supposed to be a significant 
question. It often comes us in the context of morality, or the hold 
morality is supposed to have on us, but it very rarely gets beyond a 
very crude sort of schedule of rewards and punishments. It is a 
question that can have some interest in terms of the nature of 
thinking things or persons, but that is not the interest most people 
have in it.

McGray (University of San Diego): Either heaven or hell.

Needleman (San Francisco State): It depends on our life before death.


Neumann (Claremont Scripps College): Other than fertilizer--nothing. 
Let me ask you this, "Where were you before you were born?" Well, 
it's the same thing when we die.

Pippin (U.C. San Diego): Nothing.

Ring (C.S.U. Fullerton): If we're lucky, we are buried or cremated 
and remembered for some time.

Ross (Claremont Scripps College): I don't know. I haven't died yet 
and come back to tell anyone about it. You have to have "faith" to 
know what will happen. Although it will be the best sleep you ever 
had.

Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside): Oh nothing. We die. I mean, annihilation 
is the right thing to say.

Scott-Kakures (Claremont Scripps College): Nothing. We just die.

Shallinsky (U.C. San Diego): Our bones rot.

Smart (U.C. Santa Barbara): I believe God dwells inside everyone, 
that He's working in each one of us. So if God continues after death, 
then I suppose you can consider your self part of God when you die.

Wollheim (U.C. Davis): I do not think we exist after death so nothing 
good, bad, or indifferent could happen to us. Sometimes I wish that 
this were not so.





	What Do You Think Happens To Us After Death?



	What Do You Think Happens To Us After Death?




										
	page \* arabic

				
PAGE48






Aebischer (C.S.U. Los Angeles): No one can answer€




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Subject: SU 5
Status: RO

Û¥




Chapter Five

   Are Science And Religion Compatible?


Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): Certainly they are compatible.  There's a 
lot of scientists who are religious.  Science is a human activity 
which proceeds on certain principles, has certain institutions, and 
serves certain functions of human life.  It has produced a large body 
of beliefs which are widely held among our society.  There are also 
some beliefs on the frontiers of research that are more controversial.
  And religion  is  a  very  different  sort  of  set  of  practices, 
institutions, and beliefs. The religious beliefs and practices have  
obviously  quite  different  functions  from  those  of the 
scientific beliefs and practices. They have, generally speaking, 
different subject matter.  There are different motives  involved  in 
pursuing the  subject.  The  beliefs  and practices have different 
relevance in human life. I'm not sure if a onelevel answer is 
desired to that question. There are all sorts of ways in which one 
can compare religion and science.

Arntzenius (University of Southern California): The major difference 
is that scientific claims can be assessed in the light of 
mathematical deduction and experimental  evidence,  i.e.,  objective  
criteria  for  deciding if scientific claims are true or false.  
Religious claims I think by their very nature are not so sensible, 
that is what I take to be the major difference.  Their compatibility 
depends a bit again on what you mean by religion (it used to be the 
case that religion was taken literally).  I take it that the evidence 
goes against them and that they are not compatible.  After the middle 
ages, most people became convinced that the world had more objective 
grounds to believe the scientific claims than the religious claims, 
and such claims should not be taken literally.

Beckman (Harvey Mudd):  Scientists devote a great deal of time to 
observing the world around them and to constructing highly technical  
and  precise  languages   for  communicating  their observations.  I 
think they do this to a far greater degree than do theologians.  Like 
theologians, scientists propose theories which are pictures or models 
they claim to represent the real world (whatever that is).   They 
have in common the fact that these theories  are  articulate,  
coherent  systems  of  thinking  that communities of people take 
seriously and utilize in organizing and understanding their 
observations and experiences.  If there is any sense in which 
scientific theories are "better" than theological ones,  I  would  
say  it  lies  in  the  fact  that  science  has substantially more 
practical success in predicting future events and properties in the 
observable world.  I do not take this to be a devastating point to 
theology; that is, they have a perfect right to continue practicing 
their theoretical under
tanding of the world.  There is an interesting side question of 
whether separation of church and state should also require separation 
of science and state.   I won't jump into that one; but it is clear 
that we unblushingly pour huge amounts of economic support into 
science.

Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): That's a complicated question. I'm 
going to deliberately make it simple.  I think that religion has two 
sides to it.  One of them good, one of them unfortunate. The two 
sides are this: First of all, all of the world's religions attempt to 
give a cosmological theory of the origins of the universe and the 
human race's place in it and the significance we have.  Christianity 
does it.  Buddhism does it.  Islam does it. Hinduism does it. Judaism 
does it.  All of the religions do it. And I think that 2,000 years 
ago, when we were very ignorant, it was entirely permissible.  Indeed,
 I would have done this thing, to try and come up with theories that 
could explain these things.  So, in some respect religion attempts to 
function as science.   On the other hand, the second thing that 
religion does is to attempt to engage in moral questions; to find 
basic principles on which answers can be given to new moral problems. 
 And, this kind of activity I think is essential to human happiness
  I don't think that it will ever go away.  I think that it is 
unfortunate to some degree that this necessary activity has been the 
principal property of the world's religions because I think they tied 
it to false theory.

Cohon (Stanford University):  Science  aspires  to  discover  truth 
by means  of  a  thoroughly objective, empirical method that is 
repeatable and available to all, and to detect and root out erroneous 
beliefs by using such a method.  It is not the aim of science to 
console people or to make them good or to bring them happiness, 
although its discoveries are sometimes  very  useful  for  these  
purposes  (as  well  as  for frightening people, corrupting them, and 
bringing them miseryalso not the purposes of science).  Religion 
takes many different forms, of course, but all those that I know of 
also aim at some truth, at least, although their method of getting it 
is usually not empirical and often not available to everyone.  But 
most religions I know about also have further aims:  to give people 
hope, or to improve them morally, or to lead them to eternal 
salvation (happiness, I take it), or to provide inner peace.  Some 
religions are compatible with  science.    Some  are  not,  e.g., the 
 sort  of  Christ
an fundamentalism that denies that evolution occurred or sets the age 
of the earth as very young.   It is incompatible with science because 
it rejects the empirical methods of science for finding out such 
things in favor of appeals to revelation.  Not all religions make 
pronouncements about such things;  some say that God exists (and this 
is not empirically testable), and then go on to provide consolation 
and moral guidance.

Davis (Claremont Scripps College): Well I suppose that the major 
difference between science and religion. . . has to do with subject 
matter and mythology. Subject matter religion deals with questions 
like God and the after-life, and the way in which human beings ought 
to live which are not questions that are directly addressed typically 
by scientists. Scientists as human beings are of course perfectly 
free to talk about this question like any others, but they don't.  
They aren't the kind of topics that scientists deal with. A scientist 
will accept something only if it seems that the claim is empirically 
verified or verifiable.  They can conduct a crucial experiment that 
proves it or fits into a very successful theory. But a typical 
religious person is quite prepared to accept something on authority 
because the Bible or a certain clergy person said so, and that is a 
myth that would not be accepted by a scientist. Are they compatible?  
Well, yes or no. I mean it is clear there are claims made in religion 
that
is compatible to some claims made in science and vice versa.  Are 
they incompatible?  Yes I think they are.  Believing in God as I do, 
I think both scientific and religious truth are aspects of the 
overall universal truth which God is responsible for. So I think they 
do fit well together.  It's just that we don't see how they fit 
together very well.

Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley):  I think that the major difference is 
science is trying to find out the causal properties of natural kinds 
which refers to water and electrons and they do have causal 
properties and our science is getting it right, but finding out about 
the ultimate particles doesn't tell us anything about the meaning of 
life. Since religion only talks about meaning and science only talks 
causality there shouldn't be any conflict providing that science 
doesn't try to make pronouncements about ultimate reality as some 
people do who are called naturalists or reductionists and that are 
claiming more that they can do on the basis of science. 

Dumont (Mt. Saint Mary's College): Frankly I see both as relying 
heavily on faith in the unknown. Both are human 
disciplines/activities, expressing human aspirations and subject to 
human limitations/faults.  Both are institutions and belief  systems. 
I  see many problems with both as  they are practiced today. At  its 
best  science  is humble before  its limitations and honest in its 
claims. At  its best religion provides comfort, consolation, 
inspiration, and motivation without claiming to have all of the 
answers nor to order people around.  I see no reason to think that 
they should in principle conflict, since to me they are both human 
pursuits of truth. There is a lot of bad religion around  (arrogant 
and unloving)  but  the good religion that is there could do a great 
deal to support and limit  (through true humility before nature and 
our limitations and through a proper sense of responsibility for 
life) the aspirations of science.

Fischer (U.C. Riverside): That is a very complicated question. The 
main difference is in the methods.  In science, methods are used 
proportional to belief and evidence.  We remain skeptical and we are 
not going to form conclusions for which there is no strong evidence. 
In religion, there is none of the same evidence.  People accept on 
faith and not on concrete facts.   Religion involves a leap of faith, 
accepting that it can be proved.  They are and they aren't compatible;
 that depends on religion.  If religion says God created the world in 
six days, etc., then science is probably incompatible. There are 
forms of religious belief that don't make those kinds of claims.
                                     
Friedman (U.C. Davis):  Science is a traditional enemy of traditional 
religion. However, science is compatible with enlightened religion.

Griesemer (U.C. Davis):  Science by common consent of practicing 
scientists is revisable in the face of experience (observation, 
experiment, calculation). Religious beliefs typically (though not 
universally) are not.  Now the nature of the revisablity of science 
is a difficult set of problems that I can't address briefly (I don't 
subscribe to a simple "falsifiability" concept of what distinguishes 
science from religion), but whatever it is, it seems implausible to 
me that we would find practitioners of a religion using them to 
revise the tenets of their religion.   I do think science and 
religion are compatible  in  the  sense  that  we  all  live  with  
logically incompatible beliefs, so science and religioneven if they 
entail a contradiction like, evolution says humans evolved from 
primitive ancestors and religion says we were created by Godare 
compatible in a practical sense.  And this practical sense is the 
sense that goes in science, too.  A contradiction that is never 
noticed or never invoked in a
 argument can't do much damage, so it doesn't matter too much if some 
of our beliefs are logically incompatible. This fact allowed many 
famous evolutionary biologists and other scientists  to also practice 
a religion.   However,  there are certainly some sciences (e.g., 
evolutionary biology, geology) and some religions (e.g., the form of 
biblical literalism that goes by the name of creation science) that 
are incompatible in both logical and practical  senses.  One can't  
believe  and practice both together.

Jolley (U.C. San Diego):  The short answer is that the claims of 
science are empirically falsifiable, those of religion (at least on 
one interpretation) are not.  Whether religion and science  are  
compatible  depends on how religious claims are interpreted. 

Jubien (U.C. Davis):  The major difference is that they generally 
have distinct goals (e.g., theorizing about the nature of the 
physical world versus saving souls).  To this extent they are 
compatible.  Of course, some religions make claims that are in 
conflict with science (not to mention common sense).  Such claims may 
be an essential part of certain religions, but they aren't an 
essential part of religion per se.

Lambert  (U.C.  Irvine):  I  think  there  are  two  major 
differences.   In science, you can strive to be able to predict 
phenomena.  Predictions are different than prophecies.  In science, 
you also try to find corroborative explanations.  Those are 
explanations which can be corroborated by appeal to experience.  In 
short, I think these are two segments of rational activity.  There 
are characteristics of science that are simply not characteristics of 
religion.  So I think the difference is in these two activities. 
Predicting on the one hand and producing corroborated explanations on 
the other, that's scientific.   I don't think that's part of religion.
   I think that science is a kind of rational activity. Those are two 
segments that I do not think of religion as a rational activity.  
Though there is a tradition in which it would be nice if somebody 
actually produced proof that God exists.  In fact, one of my friends 
by the name of Robert Meyer, a mathematical logician, has written a 
paper entitled "God Ex
sts."  He proved the existence of God by using some of the materials 
in mathematics.  Surely, religious activity I regard as not 
irrational but other than rational, outside what we pretend to be 
rational. I don't mean every part of it.  Its goals are not those of 
science and its activities.

Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley):  Well, in religion you have a lot more scope.  
You have a lot more freedom to believe what you believe.  In science 
there is a certain amount of play, but  according to the nature of 
science, people have to agree that the evidence offered supports the 
conclusion.   It tends to be much more restricted. Scientific 
knowledge is more restricted. I think that religion and science are 
compatible, but I think that they are about different things that we 
can observe and run into, and manipulate, and build things with and 
understand.  And I think that religion is about everything else.

Matson (U.C. Berkeley):  Science is based on beliefs that have been 
tested (note:  I do not say, "are in principle testable") in 
experience.  Evolution favors believers whose tested beliefs are true.
   Religion is based on untested  beliefs  that  are  held  on  
account  of  their  social usefulness.  Evolution does not tend to 
eliminate such beliefs on the ground of factual falsity. Thus,  
science and religion are fundamentally incompatible, insofar as 
science is able to extend the scope of experience to the point of 
putting religious beliefs to experimental tests (as has happened with 
Christianity and Islam at least).

McCann (University of Southern California): The major difference is 
that science looks to empirical evidence as the touchstone of truth,  
whereas many religions see themselves as resting on faith rather than 
evidence. . . I also point that, again historically, the scientific 
claims in these disputes have been the only one vindicated.

McGray (University of San Diego):  I fail to see any real conflict.  
The questions are different.

Needleman (San Francisco State College):  Yes.

Neumann (Claremont Scripps College):  It can or can't mix; it depends.
  The problem is that religion is very mythical, most of it doesn't 
change, which in turn is completely the opposite of science. In 
reality science and religion are only man's way of finding a reason 
for existence.

Pippin (U.C. San Diego): Yes, I think they are compatible. Religion 
seems to be an expression of some sense of a deep human finitude, an 
ability to direct or orient all or our most fundamental activities on 
the basis of well grounded reasons. Since this is not itself an 
empirical claim about anything, it is not inconsistent with anything 
in science.

Roth (Claremont McKenna College): Religion operates with certain 
categories that don't enter into science.  The main one would be 
something like the category sacred.  Science can have a relation to 
that idea, but when it does it's really beyond the parameter of 
science to some extent and starts being religious.  We know people 
who study science can often have religious sensitivity that is 
increased because of what they know scientifically, but I think when 
they are expressing their religious or spiritual views that they are 
probably leading outside the realms of science.   So I think that 
would be the biggest difference, that religion has attention focused 
on things (we might use the words sacred or divine), and science does 
not. That leads to some other differences that we have to deal with. 
The ways communities are formed and the way rituals occur you could 
argue that science has its communities and rituals and practices and 
religion has its own as well. In other ways are science and religion 
compatible? 
es, I would say certainly they are. Partly for reasons I mention that 
they are not operating as competitors, but as a way of organizing and 
looking at experience as different dimensions. Some people would 
argue that the dimensions are incompatible.  I don't find that myself.
 

Schwyzer (U.C. Santa Barbara): They can be compatible. A good 
Christian can still believe in science. He can believe in Genesis as 
a myth. I don't believe that religion can swallow the evolutionist 
theory, just as I don't believe that science disproves religion. 
Religion has a different origin than science; it is not from an 
intellectual motivation. They both answer different questions. They 
have different realms of inquiry. Religion deals with the fate of 
mankind and is not straightforward curiosity as is science.

Shalinsky (U.C. San Diego): The major difference is faith, while the 
other is required to meet a stringent set of requirements.  That is, 
a scientific theory has to meet a number of criteria:  it has to 
explain empirical data, it has to accurately predict events, it has 
to be internally coherent. Religion need not meet any of these 
criteriait need not, by definition, be confirmed.  Even so, it had 
an interesting feature: any evidence,  even countervailing evidence, 
can be used in its support.  Thus one can point to the absence of God 
as proof of His existence, the presence of evil as proof of His 
existence, the presence of flowers  and bees as evidence of His 
existence, and so on. The question of the compatibility of religion 
and science depends upon some characterization of the religious 
doctrines involved:  if the religious claim is that humankind started 
with Adam and Eve, then such a claim obviously clashes with 
evolutionary theory;  if the religious claim is that humans ought to 
observe the various c
mmandments, then such a claim might clash with scientific theory.   
The question really depends  upon the  scope of  the religious 
theory:  if it makes claims about the ultimate nature of reality,  
then there may very well be conflict;  if it  simply concerns 
questions about morality, then there may not be.

Sircello (U.C. Irvine): Science and religion are compatible, but they 
don't have anything to do with one another.  In other words, they 
answer the same questions, but in a different way. Where science is a 
controlled means, religion is not.

Suppes (Stanford University):  I think that religion of course in 
many ways has helped form the setting for modern science and that 
there are forms of religious beliefs that people can have which are 
very inconsistent with good evidence.  A good example would be the 
creationist movement. Creationists are against teaching evolution as 
a scientific theory. Now I think that the creationist viewpoint is 
naive and a bad example of the interaction of religion and science.

Wollheim (U.C. Davis):  Science offers explanations.  I do not see 
how religion can, because what religion proposes goes beyond what we 
look to for making things explicable. God could not be constrained by 
our categories.

Woodruff (U.C. Irvine): I think originally religion was a substitute 
for science.  That is, as a method of control over the environment or 
as an explanation of things.  So to the extent that that is true 
there is some competition between them.  But certainly my own view of 
theology, as expressed before, is not incompatible with science.  I 
don't see any reason for them to be incompatible. I mean 
fundamentalists who believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, of course 
there will be a conflict there.  But I don't see that as a necessary 
aspect of religion.   So I think they are perfectly compatible.  They 
are just addressed to different things.  Science tries to describe 
the way the universe is, and religion tries to give us some kind of 
emotional relation to the whole. 






	What Is The Difference Between Science and Religion?



	Are Science And Religion Compatible?




	page \* arabic

PAGE37






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Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:28:12 EST
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Subject: SU 9
Status: RO

Û¥




Chapter Nine

Do You Think Artificial
Intelligence Will Equal Or
Surpass Human Intelligence?

	
Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): I think the first thing I would say is that 
I do not have a very informed opinion on artificial intelligence. I 
assume that in some respect artificial intelligence has already 
surpassed human intelligence.  My computer can do some things that I 
can't.  But do I think that someday computers will be able to do 
every task that humans can handle?  No, I don't really think that. 
But that may be as much of an expression of prejudice as anything 
else.  It's not based on a particular knowledge of what computers can 
do. That's a question really outside my area of expertise. 

Arntzenius (University of Southern California): It depends a bit on 
what you mean by intelligence.  If you mean the ability to do IQ 
tests well then I certainly think that we will be able to design 
computers that will do the tests better than we can. Why?  Well we've 
been able to program computers  to  do arithmetic better than we do; 
they certainly play chess better than I do. In practice we seem to be 
a very complicated and very efficiently designed machine. I doubt 
very much if our explicit design will be able to construct something 
that in almost all areas outperforms us.  I'm not even convinced that 
the hardest problem is to design something that has the mental 
capacity that we do. 

Beckman (Harvey Mudd): There are several different issues to be 
considered in artificial intelligence.  As you've phrased your 
question in terms of "intelligence," we are forced to ask how 
intelligence should be assessed.  If, for example, we accept the idea 
that intelligence should be measured by how rapidly something can 
perform complex mathematical tasks or store and retrieve mathematical 
information, then computers have already beaten the human mind by a 
long shot.  However, if we interpret intelligence in some more 
complex way--say, translating between human natural languages or 
making design decisions based on more than technical factors--it's 
not entirely clear whether computers will ever beat the human mind.  
If we ask the question in terms of "consciousness" rather than 
"intelligence," then I don't hold out much hope that computers will 
ever replicate human consciousness; in other words, I think that  
artificial  intelligence will  always  be  "artificial"  in 
significant ways. 

Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego):  I think that it will surpass 
human intelligence.  I think that in some dimensions it surpassed 
human intelligence twenty years ago.  However, it surpassed it in 
only a very narrow capacity--the  capacity  for  a  sheer  repetitive 
computation  like  doing  long  division,  or multiplication,  or 
addition or things like that but intelligence is a very much broader 
capacity than that.   I think it will take fifty or a hundred years 
before we understand the human brain fully.  When we understand how 
the human brain works, I think it will then be relatively 
straightforward, though it will be difficult.  It will be 
conceptually a straightforward technological matter to make an 
artificial system which can do the things that we do.   I don't think 
we will do that however.   It's too easy to make human intelligence 
already.  You only need a loving couple to do it.  So we're not going 
to put up millions of dollars to make artificial humans.  What we 
will do instead is to take arti
icial intelligence systems for some scientific purpose that we create 
some subset of the human capacities or perhaps will show some 
cognitive feature that we don't have at all.  After all there are 
many more kinds of brains possible than just the human brain.  I 
fully expect in the fairly near future for artificial intelligence to 
exceed the humans in many dimensions.  I don't know how this is all 
going to come out.  I think it's going to be a very exciting and 
interesting adventure and I'm not entirely comfortable with every 
aspect of it, but I think it will happen.

Cohon (Stanford University):  I can't predict what kinds of machines 
will be built in the future. On the one hand, I am inclined to think 
that, since the human brain is made of matter and it can think, it is 
possible to make other things out of matter that do the same things. 
On the other hand, much of what we classify as intelligent is 
socially defined and can only occur within a social context; this is 
especially true of speech. Consequently, it may be that no real 
machine intelligence is possible in the absence of some sort of 
machine community or society of machines. Anyway, while scholars are 
talking about science fiction scenarios, real researchers in machine 
intelligence are very far from understanding what human intelligence 
is, so at present it is impossible to predict whether machine 
intelligence can be made to equal it. For example, it is not 
understood how human beings recognize faces or understand speech of 
unknown persons, and psychologists are only beginning to figure out 
how people make sens
 of information that is presented to them in written form. Until we 
know what human intelligence is it is impossible to say whether 
machines will be able to duplicate it or surpass it.

Copp (U.C. Davis):  In some respects, yes; in others no, I doubt it 
will surpass human creativity. But I am only projecting up to 50 
years. Beyond that, who knows?

Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley):  I have written two books on this subject. 
There are two kinds of artificial intelligence. The first kind, which 
started in about 1960, was devoted to using computers that were 
called physical symbol systems. The computer would have in it symbols 
that represented features of the world and the programs of the 
computer would be used to make inferences and deduce conclusions from 
this representation of features. I said in 1965, and in my book in 
1972, that this kind of artificial intelligence would not work 
because of our way of being in the world is not having in our mind 
representations and features. It turns out that I think (and lots of 
other people now are beginning to think) that I was right, that it is 
failing. There was an article that had A.I. on the cover and quoted 
me and agreed with me that symbolic A.I. did not succeed. But now 
there is a new kind of A.I. using computers doing what is called 
simulated neural networks. I think that that will never produce full 
human intelli
ence, but I think that it is not philosophically wrong like the 
symbolic A.I. but I do not think that it will work because the brain 
is too complicated and we do not know how it is wired up, so we can't 
make a simulated network that is enough like it even if we could. I 
think that the fact that we have bodies and move around in a world 
and have a culture is part of the way that our neural network gets 
tuned the way it is tuned and a computer that just had a neural 
network and passively took in what is called input vectors and paired 
them with output vectors [will not] have our kind of intelligence.

Fischer (U.C. Riverside): In certain ways, such as calculations, 
computers are already equal,  if not better.   They are also 
continually progressing in mechanics.  However, I remain skeptical as 
to whether computers will ever be as insightful or as creative as the 
human mind. 

Friedman (U.C. Davis):  No, never! Because we lead from it, and so we 
will be that much smarter. I've believed in manmachine relations for 
a long time.

Griesemer (U.C. Davis):  I'm not convinced that artificial 
intelligence is intelligence, so I don't think there's yet a question 
about whether it will bypass human intelligence. I think intelligence 
is a property of certain biological entities, so whatever computers 
are capable of, it isn't intelligence (unless computers are capable 
of being certain sorts of biological entities!). It's merely by 
analogy that we call what computing machines do thinking.

Jolley (U.C. San Diego): I am not well versed in this debate, but no 
I don't think that artificial intelligence will equal or bypass human 
intelligence except in very limited spheres (such as the ability to 
perform calculations at fantastic speed). My reasons are those which 
Descartes gives in the Discourses of Method, Part V.

Jubien (U.C. Davis):  If "artificial intelligence" just refers to the 
capacities of computers, then I think it already exceeds the 
capacities of human intelligence in certain ways (e.g., speed of 
computation). I don't think computers will ever have fully "human" 
intelligence because I don't think they will ever have mental 
experiences akin to those that humans have.

Kalish (U.C. Los Angeles): There are things which computers can do 
now which human beings can't do and the speed with which you can do 
computations and things like that are incredible. Also computers can 
store an enormous amount of information in its memories and you can 
get it back. On the other hand, it is quite well known that there are 
problems which you cannot prove and that there is no algorithm which 
will ever solve them. Human ingenuity is the only way they will ever 
be solved. So these are two entities where the human mind and the 
artificial machine differ. They both have enormous qualities and it 
is not a matter of trying to say that there are two things in which 
one is a little better than the other. There are certain things that 
one can do that the other can't and we are getting better and better. 
My gosh the things that can be done now and the way you can 
communicate with people is fascinating. So let me put it this way, I 
don't think that any person of your generation who doesn't become 
comput
r competent is going to be able to compete in this life. There are 
mathematical problems that only the human mind will be able to answer 
because we can prove that there is no way we can program a machine to 
answer the question.

Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): There is the so called Turing test.  When 
you carry on a conversation and you can't tell if it's a machine or a 
person.  I don't really have a view as to whether we will be able to 
create machines that will pass the Turing test.  It's clear that 
machines can already do tasks which require a kind of intelligence, 
much better than we can.   I use a spell checker because it is a 
better speller than I am and quicker.  I don't know of any machine 
that is as creative as I am.  I am very skeptical to whether we will 
be able to do it,  unless we start to build biological machines.

Lambert (U.C. Irvine): Well, there are several things to think about 
it.  First, it's a difficult thing to say what human intelligence  is 
 and  it's  hard  to  tell  whether  artificial intelligence will 
surpass human intelligence or not.  We are not even clear what human 
intelligence is.  But if it means, for example, that machines will be 
able to do certain things better than human beings would do 
intellectual things, well they can already do things better than 
humans.   For example, machines, the new computers, put in parallels, 
can solve differential equations infinitely faster than human beings 
can do.  Now, whether you're going to call that a case of surpassing 
human intelligence, I don't know.  It certainly can do things faster. 
 There are respects in which computers just don't even come close to 
human beings.   So I'm inclined to say or view the whole question of, 
will computers ultimately surpass human beings' intelligence not to 
be a clear question.  As I've suggested, if you look at intelligence
in one way, they're not.  So it's not a well formed question for me. 


Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley):  I will give you a typical philosopher's 
answer for this. I depends in what you mean by intelligence. Already 
computers are able to do certain tasks which we take to be cognitive 
tasks much better than we can. I don't think this makes them more 
intelligent. I think that there are many kinds of human intelligence. 
There is artistic intelligence, there is mathematical intelligence, 
there is a kind of verbal ability, there is the ability to see the 
whole picture, the ability to see both sides of an issue. There are 
just so many aspects of human intelligence which are vital. I don't 
see artificially constructed machines as being able to perform all of 
the functions which we would naturally attribute to human 
intelligence. I do think that machines will be able to surpass us on 
some of these tasks, but not on intelligence per say, not on 
intelligence overall.

Matson (U.C. Berkeley):  Noat any rate not using any conceivable 
refinement of the Turing machine (digital computer). Turing machines 
necessarily follow contextfree algorithms; that is not the way we 
think.

McCann (University of Southern California): I guess it would depend 
on what factors you have in mind. In terms of calculating lots of big 
columns of numbers quickly, obviously computers can do that. Although 
of course whether they are actually computing or calculating as 
opposed to what is really happening, a bunch of electrical states 
flip-flopping inside the machine with the results being interpreted 
in certain ways. The thing that stands most in the way of getting a 
straightforward yes or no answer is just that I think we do not have 
much of a hint of what human intelligence is. I am very persuaded by 
Howard Gardener's work on multiple intelligence. He is claiming that 
the sorts of capabilities for doing certain tasks quickly, that we 
called intelligence, get measured on the standard intelligence test, 
and things like that in our culture are just a very narrow range of 
human competencies that are artificially selected out or artificially 
highlighted. In a South Pacific's Island's culture, for example, th
 ability to navigate by stars is a crucial part of intelligence, but 
it is not exactly noted by us. In fact, I think there is a big 
indeterminacy in the notion of intelligence, whether human or 
artificial. And then once you go on to say what are the comparisons 
and contrast of human intelligence and artificial intelligence the 
questions are sort of fatally infected with the multiple ambiguities 
involved in the notion of intelligence in general. There is no doubt 
that machines can do some things that we count as intelligent tasks 
better than we can, but there is no doubt that there are a lot of 
things that we can do with the results of some of these processes 
that the machines cannot and maybe would not be able to do.

McGray (University of San Diego):  The answer is "yes" and "no." 
Computers are much more adept than we are at certain kinds of 
consistency tests and certain kinds of expert systems. But some other 
sorts of questions, even some simple problems in first order 
predicate logic, cannot be decided by any machine.

Pippin (U.C. San Diego): The real question is a philosophical one: 
What is human intelligence?

Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside):  Yes, because  human intelligence is the 
result of the operations of a machine. There is no reason why better 
machines can't be made. 

Ross (Claremont Scripps College): No, because a computer needs a 
programmer to teach it what it needs to know.  A computer doesn't 
have an imagination and without an imagination the computer will be 
unable to form questions and answers itself or ways of solving 
problems.   A programmer has to do these things,  so a computer will 
always be dependent on programmers.

Roth (Claremont McKenna College): That's a really interesting 
question.   The first response I would give I think if we are 
thinking about human intelligence at it's best, my guess is that 
artificial intelligence will not be capable of surpassing or even 
equalling human intelligence, especially if we look at the subtlety 
and the kind of nuances, the imaginative potential that there is of 
human intelligence. I'm looking more on the side of creativity.  On 
the side of our  intelligence that  is  laced with feeling,  with 
aesthetic qualities, things of this kind and it seems to me to forget 
it at least as I'm sitting here now. That it would be difficult to 
imagine that we could artificially create something that would be 
equal to that kind of subtlety in terms of intelligence.  The other 
part is a little fictitious, but not entirely so.  If human beings 
fail to develop the potential of their own intelligence it's 
conceivable to me that we might create artificial intelligence that 
would be superior to ours.  We
might be more rational in some ways. So I think this is another thing,
 the human intelligence is not a fixed element; it's something that 
could become better or worse, depending on what we choose to do with 
it,  how we develop it. Sometimes we are not nearly as intelligent as 
we think we are, or as we could be, but I guess I'm impressed by when 
I look at what the human mind has been capable of doing.  That it 
seems to have a range and a scope on one hand and also a subtle 
dimension of creativity that I find it hard to define. 

Schwyzer (U.C. Santa Barbara): It's such a frightening concept. 
Intelligence by itself is not very interesting. I think that some 
human should go along with that intelligence. It makes no sense to 
just have intelligence and nothing more. It's like having weight 
without size. We can have machines, but intelligence is a human 
attribute. I suppose I am a humanist. I fail to be fascinated with 
non-human things. I do have a computer in my office;  however, it 
hasn't been used yet. It's good decoration.

Shalinsky (U.C. San Diego): It's not precisely clear what this 
question is asking. To claim that some intelligence "equals" or 
"bypasses" another is quite vague. It is certainly clear that many 
forms of artificial intelligence surpass human intelligence: the 
calculator can perform functions that humans can not, a plain old 
digital computer can perform functions that humans cannot, and a 
super computer can perform functions that humans could not even dream 
of performing. The question ought to be phrased differently: will 
artificial intelligence equal or bypass human intelligence in the 
realms in which the latter is now superior? This is an important 
question, because it applies an important distinction between the 
kinds of intelligence behavior (e.g., numbercrunching) better 
performed by a very fast computer processing in serial fashion, and 
the kinds of intelligent behavior which are best performed by 
parallel processors. Humans process in parallel, and this accounts 
for their ability to perform and unders
and in complicated contents. Currently, for example, the prospect of 
writing a computer program which will model even the simplest kinds 
of human behavior is quite dim. Consider, for example, the human 
capacity to interpret utterances: while we understand the meaning of 
"Mr. Smith watched the fireworks go up in his pajamas last July 4th," 
the computer has considerable difficulty. While we manage to 
recognize even as many as hundreds of different faces, the computer 
has considerable [trouble with face recognition]. In my view, there 
is absolutely no reason to think that parallel computers will not 
equal intelligence (even in the domains in which the latter currently 
surpasses the most advanced artificial intelligence)but this is 
just a bet, after all!
.
Sircello (U.C. Irvine): Machines will be able to do more, but will 
not be more intelligent than humans.

Suppes (Stanford University):  Already in certain respects, of course,
 computers could do things better than human beings. For example, 
computation. Other things they that can't do as well. So I think what 
will happen will be an increasing complicated comparison. Computers 
will continue to acquire capabilities they don't now have and so the 
comparison and kinds of tasks they could do, how well they do in 
comparison to, show how well humans do, will continue to change.

Wollheim (U.C. Davis):  The problem that confronts us first is how to 
introduce consciousness and meaning. I don't have any conviction that 
this can be done.

Woodruff (U.C. Irvine): I think that hardware, as well as wetware, as 
it's called, can do these things, in principle.  So artificial 
intelligence of this sort is possible.  I think to some extent it 
already exists.  But what people have in mind, I suppose, when they 
ask this question is that they imagine it being like an alien coming 
and saying these things that we just can't understand and saying, "Oh,
 he's so smart, he's smarter than we could ever. . ." and so on.   Do 
I think that sort of thing will happen?  I can imagine it happening.  
I think that for a long time, humans would understand how it happened.
 That is that one would have to create some  kind  of  
quasievolutionary mechanisms  that would  allow machines to evolve,  
so they could go beyond humans actually programming them.   Although 
even now,  computers have certain abilities that even though we 
program them to do these things, what they do is so complex (because 
it's so large scale) there is a certain sense in which we can't 
understand what
they're doing.  I think that we can understand what artificial 
intelligence is, and that it's not, in principle, different in kind 
from what humans do. If there are differences, they have to do with 
the fact that we are different kinds of machines than electronic 
computers.   We are massively parallel, and we have all these 
interconnections in the brain which people are now trying to 
understand,  stuff called neural net computing.    But  it's  not any 
kind  of  ontological difference, not different kinds of stuff or 
substance in mind and matter.  So do I think that artificial 
intelligence will equal or bypass human intelligence?  I'm not sure, 
but I certainly wouldn't be surprised.   The reason I wouldn't be 
surprised is that we create machines that are much more powerful 
physically.  I don't see any reason why we cannot create thinking 
machines that are more powerful than we are.  In fact, we've already 
done it in certain respects.   I especially don't think that human 
intelligence is something that is es
entially different from machine intelligence. Our brains thinking or 
electronics thinking are essentially the same thing. 








	Will Artificial Intelligence Equal or Surpass Human Intelligence?



	Will Artificial Intelligence Surpass Human Intelligence?




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McGray (Unive€




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Û¥




Chapter Ten

Which Five Philosophical Books
Would You Bring If You Were
Going To Be Struck On
A Desert Island?


Arntzenius (University of Southern California): I'd take J.S. Bell's 
Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, because I haven't 
read this book and Bell is the most brilliant writer in philosophical 
physics. I'd take Van Klaus' book of quantum mechanics which I 
haven't read and should (prove) to be very interesting. Then I might 
take the three volume series on parallel distributive processing, 
which describes neuro-network methods, solving certain problems and 
prime ultimatum which is discovering intelligence in a scientific 
series. Last I would probably take the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, so 
that I would learn more about eastern traditions.

Beckman (Harvey Mudd): Aristotle's Ethics, Plato's Republic, 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra, Wittgenstein's On Certainty, and Heidegger's 
Being and Time. They're all books that you can read many times and 
they are new, different every time you read them.

Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): I don't think I will take five 
philosophical books. I already know the philosophical books that I 
might regard as important. I will take something that I haven't read 
or I will take something like the Encyclopedia Britannica or 
something like that, so that I will acquire new information. I don't 
want to reread books that I already read. I think that answer is this,
 I will not take any philosophical text at all. I will take the 
biggest book on physics, astronomy, chemistry, geology, and 
mathematics that I can find.

Cohon (Stanford University): Hard question. I know I won't be able to 
stand by my list for even a day. But here's today's list: David Hume, 
A Treatise of Human Nature--there is so much in it to think about and 
puzzle over. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals--
it is inspiring, deep, also puzzling, worth reading again and again. 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice--an enormous amount in it, and maybe 
I'd finally get it all down. Plato, several dialogues--I suppose this 
is a cop-out, but I wouldn't want to be limited to just one. Plato is 
so subtle and clever. The Euthyphro would be one, and maybe the Meno 
would be another.

Copp (U.C. Davis): How long would I be stuck there? Do you mean 
forever, with no rescue? If so, I would take Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics, Rawl's Theory of Justice, Hume's Treatise, Grice's Studies of 
the Way of Words, and Hobbes' Leviathan.

Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I would take Heidegger's Being and Time 
because I think it is so complicated that though I have taught it for 
25 years and written a book on it, I still haven't gotten to the 
bottom of it. I suppose I would take the Brothers Karamozov which I 
think is the greatest novel ever written. The fact is that on a 
deserted island I wouldn't want to read philosophy. I would rather 
take a lot of good novels like Gravity's Rainbow to read over and 
over, and the Iliad, and Shakespearean plays.

Fischer (U.C. Riverside): I would hope that I could bring more than 
five, but if I had to choose I would pick: The Republic by Plato, 
Meditations by Rene Descartes, History of Western Philosophy by 
Bertrand Russell, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the 
Groundwork of Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant.

Friedman (U.C. Davis): Meditations, Descartes; Ethics, Spinoza; A 
Treatise on Human Nature, Hume; Critique of Pure Reason, Kant; Tao Te 
Ching, Lao Tzu.

Kalish (U.C. Los Angeles): The first two I would choose are A 
Treatise on Human Nature and Enquiry Into Human Understanding by 
David Hume. Second, I would choose the Autobiography of Bertrand 
Russell. Third, I would choose the Autobiography of John Stuart Mill. 
The reason I would choose this is because it is a literary 
masterpiece as well as an extraordinary book. He was probably one of 
the only major philosophers in the entire western tradition that 
really took seriously what we know today as feminism. Next I would 
choose Human Nature and Conduct by John Dewey because it influenced 
my own development.

Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): I would take things that kept me occupied. 
I would take works by  Bertrand Russell and things I really enjoy. 
Things by Carnap and probably something very mathematical and logical,
 some kind of reason work, and category theory, something like that. 
And if I was struck on a desert island I would have plenty of time to 
read many things I don't have the time for now.

Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): I would take Rousseau--writings on human 
nature and politics, Saint Augustine's Confessions, Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit, and I would take a book on ethics and 
society, science and society, but I can't decide which one it would 
be.

Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Plato's Republic; I find something new to 
argue with in it every time I read it. Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations; I would have time to puzzle out the hints. 
Nietzsche's Will to Power--an enormous treasury of insights waiting 
to be developed. Spinoza's Ethics for inspiration--the greatest 
single work of philosophy. Hobbes' controversy with Bramhall on free 
will. The most fun to read. Schopenhauer's World as Will and Idea 
would console me for being out of the rat race.

McCann (University of Southern California): I'd take, first of all, 
Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Hume's A Treatise on 
Human Nature, and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, not only because 
they are the books I am professionally concerned with and have a lot 
more to learn, but because they are the most important philosophical 
works of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rounding out, I 
would take Wittgenstein's Philosophical  Investigations and some of 
Quine's writings, including Word and Object, as these are among the 
most fruitful contemporary writings.

McGray (University of San Diego): I would probably want the works of 
Wittgenstein, Russell, Quine, and Putnam, plus some logic texts and 
stuff on artificial intelligence. Right now I am more interested in 
certain questions and areas of philosophy rather than specific 
authors.

Needleman (San Francisco State): The Dialogues of Plato, Ethics of 
Spinoza, Tao Te Ching.
Pippin (U.C. San Diego): Plato's Republic; Descartes' Meditations; 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit; 
Heidegger's Being and Time.

Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside): Well, the first thing I'd  choose is 
"Boat Building Made Simple." I would also take Hume's Human Nature, 
an article on logics-amatics and metamathematics, Quine's Word and 
Object, and Aristotle's Metaphysics.

Ross (Claremont Scripps College): First, five books is not very many 
when there are so many books to choose from. I would take a book on 
the works of Plato and Aristotle, Dostoyevsky, any book by Dewey or 
Kant or Spinoza because they are very religious and deal with 
pantheism.

Scott-Kakures (Claremont Scripps College): I don't think I'd take any 
philosophy. But, I wonder how I got into such a nightmarish state. I 
don't know. I guess you're going to force me to answer. I guess 
Aristotle's Ethics, that's one. Spinoza's Ethics, and Kant's Second 
Critique. That's all I take.

Shalinksy (U.C. San Diego): The best I can do is four: 1) The 
Critique of Pure Reason (because it's the most important worthwhile 
hard text in philosophy. 2) The Critique of Practical Reason (because 
it's the second most worthwhile hard text in philosophy); 3) 
Neurophilosophy (because I believe human behavior must be explained 
in neurobiological terms, and because I am mentioned in the prefatory 
remarks); and 4) any logic textbook (because while away, the long 
desperate hours by doing logic problems would at least be somewhat 
distracting).

Sircello (U.C. Irvine): Plato's Symposium and Spinoza's Ethics 
because they deal with my own philosophical interest.

Suppes (Stanford University): I would take the collective works of 
Aristotle; the single volume of Treatise on Human Nature by David 
Hume; the three critiques of Kant, hopefully in volume--Critique of 
Pure Reason, and Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of 
Judgement. Then I might take something of a different sort in science,
 perhaps a superb text in classical physics partly because I might 
find it very useful and a superb text in electrical engineering 
because I would like to set up my own generator.

Wollheim (U.C. Davis): Montaigne's Essays, Freud's Introductory 
Lectures, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Plato's 
Dialogues, and Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. They are 
1) long; 2) interesting and amusing to read; and 3) I haven't read 
them all.








	Which Books Would You Bring if Stuck on a Desert Island?



	Which Books Would You Bring If Stuck On A Desert Island?




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Chapter Ten

Which Five Philosophical Books
Would You Bring If You Were
Going To Be Struck On
A Desert Island?

€














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Û¥





	CALIFORNIA PHILOSOPHERS


Adams, Robert:		University of California,
				Los Angeles

Aebischer, Scott:		California State University, 				Los Angeles

Arntzenius, Frank:		University of Southern 				California

Beckman, T.:			Harvey Mudd College

Beckner, Morton:		Pomona College

Blake, David:			Loyola Marymount University

Churchland, Patricia:		University of California,
				San Diego

Churchland, Paul:		University of California, 
				San Diego

Cohon, Rachel:		Stanford University

Copp, David:			University of California, Davis

Davis, Steven:			Claremont Graduate School

Dreyfus, Hubert:		University of California, 				Berkeley

Dumont, Michele:		Mount Saint Mary's College 

Fischer, John:			University of California, 				Riverside

Friedman, Joel:		University of California, Davis

Griesmer, James:		University of California, Davis

Jolley, Nicholas:		University of California, 
				San Diego		

Jubien, Michael:		University of California, Davis

Kalish, Donald:		University of California, 
				Los Angeles

Kaplan, David:		University of California, 
				Los Angeles

Lambert, Joseph:		University of California, Irvine

Lloyd, Elisabeth:		University of California, 				Berkeley 

Matson, Wallace:		University of California, 					Berkeley

McCann, Edwin:		University of Southern 				California 

McGray, James:		University of San Diego

Needleman, Jacob:		California State University, 				San Francisco

Neumann, Harry:		Claremont Scripps College

Pippin, Robert:		University of California, 
				San Diego


Ring, Merrill:			California State University, 				Fullerton

Rosenberg, Alexander:		University of California, 				Riverside		

Ross, Ralph:			Claremont Scripps College

Roth, John:			Claremont McKenna College

Scott-Kakures, Dion:		Claremont Scripps College

Schwyzer, Hubert:		University of California, 
				Santa Barbara

Shalinsky, Allison:		University of California, 
				San Diego

Sircello, Guy:			University of California, Irvine

Smart, Ninian: 		University of California, 
				Santa Barbara

Suppes, Patrick:		Stanford University			
Wollheim, Richard:		University of California, Davis

Woodruff, Peter: 		University of California, 
				Irvine







	


	California Philosophers



	California Philosophers




	page \* roman


	page \* roman



ˆ



	CALIFORNIA PHILOSOPHERS


Adams, Robert:		University of California,
				Los Angeles

Aebischer, Scott:		Californi€





















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Status: RO

Û¥






	PREFACE


	In the Fall of 1991 students enrolled in Introduction to Philosophy 
classes at Mount San Antonio College conducted interviews with some 
of the most prominent philosophers in California. Ten questions were 
asked of each philosopher, including queries about the existence of 
God, life after death, and the interface between human and artificial 
intelligence.
            The interviews ranged from personal one on one 
conversations, to telephone interviews, to mailed written responses. 
There were originally over fifty interviews that were transcribed. 
>From these the editors selected between twenty and thirty of the most 
representative and insightful responses.  Moreover, it was not 
required that each question be answered; thus, some philosophers 
chose to respond to only a few of the posed questions.
            The overall result is a fascinating study of the rarefied 
world of professional philosophy which  provides a glimpse into how 
philosophers deal with questions that have held a perennial interest 
to humankind, regardless of time and place. What is perhaps most 
revealing in this study is how often philosophers from different 
research backgrounds agree, especially when dealing with questions 
concerning the existence of a Supreme Being or the possibility of 
life after death. Although the philosophers represented in this book 
reflect a wide variety of interests (a significant number, for 
instance, were chairpersons of their respective departments), it 
should be noted that this selection is a small one and not 
necessarily indicative of the majority of professional philosophers 
in California.
             
                 



	Introduction



	Preface




	page \* romanix

PAGEix	








	PREFACE


	In the Fall of 1991 students enrolled in Introduction to Philosophy 
classes at Mount San Antonio Colleg€


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Subject: chapter 1 (?)
Status: RO

Û¥



It is often recounted that the first meeting of the two famous Sufi 
saints, Malauna Rum and Shams-i Tabriz, was anything but ordinary. 
The most popular version of this story recounts that the former, an 
intense devotee of the Lord, had earnestly prayed: "Please give me 
some dear friend of Thine to be my companion, with whom I may share 
the agonies of diving separation and the joys of meeting." God then 
sent him off to Kuniya where he soon came upon a renowned scholar and 
philosopher, sitting beside a pool of water. Seeing that this 
gentlemen was perusing some lengthy manuscripts, Tabriz enquired: 
"You appear to be busy. May I ask what is so seriously engaging your 
attention?" Malauna responded: "These are priceless works and in them 
are some deep and divine mysteries, insoluble to many of the best 
scholars. I am now in the process of solving them....of course, these 
works are far beyond your comprehension, for only a highly trained 
intellect could ever hope to understand them." A smile lit upon Shams-
i Tabr
z's face, and he immediately jumped forward, grabbed the books and 
threw them in the water. True knowledge, he told Malauna, "does not 
reside in books." The shocked scholar, not believing what had just 
occurred, sadly replied: "Oh dervish, you don't know what you have 
just done. You do not understand what a loss the world has suffered 
from your actions. There were rare treasures in these works, and now 
they are lost forever." Shams-i smiled again, and then, putting his 
hand in the water, retrieved the manuscripts and returned them to 
Malauna in their original condition. He then remarked: "Don't break 
your heart over such children's toys." Not surprisingly, this was a 
tremendously cathartic experience for Malauna, and he soon discarded 
all his books and went on to become both a most devoted disciple and 
celebrated sufi mystic.

This story, obviously, is of questionable credibility (as are many of 
the putatively miraculous events with hagiographical literature tries 
to associate with the object of their idolatry). This need not overly 
concern us, however, for whether or not this narration accurately 
portrays the initial meeting of these two saints, it does 
nevertheless correctly communicate a very important message about the 
difficulty encountered when one attempts to study or describe a 
mystical religion. That is, the study of such is always, by way of 
very definition, explicitly reductionistic.

Stated simply, such a dimunition is endemic to each and every 
methodology--whether it be primitivization (Freudian, for e.g.) 
theory, functionalism, hermeneutical enquiry, structuralism, or 
developmental appraisal--which the investigator currently has at his 
or her disposal (with the exception of actually adopting a meditative 
discipline and experiencing the mystic state for one's self). Any 
attempt at analysis of the sacred through the mundane is simply bound 
to fail in some respect. And while the possibility of a sociology of 
empathetic-participation (or internal gnosis) is a provocative 
suggestion, it cannot satisfy my stated purpose, namely: to complete 
a thesis which pretends to illuminate one or more aspects of the 
explicitly mystical religion of the Radhasoami satsang. First, such a 
methodology, which I would argue is actually the only proper avenue 
for understanding those movements which continually remind us of the 
meaninglessness of conceptual knowledge, is clearly quite beyond the 
capabilities of
this author (who is currently so far away from the attainment of 
internal gnosis that it seems all but impossible). And even if one 
more disciplined and qualified than myself were to succeed in such an 
endeavor and gain true knowledge for himself, we can confidently 
presume that he would, as all those before him, remind us that this 
enlightenment was beyond all expression. Finally, in a worse case 
scenario--one in which this radical methodology was combined with the 
more conventional approaches those findings which might have been 
articulated prior to internal gnosis would probably be irretrievably 
lost (unless, of course, the scholar under whose tutelage one 
initiated the investigation had, as Shams-i, the ability to re-create 
destroyed manuscripts!). This would, of course, be immensely 
satisfying at a personal level, but even the more liberal academics 
at this institution tend to desire something a little more palpable 
prior to the awarding of degrees.

All students (in this world of "publish or perish") of mystic 
religion, then, have constructed for themselves a pathological 
paradox: they have chosen to investigate that which, when fully 
understood, precludes all recapitulation. We can, obviously, escape 
the dilemma by studying the secular side of these movements 
exclusively; analyzing, if you will, only the dimension of "religion,
" and arbitrarily excluding the "mystic" aspect. But while this may 
be enlightening in its own ways, it fails in a fundamental regard, 
since both sides of the expression must clearly be posited 
simultaneously if we are to correctly understand the tradition as an 
organic whole. Moreover, when we choose to investigate truly other-
worldly individuals, the sants become prime instances, such an 
approach is of negligible utility, for we quickly discover that they 
generally disregard the secular in favor of an exclusive emphasis 
upon the sacred.

We must begin our study, then, cautiously, noting that we can never 
hope to successfully enunciate that which for us remains wholly other.
 Ironically, however, those mystics whom we will analyze are 
confronted by precisely the same dilemma. It is here we find the 
opening through which we can try to peek into these spiritual 
communities, for though we may never be able to adequately describe 
the sacred, neither can even the "greatest" among our vast heritage 
of religious prophets. Indeed, we might even go so far as to 
postulate that the degree to which a saint is able to express his 
experience is inversely proportional to the ultimacy of his 
enlightenment. The fact remains, however, that most mystics do try to 
convey in various ways their intuitions or apprehensions. We may not 
fully comprehend the ground of this communication but we can 
successfully investigate and appraise the description itself, as long 
as we keep this caveat--that what we are studying is at best an 
imperfect and limited view of the ineff
ble--constantly at the fore of our minds.

The question which arises in this atmosphere is How to best examine 
this communication? Van Baaren reminds us that the systematic science 
of religion, 

is distinguished from other systematic disciplines...by its lack of 
normative character. It only studies religions as they are 
empirically and disclaims any statements concerning the value and 
truth of the phenomena studied...[the inevitable convictions of the 
scholar] are irrelevant for scientific work and [he] must rule them 
out as much as possible in his research...As the truth of religion 
cannot be scientifically demonstrated, science of religion refrains 
from any judgement.

Our self-appointed task will be, then, pseudo-phenomenological; we 
will try to simply reproduce the teachings enunciated within the 
Radhasoami movement as precisely as possible, all the while excluding,
 to the extent that we are able, our own socio-cultural prejudices. 
To facilitate this, we shall attempt to comprehend religion and 
religious activities as meaningful to the individuals involved int eh 
spiritual community. Furthermore, in order to prevent what would be 
an incorrectly exclusive correlation of the term "individuals" with 
the disciples within this movement, we shall also engage in a 
hermeneutical analysis (as far as is cognizable) of the mystics' 
attempted communication of trans-mundane "truth." We concern 
ourselves, then, primarily with the interpretation of subjective 
meaning, or in the parlance of the phenomenologists among us, the 
"intentionality" of religion.

As a corollary, we will strenuously attempt to avoid compromising our 
ability to reveal this meaning by rejecting at the outset the always-
seductive tendency to evaluate the group according to any of the 
critical dimensions which we no doubt possess a priori: thus, our 
methodology admittedly has very few "teeth," indeed we will actually 
endeavor to remove most of them. We will, in other words, engage a 
Weberian or verstehen approach to the scientific study of religion. 
Like Weber, however, we will combat the potential radicalization and 
subjectivism of our methodology by supplementing this with yet 
another distinct approach, namely: causal inquiry or explanation.

Among those influences which we can identify, probably the most 
important and yet misinterpreted is the history of the Radhasoami 
movement. My goal in this essay, then, first and foremost, is to 
produce a comprehensive though concise description of the formative 
(i.e., early) history of this group. Above all else, I am concerned 
with the synthesis and introduction of the facts pertaining to these 
significant years, particularly those which pertain to the various 
succession crises, for only if we begin to understand this aspect can 
we ever hope that Radhasoami studies will evolve from its present 
stage of stagnant infancy and claim its rightful position as an 
immensely productive field of scholarly research into the sociology, 
psychology, philosophy, etc. of religion.

I begin my work, therefore with a short articulation of the sant 
tradition, clearly the major anterior influence upon the Radhasoami 
movement. Here we find the earliest manifestation of the three 
distinguishing characteristics of the Radhasoami faith, the exclusive 
emphases upon shabd, satguru and bhakti. Moreover, it is in this 
section that we first encounter what will become a recurring dualism, 
namely: the internal and external aspects of each of these foci. We 
trace our examination from the formative stages of this movement 
through to the times of Tulsi Sahib, according to all current 
evidence the last sant prior to the real object of our study, Shiv 
Dayal, the founder of the Radhasoami satsang. We then provide what 
little information is available about the life of the latter, 
emphasizing what we know of his direct and indirect relations with 
the sants. After this, I will provide a summary of the major tenets 
of the Radhasoami faith as articulated by Shiv Dayal, and though this 
section is severely limit
d due to necessary brevity, I will again briefly allude to the 
soteriological dualism so characteristic of the sants.

I commence chapter three by introducing a heuristic concept of 
paradox and demonstrating that much of Shiv Dayal's teachings can 
only be appreciated through a proper understanding of this notion.  
>From here we will delineate some theoretical hypothesis about the 
structure and content of religious paradox, asserting that it is not 
only necessary but also immensely beneficial in various respects. In 
many ways, Radhasoami paradox is best understood as an expression of 
the sant dualism remarked upon earlier. Appreciation of the assets of 
paradox, however, should not prevent one from remarking about the 
tensions associated with it. Let's be frank: no one likes to accept 
that he is being given apparently contradictory instructions, even if 
he does understand why this is necessary. Moreover, we will even 
briefly suggest that paradox is successful to the extent that it does 
exert constant pressure upon the disciple by pulling him or her in 
opposing directions. This is probably very hard to live with, and 
thus there
is a constant tendency to try to solve the inherent contradictions of 
the teachings. We will argue that during the times of Shiv Dayal, 
though, these tensions were both rooted in and alleviated by the 
central and most fundamental paradox within Radhasoami: the guru.

After the death of this remarkable mystic-prophet, however, there 
manifested simultaneously a need to eliminate the tensions of paradox 
and an understandable desire to routinize succession to the guruship. 
We will describe two fundamental approaches to the latter question, 
and associate each with one of the two major sub-lineages which 
developed after Shiv Dayal. Both of these factions, we will argue, 
attempted to resolve the paradoxes we will posit, and it is when we 
examine this that we come upon the primary thesis I am trying to 
advance. We can and, I believe will demonstrate that each group 
resolved the tensions of doctrinal contradiction in a manner which 
they explicitly (though not necessarily intentionally) derived from 
the way they resolved the problem of succession. We indicate this by 
examining first the history of each sub-lineage, then enunciating 
(both concretely and abstractly) the method which they used to 
identify and legitimize successorship, and finally by noting the 
effects of such upon t
e evolution of doctrine.

Finally, in an effort to standardize this work by giving my 
introduction, as is so popular these days, the tone of an apologia, I 
conclude by telling the reader that my opinions and interpretations, 
like my errors, are my own, and though I have tried throughout to 
provide an empathetic articulation these need not and should not be 
taken as necessarily accurate expositions of the teachings I am 
trying to reveal.








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Û¥


The "path of the saints," commonly referred to as sant mat or nirguna 
bhakti, represents perhaps both the most important and least 
understood religious development within india during the last 
Christian millennium. Though Ramanand and Jnanesvar are often 
considered the founders of this school of thought, its original 
articulation, systematization and widespread expansion are properly 
traced to the influence of Kabir in the north and Namdev in the south.
 Their fertile legacy, the sant tradition which was to inspire an 
unprecedented emergence of sublime mystic-poets (among them: Guru 
Nanak, the founder of Sikhism; Raidas; Paltu; and Dadu), represents 
from a diachronic perspective,

a spiritual lineage without being parampara in the conventional sense 
of the term. From a synchronical point of view, they form kinds of 
loose confraternities made of intensely pious and other-worldly 
laymen and women, belonging mostly though not exclusively, to the 
lower strata of Indian society.

It can thus be stated that sant mat does not constitute a religion in 
the traditional sense of the word, indeed it cannot even be properly 
described as a distinct, precise or homogenous philosophical school; 
rather, the term accurately denotes a diverse spiritual "movement" of 
sorts, one which manifested a common religious "attitude" by adhering 
to generally similar metaphysical and soteriological notions. As the 
tradition evolved, this spiritual milieu became more structured and 
elaborate, conveying a cultural identity upon its adherents by 
communicating a latent disciplinary matrix, representing a broad 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and moral injunctions.

By virtue of these similar religious, theological, soteriological and 
social orientations, however, this tradition also manifested a quasi-
communal identity which was maintained by,

some principles of cohesion fundamental to many aspects of Indian 
cultural reality. Underlying their perception was the common South 
Asian world view which sees the varied orders of the created universe 
as forming a continuous, substantial whole. Within this substantial 
universe were distinguished two basic principles of cohesion. The 
first depended on a concept of the organic relationship between guru 
and disciples, which generated self-perpetuating lineages; the second 
derived from a sense that "true" sants of any lineage formed a 
vaguely related spiritual clan....

The sant philosophy (for want of an appropriate neologism) which 
these mystics share appears, upon cursory glance, to be fundamentally 
syncretic, at its core apparently consisting in the nexus of a subtle 
wedding of virtually every dominant Indic religious tradition of the 
time. Among the components of this synthesis, movements of dissent--
particularly Sufism, Vaishnava bhakti, and (after Kabir) the yoga of 
the Nath cult--against the external and conventional religious 
sensibilities of the time seem to have had the most significant 
influence. In the works of virtually all of the sants, therefore, we 
find attacks (often fierce) and explicit denunciations of idolatry, 
caste-distinction, ritualism, etc. And yet their teachings, though at 
times they resemble on the surface any number of these more prominent 
traditions (they have been, for e.g., recurringly categorized as 
reformist vaishnavites), when viewed as an organic whole cannot be 
properly classified among any of them.  These mystic-poets remain 
first and
foremost neither social reformers nor even religious prophets, but 
rather true bhakts constantly absorbed in a relationship of love with 
the transcendent divine they apprehend as immanent to their very 
being.

Admittedly, much of the confusion arises from their repeatedly 
endowing vaishnava names to the Supreme Being, but the fulcrum of 
their attention is neither worship of the lord Vishnu nor any of his 
avatars (incarnations; Krishna and Rama, for e.g.). Similarly, the 
authority of Puranic lore is denied and their strict monotheism 
explicitly repudiates the Hindu pantheon. Instead, sant bhakti is 
characteristically an individualized extension of saguna bhakti which 
is most often distinguished by the orientation towards the 
essentially nirguna (formless and impersonal) Supreme Being which 
they intuit within the interior recesses of their own hearts. Though 
this theological bent has seduced many to classify the sants as 
Vedantic advaitists (lit., "non-dualists"), with whom they at times 
do have much in common, they unanimously defy such 
compartmentalization. Their descriptions of the Supreme Being were 
neither limited to realms of saguna or the nirguna, nor to theism or 
monism, nor to any other aspects, which they
consider simply arbitrary and man-made limitations given to the 
ultimate. The divine as apprehended by these mystics defies all 
logical or rational conceptionalization and accordingly, despite 
their very own articulations, remains for the unenlightened ganz 
andere and wholly ineffable.

Generally members of the lower castes, these uneducated and other-
wordly saints sought not only to communicate this experience of the 
sacred (inevitably in the vernacular) but also to make such an 
internal gnosis readily accessible to all those who truly yearned for 
true and ultimate moksa (salvation). It should not be inferred from 
this that sant bhakti, as is the case of more conventional bhakti 
movements, was portrayed by these mystics as an easy path or one 
which could be followed by the masses. Although bhakti was primarily 
conceived of as a path of bliss, it has been simultaneously described 
as an arduous and difficult journey, full of suffering from the pain 
of separation from the beloved. The bhakti of the sants is further 
characterized by the fact that it only finds proper expression in two 
forms: to the satguru (representing both the ultimate Reality 
apprehended in one's self and the human guru) and through meditation 
upon his name (lit., "name") or shabd (lit., "word").

Ram or Nam on the one hand and the Satguru on the other constitute 
for the human jiva the only two possible modes of apprehending the 
Divine--and ultimately of merging into It. Both have an exterior 
(voiced or visible) aspect as well as an interior (unvoiced or 
invisible) aspect; but the first is clearly subservient to the second 
and it is only the inner sadhana, the interior religion which leads 
the soul to the mystical experience known as paraca: through paraca, 
the jiva is reabsorbed into the oneness of Ram 'as water merges into 
water': suh is the mysterious state of 'Sahaja', which can only be 
accomplished within.

Having noted such, we can now safely assert that sant mat, though it 
owed much to some of the more traditional religious movements which 
surrounded it during its infancy, is clearly distinguished precisely 
by virtue of the uniqueness of the emphasis given to these two 
exclusive foci for bhakti.

There is no doubt that the sant tradition generally, particularly as 
manifested in the teachings of Nanak, was instrumental in the way 
Shiv Dayal Singh articulated what came to be known as the Radhasoami 
faith. Without diminishing the importance of these earlier mystics, 
however, we can clearly posit that the primary vehicle for conveying 
the sant heritage to the latter was the 19th century guru, Tulsi 
Sahib of Hathras. Being both the latest saint (prior to Shiv Dayal), 
a contemporary for roughly twenty years and a close associate, there 
can be no doubt that if we are to look for direct influences 
exclusive of mystic revelation, then it is to him that we must turn. 


Despite his diachronic proximity to us, though, it is also in Tulsi, 
ironically, that we encounter a recurring dilemma in the study of the 
sant tradition. Though he was, no doubt, and remains an important--
albeit controversial--personage in the annals of Indian spiritual 
history the biographical information which is available to the 
interested scholar is extremely vague, most of it coming from the 
putatively autobiographical portions of his writings; these are at 
best contradictory and certainly of questionable credibility. 
Proceeding with this obstacle in mind, we can cautiously recount that 
Tulsi is reputed to have come from the royal lineage of Peshwas in 
Poona. He was born sometime in the latter half of the 1700s, but 
early in life decided to renounce the world and fled from the 
Peshwa's court in approximately 1804. After travelling extensively, 
particularly in the south, he settled in Hathras and came to be known 
as Dakhani Baba ("sage from the south").

Though he never acknowledged the identity of his guru (if he indeed 
adopted one) in his writings, two distinct possibilities have been 
enunciated. Kirpal Singh, relying upon a volatile contention that the 
last of the Sikh Gurus, Gobind Singh, did not die in 1708 (as 
conventional wisdom would have us believe), argues that Tulsi's 
ministry was simply an extension of the true Sikh parampara:

During his extensive travels, he [Guru Gobind Singh's] met and lived 
with the ruling family of the Peshwas and initiated some of its 
members into the inner science. It is said that one Ratnagar Rao of 
the Peshwa family was initiated and authorized to carry on the work 
by Guru Gobind Singh. Sham Rao Peshwa, the elder brother of Baji Rao, 
the then ruling chief who must have contact Ratnagar Rao, showed a 
remarkable aptitude for the spiritual path and made rapid headway. In 
course of time, this young scion of the royal family settled in 
Hathras, and came to be known as Tulsi Sahib.

Again Prasad Mathur responds, with some justification perhaps, that 
the presupposition underlying this assertion is both unsubstantiated 
and of dubious veracity:

...this statement is not historically true. Guru Gobind Singh died in 
1708. The same year Sahu, son of Shivaji, became king of Maharashtra 
and appointed Valaji Vishwanath as the first Peshwa in 1713. Baji Rao 
became Peshwa in 1720 and he was the eldest son of his father (Balaji 
Vishwanath).

Pandit Pandurang Sharma, a Marathi scholar, contended in the June 31 
issue of Vividh Gyan Vistar that Tulsi "was initiated by a guru in 
the town of Hathras, and under the instructions of his guru he did 
intense meditation." No evidence in support of this supposition is 
currently available, however, nor has this reputed guru ever been 
identified. Indeed, the members of the Tulsi panth (also known as the 
Sahib panth) which continue to oversee Tulsi's samadh and relics deny 
that he even recognized anyone as his spiritual master. Finally, one 
should not overlook a distinctly possible scenario in which Tulsi, if 
he was indeed initiated, receives updesh (initiation instructions) 
from an as of yet unidentified guru in the south of India.

Tulsi's ministry, narrated in his Ghat Ramayan, Ratan Sagar, 
Shabdavali and the uncompleted Padma Sagar, represented a broad and 
highly developed systematization of the philosophy of the earlier 
sants. He is said to have been the first mystic to employ the term 
sant mat as a description for the teachings of the movement. In his 
writings (many of which recount lively encounters with scholars and 
priests) we can delineate an extremely comprehensive and developed 
cosmology, the standard rejection of ritual observances, etc. Of 
particular importance for our purposes, however, is his precise 
identification of the shabd as a melodious current or manifestation 
of the divine, and his continuing emphasis on the interiority of both 
religious devotion and experience. He reminds us, for instance, in 
the Shabdavali:

Who have seen within, the splendor of the celestial region with their 
inner eye, they alone can show the beginning of the beginning.

Who have found the secrets of the supreme state, only they give us 
hints of that state.

Who have merged their souls in Shabd have realized the truth of what 
Master hath said.

Who have permitted the current of spiritual regions above, they know 
the state of the Inaccessible.

Varied aspects of the mystery and the secret of the Unspoken Word are 
unravelled by them.

Who have brought faith and have learned this truth, they alone can 
look for the Lord.

Tulsi attracted a significant following, among whom Surswami, 
Girdhara Das, Gharib Das and (according to some) Shiv Dayal were the 
most prominent. The association between Tulsi and the latter shall be 
dealt with in more detail later in this work, but as we shall 
repeatedly see the perspectives of this relationship enunciated are 
often quite contradictory, primarily as a result of the differing 
doctrinal presuppositions underlying each. By way of conclusion to 
this section, then as introduction to the next, I will reproduce the 
little (though enlightening) credible information which is available 
to us regarding the relationship of these two sants.

1.  The manuscript accounts of Baba Surain Singh, the Jeevan Charitra 
Soamiji Maharaj by Seth Partap Singh, and other accounts mention that 
Shiv Dayal's parents were devotees of Tulsi Sahib.
2.  Tulsi Sahib named the sons of Dilwali Singh; respectively, Shiv 
Dayal, Bindraban, and Partap.
3.  Shiv Dayal held great respect for Tulsi Sahib, often recounting 
stories connected with his life and work. Also, he had a close 
association with many of Tulsi Sahib's devotees, including Girdhari 
Lal, whom he supported during his last years.
4.  Shiv Dayal Singh, after the passing of Tulsi Sahib, would visit 
Hathras to honor the memory of the saint.
5.  Gharib Das, one of the earliest disciples of Tuylsi Sahib, stated 
that Tulsi Sahib passed on his spiritual mantleship to Shiv Dayal 
Singh (then known as Munshi Ji) before his death in 1843.
6.  The writings of Tulsi Sahib were held with great veneration. Shiv 
Dayal also referred to him as "Sat Sahib" ('True Lord'), as did 
Dayal's disciples.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SHIV DAYAL SINGH

Prior to any examination for the life of the progenitor of the 
Radhasoami satsang, Shiv Dayal Singh, known to his followers as 
Radhasoamiji or simply Soamiji Maharaj, we must issue a caveat which 
the reader should keep in mind throughout this entire essay: despite 
his influential position, given the subsequent growth and expansion 
of his sampradaya throughout both India and a number of foreign 
countries, Soamiji's biography and the nature of his teachings to 
this day remain shrouded in the cloak of historical controversy and 
mystery. Western scholarly attention did not focus upon him or the 
Radhasoami faith until decades after his death and the initial 
schisms which ensued, and those early reports which were eventually 
produced were so strongly influenced by the Christian missionary zeal 
of their authors that they are of very limited utility to the modern 
researcher. In addition to this, Soamiji provided no written 
narrative of his life, and thus academics studying this tradition are 
compelled to rely upon 
he brief biographical accounts published in sectarian literature, as 
well as the larger Jeevan Charitra Soami Maharaj, authored by his 
younger brother and devoted disciple, Seth Pratap Singh. This absence 
of reliable third-party accounts is certainly an obstacle, but 
nevertheless, it should not be overemphasized, for despite the rather 
limited scope of the available sources general unaninimity regarding 
the major dates and many of the events of his life does exist, a rare 
and fortunate occurrence within the Indian sant tradition.

Soamiji was born on August 25, 1818 at Panni Gali, three miles from 
the heart of Agra. Little information regarding his family lineage is 
available, abut it is known that both of his parents, Seth Diwali 
Singh and Maha Maya, as well as most of his extended family were well-
versed in the sant mat tradition. His father, and perhaps certain 
other relations, were originally members of the Nanak panth; and as a 
result, Nanak's writings (the Jap Ji, for e.g.) were recited by the 
family on a regular basis and clearly played a significant formative 
role in his early spiritual development. The other major mystical 
influence within his family was the aforementioned Tulsi Sahib of 
Hathras, the primary satguru in the shabd yoga tradition of the time. 
Both Diwali Singh and Maha Maya were initiates of this sant, as were 
numerous other members of the family. This association remained very 
close throughout Tulsi Sahib's life, as it is recorded that Soamiji's 
family often visited Hathras, and likewise would be visited in Ag
a by their satguru. Indeed, it is suggested by some that being 
particularly pleased with the devotion of the family during one of 
these latter occasions he foretold the coming of Shiv Dayal, as well 
as his divine status, as Puri narrates:

Seth Dilwali Singh's mother [Soamiji's grandmother] replied, "I have 
everything through your grace and need nothing. But," pointing to her 
daughter-in-law, she submitted, "Mahamaya wants something." Mahamaya, 
the wife of Seth Dilwali Singh, had no son. Tulsi Sahib, in the same 
vein of compassion and kindness said, "Yes, she will have a son. But 
do not look upon the child as a mere human being." [i.e. he will be a 
perfect Saint].

At the age of five Shiv Dayal began his formal education, and 
attained the proficiency in Hindi, Urdu, Gurmukhi, Persian, Arabic 
and Sanskrit. His apparently remarkable scholastic success 
notwithstanding, his religious tendencies, coupled perhaps with the 
mystical atmosphere which had permeated his infancy asserted 
themselves when he was only six years old; at this young age he began 
to perform daily meditation (abhyas) while continuing with his 
studies. Evidently, the observation of his predisposition toward 
spiritual activity (parmarth), coupled with Tulsi's augury, impacted 
the family's perception and treatment of the youth: even this early 
in life he seems to have been accorded the reverence and "prestige" 
usually reserved for one's satguru alone. Not only did he receive 
respectful treatment, but Pratap Singhji recollects that,

Even during his school days, Soamiji Maharaj used to impart religious 
instructions of the highest order to His parents and the members of 
His family, acquaintances and ascetics who came to Him.

Though this inclination towards spiritual practices continued to 
assert itself, Soamiji's early life followed, for the most part, the 
traditional grihashtri (householder) pattern, though it seems that 
his worldly actions were often performed only in deference to his 
parents' wishes. He was, for instance, married at an early age to 
Narayan Dei of Fairdabad--later known as Radhaji Maharaj when she 
began to play a role in his public satsang--at the request of his 
father. The emphasis on dutiful performance of swarth (wordly work) 
and parmarth, which came to figure prominently in his later 
discourses and teachings, can thus clearly find precedent and perhaps 
a degree of inspiration in his own early childhood experiences.

Upon the completion of his formal education, Soamiji began to work 
for a governmental officer in Banda as a Persian translator. Feeling, 
however, that the duties of this position were too onerous to permit 
sufficient devotional exercises (sadhana) he left the post and began 
to serve as a Persian tutor with the raja of Ballabhgarh for a few 
hours daily. He served in this capacity for a time, but upon his 
father's illness and eventual death Soamiji returned to Panni Gali 
where he was to spend the rest of his life.

Very little is known about the next phase of his life, except that he 
disapproved of the family's money-lending business and put an end to 
it. Having done so, it seems that Soamiji began to devote himself 
fully to intense spiritual activity, sitting in continual meditation 
for lengthy periods, as well as giving private discourses and 
initiations to a small group of disciples. This persisted for 
approximately fifteen years until 1861, when the foundations for what 
came to be known as the Radhasoami Satsang were established, as 
described by Pratap Singh:

For more than a year, some satsangis and satsangins had been praying 
to His august graciousness for the establishment of general satsang. 
Soamiji Maharaj accepted their prayer. He was pleased to start 
discourses on Sant Mat to Parmathis at his own residence on Basant 
Panchmi day, Friday, the 15th of February, 1861 A.D.

As a result of the regular public discourses and initiations which 
ensued, his following expanded rapidly: prior to his death on June 15,
 1878 he is said to have initiated between eight and ten thousand 
individuals. In addition to this, he authored a number of devotional 
hymns in Urdu which were compiled after his death in Sar Bachan 
Radhasoami Chand-Band, and notes from his discourses were later 
arranged in Sar Bachan Radhasoami Bartik. Both of these works, 
covering all the essentials of the faith, served continue to function 
as elementary texts for virtually every subsequent disciple in the 
Radhasoami tradition.

THE TEACHINGS OF SHIV DAYAL SINGH

As all the other mystics who preceded him in the sant tradition, 
Soamiji Maharaj's spiritual ministry and teachings were premised upon 
a precise and developed notion of cosmogeny, as well as the 
theological and soteriological concepts which were abstracted from it.
 The foundation for all his doctrinal elaborations was, of course, 
his perception of Supreme Reality in its ultimate state. This 
formless Lord, totally beyond comprehension or description, is said 
to exist absorbed within itself (unmun) in a state of sunn samadhi 
(intense rapture or bliss). Unfathomable, infinite, eternal, and 
nameless (anami), this radically prior consciousness is described by 
Shiv Dayal as simply "a wonder, a wonder, a wonder." At some point in 
his ministry, Soamiji adopted the appellation "Radhasoami" 
(radhasvami) for this Supreme Being.

Wonder, writes Soamiji, "then took on a form," whereupon he outlines 
an elaborate and comprehensive cosmology. The divine Being initially 
manifest as a creative urge, a form which he calls mauj. From this, a 
current descended and created a hierarchy of spiritual levels, 
corresponding to various planes of consciousness. The 
cosmological/ontological schema he then outlines is first subdivided 
into a number of realms or deshes: sat desh, brahmand, and, and pind. 
These deshes--with the notable exception of pind--are then further 
subdivided into eight smaller regions, called pads or loks. Beginning 
from the top, they are: Radhasoami dham (corresponding to the 
absolute, formless and ultimate state of sunn samadhi outlined above);
 alakh lok; agam lok; sat lok; bhanwar gupha; daswan dwar (sometimes 
further departmentalized into sun and maha sunn); trikuti; and, 
sahans-dal-kanwal. The other desh, pind, corresponds to both the 
cosmological and physiological; it signifies the entire cosmos in 
which we currently exist,
as well as our physical body, the associated cakras (or ganglia) and 
the levels of consciousness we experience when our attention operates 
from each of these centers (waking or dreaming consciousness, for e.g.
).

The process of creation itself can be separated into two distinct 
phases. The first consisted in the Lord directly manifesting himself, 
in varying degrees of intensity, to effect the divisions of agam, 
alakh, and sat lok. At this point, however, he projected himself into 
two forms: the shabd and the surats. The latter, loosely translated 
as either individuated consciousness or souls, are thus considered to 
be a part (ansh) of the Supreme Being. This is the fundamental foal 
of Soamiji's mat, to reveal to the surat that, in its actual and true 
nature, it is undifferentiated from the Lord. The basic problematic 
for Radhasoami, then, is identity. Soamiji reminds us of this on 
numerous occasions:

[the malady] is ignorance, for the individual does not know who he is,
 whose essence he is and where is that Source...The disease of 
ignorance cannot be got rid of by dogmatic belief...but it will be 
cured by taking shelter of Sat Guru of the time. He will give the 
necessary vision; then the Jiva will know itself and its master.

Listen thou, from me, O soul, to the secret of thine own being. Thou 
wert ever one with me.

The surat, then, having descended to the bottom of the spiritual 
hierarchy, is not aware of itself. This unenlightened surat, called 
the jiva when in this world, is enclosed by mental, astral, and 
physical sheaths or bodies, must undergo death and rebirth in 
chaurasi (lit. "the wheel of eighty-four," or transmigration) and 
experiences the transitory pain and pleasure as a result of the karma 
it accumulates.

Salvation (moksa), for Soamiji, represents a reversal of the process 
of creation which was responsible for this loss of identity and the 
concomitant suffering of the surat. Described as the dispelling of 
maya (or delusion), it consists in the extrication of the jiva from 
the lower creation, culminating eventually in the recognition of its 
true identity; this illuminative and unitive revelation is described 
as a return or a merger with the Lord. The liberation of the soul 
(jivan mukti) by ascent to its "true and original home" is, then, the 
ultimate (if not the only objective of Soamiji's teachings, 
representing as it does the only possible avenue for the attainment 
of real and permanent bliss.

The only method for this God-realization (i.e., self-realization), in 
Shiv Dayal Singh's view, is the path of devotion or bhakti. In this 
world, the soul acts as though it is a separate and discreet entity. 
This "egocentric" view, though incorrect, cannot be dispelled by 
merely asserting one's consciousness as undifferentiated. Rather, 
one's entire method of cognition must be altered such that one begins 
to actually experience and apprehend himself in this manner. And it 
is only through total surrender to and love for the divine Being that 
this can be achieved. Consistent with the sant tradition, within the 
Radhasoami teachings there are two essential foci for the practice of 
this bhakti--shabd and the satguru--each of which represents a manner 
in which the formless Lord is said to manifest and mediate himself.

THE SHABD

As briefly described earlier, the Supreme Being projected himself at 
sat lok into two forms: the shabd and the surat. The latter 
represents the individual souls which populate the various levels of 
lower consciousness. The former, on the other hand, is an audible 
(and visible) current or sound which is responsible for the creation 
of these lower planes. It literally permeates and sustains the cosmos,
 and in a more important sense, it is considered to be identical to 
the divine; it is a wholly sacred manifestation of the formless 
ultimate.

This shabd has a dual function, however, both creative and attractive.
 In this purview, the path of illumination, as alluded to earlier, is 
considered simply a reversal of the process of creation: just as the 
shabd descended to create the cosmos, so the jiva must ascend through 
(and eventually transcend) the lower levels of consciousness. This 
surat, by focusing its attention upon the shabd, is attracted by it 
and pulled upwards in such a way that consciousness is gradually 
withdrawn from the lower regions until it eventually comes to 
recognize itself as a projection of this very shabd.

The practice of this shabd-bhakti, called surat-shabd-yoga (lit. 
union of the surat with the shabd), is the core of the devotional 
techniques (sadhana) Soamiji taught. To understand it, we must first 
note the two aspects of shabd (also called nam) which Shiv Dayal 
Singh describes:

My brother! I am going to define nam. It is of two kinds.
They are dhunatmak nam and the varna form of the dhunatmak nam. I 
give out details of both these kinds.
What is uttered by tongue may be termed as varna or akshar.
What is spoken and reduced to writing is termed varnatmak.
The varnatmak is lakhayak [indicator] of dhun. But without perfect 
guru, nothing can be achieved.



From FGFN33D@prodigy.com  Sat Jan 27 17:40:28 1996
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Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:38:54 EST
From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN)
X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50]
Message-Id: <013.09698418.FGFN33D@prodigy.com>
To: dlane@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: notes about documents...
Status: RO


 Dave,
   Chapter 9 didn't import... I'll check it out and try to send it 
soon.
   I e-mailed two documents called chapters 1 and 2... I don't know 
what they were for, but I mailed them anyway.
  I tried to senf everything in order, but then I noticed the preface 
was missing... sorry I mailed it out order.
  Also, the class syllabi didn't import. I'll check them out and see 
what's up.
  I'm going to e-ail Dennis from MSAC about how to get a comment 
feature for the page... hopefully he'll give me the html codes and 
I'll just give them to you.
  I think I sent you my MSAC account address, right? Well, just in 
case, it's 6phl1001@ibm.mtsac.edu 

  Thanks, Dave, and I'll try to have everything else done soon. See 
you...

  PAUL

From FGFN33D@prodigy.com  Sat Jan 27 18:11:43 1996
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Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 21:09:44 EST
From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN)
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Message-Id: <013.09700391.FGFN33D@prodigy.com>
To: dlane@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: philo
Status: RO

Introduction to Philosophy
Class Outline: Spring 1996
1





Professor: David Christopher Lane, Ph.D.
Office: 26-D 211-G
Phone: 909 594-5611 (4593)--off campus only
On campus: dial 4000 then 4593
Fax: 909 594-7661
E-mail address: dlane@ibm.mtsac.edu
Web site: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane
Office hours: 12:45 to 2:15 p.m. (Monday and Wednesday) 7:00 to 8:00 
a.m. (Friday)           
Subjects currently teaching: Introduction to Major World Religions; 
Introduction to Philosophy; and Introduction to Sociology.

REQUIRED BOOKS:

1. Looking at Philosophy by Palmer.
2. Schrodinger's Kittens and the Search for Reality by
John Gribbin.
3. Darwin's Dangerous Idea by Daniel Dennett
4. Why I Don't Eat Faces by MSAC.
5. The Trial and Death of Socrates by Plato.
6. The Socratic Universe edited by MSAC.
7. Talks with Sri Ramana Maharshi
8. Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality by Ken Wilber.
9. Gentle Godlessness by Paul O'Brien.
10. Portable Nietzsche edited by Kaufmann.
11. The Razor's Edge by W. Somerset Maugham.
12. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul by Paul
Churchland.
13. The Science of Superconsciousness by Tony Kassir
14. Da: The Strange Case of Franklin Jones

RECOMMENDED (but not mandatory) TEXT:

1. The World Treasury of Physics, Astronomy, and Mathematics edited 
by Ferris.

OVERALL CLASS REQUIREMENTS (mandatory):

1. Perfect class attendance.
2. Absolutely no tardies.
3. All reading completed on time.
4. Up-to-date record of class/test progress and monthly e-mail 
updates.
5. Consistent in-class participation and engagement.
6. Weekly e-mail progress reports on reading/analysis.
7. Two questions on assigned reading each week.
8. Periodic meetings with class T.A.

WEEKLY READING ASSIGNMENTS
(All reading assignments must be done on the required date; 
absolutely no exceptions)

Monday, Week Two: Looking at Philosophy by Palmer (entire book).
Monday, Week Three: Schrodinger's Kittens and the Search for Reality 
by John Gribbin (entire book)
Monday, Week Four: Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1/2 of book)
Monday, Week Five: Darwin's Dangerous Idea (2/2 of book)
Monday, Week Six: Why I Don't Eat Faces  and The Socratic Universe 
(both in their entirety)
Monday, Week Seven: The Trial and Death of Socrates by Plato (entire 
book)
Monday, Week Eight: Talks with Sri Ramana Maharshi (assigned 
portions) & The Science of Superconsciousness
Monday, Week Nine: Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality (1/2
of book)
Monday, Week Ten: Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality (2/2 of book) & Da: 
The Strange Case of Franklin Jones
Monday, Week Eleven: Gentle Godlessness by Paul O'Brien (entire 
manuscript)
Monday, Week Twelve: Portable Nietzsche (1/2 of book)
Monday, Week Thirteen: Portable Nietzsche (2/2 of book)
Monday, Week Fourteen: The Razor's Edge (entire book)
Monday, Week Fifteen: The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul (1/2 
of book)
Monday, Week Sixteen: The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (2/2 
of book)
Monday, Week Seventeen: Finals

SCHEDULED TESTS
(All tests must be taken on the assigned dates; absolutely no 
exceptions.)

REQUIRED TWO QUESTIONS PER WEEK
Each student is required to write two questions each week (due 
Mondays). Be sure to write them out and bring them to class as well 
as e-mail one copy to your
T.A. 

INTERNET
Each student will be assigned a computer account (during the second 
week of school)
which will allow them access to the internet and to e-mail. Each 
student is required to
e-mail the professor at least once a month about his/her progress in 
the class; additionally each student is required to read in a 
internet newsgroup each week. This semester the assigned newsgroup is 
comp.ai.philosophy

GRADING POLICY
In order to pass Dr. Lane's class (with a "C" or higher) you must do 
the following
minimum requirements (absolutely no exceptions):

1. Perfect attendance 
(Any class that is missed must be made up by reading one of the extra 
books in its entirety mentioned below. After reading the book 
thoroughly, the student will then e-mail the Professor with his/her 
one page analysis. Any student missing more than 4 or more classes 
must immediately drop the class or receive an "F" for the entire 
semester. There are no exceptions to this rule. Why? Because I 
consider perfect attendance a cornerstone to the class. If you must 
miss a class for whatever reasons, you must read one extra book per 
missed class and e-mail your critique within two weeks. Each student 
is also required to keep an accurate record of his/her attendance. 
One of the following books may be read to make-up for a single class 
session. Keep in mind that three missed classes is the terminal limit 
and therefore three extra books are the limit allowed.
A. Biology as Ideology by Lewontin. B. Matter and Consciousness by 
Paul Churchland. C. The Screwtape Letters by C.S. Lewis. D. Darwin 
for Beginners. E. Einstein for Beginners. F. Nietzsche for Beginners. 
G. Foucalt for Beginners.

2. No Tardies
Any student who enters the classroom 5 minutes or more after the 
class starts is required to make up that tardy by reading one of the 
following short books. There are no exceptions to this rule. Four or 
more tardies and the student is required to drop the class or receive 
an "F" for the semester. Below is the list of books one may read if 
one is tardy (one book per tardy): A. The Communist Manifesto by Karl 
Marx; B. The Gospel of John. C. The Way of a Pilgrim. D. A Grief 
Observed by C.S. Lewis.

3. Do All of the Assigned Reading 
Each student is required to thoroughly read each week's assignment. 
There are no exceptions to this rule and the student is advised that 
unless the reading is done by the
required time he/she should seriously consider dropping the class. 
Each Monday the student will be asked if he/she did the reading; it 
is assumed that any student who attends class has a priori met the 
reading requirement. 

4. Two Questions Each Week
Each student must write two questions each week on the assigned 
reading. These questions form the basis for the Socratic 
lecture/discussion which commences each Monday. Any student who does 
not do the
necessary two questions should seriously consider dropping the class. 
There are no exceptions to this rule.

5. Pass Each Scheduled Test
Every test is an important one and each one reflects, more or less, 
the effort the student has put into the class. Each test must be 
taken at the scheduled time. There are no make-ups given.

6. Complete All Assigned Internet/Computer Tasks


TO RECEIVE AN "A" IN THE CLASS YOU MUST IN ADDITION TO THE MINIMUM 
REQUIREMENTS DO THE FOLLOWING:

1. Receive a "B" average or higher on your test scores.
2. Listen to one book on tape (from the following list: The Hot Zone; 
The Physics of Immortality; Black Holes and Baby Universes; Genius; 
and/or The Tenth Dimension.
3. Watch one video (from the following list: A Brief History of Time; 
The Double Helix; A Hairdresser's Husband (French); The Apu Trilogy 
(select one or more from this famous Indian series of movies); and/or 
Mindwalk.
4. Post one well-reasoned article on a pre-assigned Internet 
newsgroup.
5. Read one extra book (from the following list: Einstein: His Life 
and Times by Ronald Clark; Surely Your Joking Mr. Feynman by Richard 
Feynman; Shadows of the
Mind by Roger Penrose; Neurophilosophy by Patricia Smith Churchland; 
Rediscovery of the Mind by John Searle; The Blind Watchmaker by 
Richard Dawkins; Ramana Maharshi and the Path of Self-Knowledge; 
Autobiography of a Yogi by Paramahansa Yogananda; The Interior Castle 
by Teresa of Avila; The Confessions by St. Augustine; and/or 
Uncertainty by David Cassidy.

PERSONAL NOTE TO THE STUDENT FROM YOUR TEACHER:

If you do the necessary work I can guarantee you that you will excel 
in this class.
I am not asking for brilliance; I am not asking for you to understand 
difficult things;
I am not asking you to be a great writer. I am asking that you give 
me your fullest
effort. With that I can assure you that you will pass with flying 
colors.

MAY THE KANTIAN FORCE BE WITH YOU!

notes:


Introduction to Philosophy
Professor David Lane, Ph.D.
Class Outline 1996


"Check ou the Web: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane"
QQQ




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Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 21:10:40 EST
From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN)
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To: dlane@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: socio syllabus
Status: RO


Introduction to Sociology



Professor: David Christopher Lane, Ph.D.
Office: 26-D 211-G
Phone: 909 594-5611 (4593) off campus
On campus: dial 4000 then 4593
Fax: 909 594-7661
E-mail address: dlane@ibm.mtsac.edu
Web Site: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane
Office hours: 12:45 to 2:15 p.m. (Monday and Wednesday); 7:00 to 8:00 
a.m. (Friday)           
Subjects currently teaching: Sociology, Philosophy, and World 
Religions

REQUIRED BOOKS:
1. Sociology by Calhoun.
2. Down and Out in Paris and London by George Orwell.
3. Civilization and Its Discontents by Freud. 
4. The Social Construction of Reality by Peter Berger.
5. The Denial of Death by Ernest Becker.
6. The Autobiography of Charles Darwin.
7. The Naturalist by Edward O. Wilson.  
8. Creating Minds by Howard Gardner.
9. The Sexual Brain by Simon LeVay.
10. Being Digital.
11. Real by Dodie Bellamy 
12. Amusing Ourselves to Death by Neil Postman

OVERALL CLASS REQUIREMENTS (mandatory):
1. Perfect class attendance.
2. Absolutely no tardies.
3. All reading completed on time.
4. Up-to-date record of class/test progress and monthly e-mail 
updates.
5. Consistent in-class participation and engagement.
6. Weekly e-mail progress reports on reading/analysis.
7. Three questions on assigned reading each week.

WEEKLY READING ASSIGNMENTS
(All reading assignments must be done on the required date; 
absolutely no exceptions)
Friday, Week Two (1/3 of Sociology)
Friday, Week Three (2/3 of Sociology)
Friday, Week Four (3/3 of Sociology)
Friday, Week Five (Down and Out in Paris and London; entire book)
Friday, Week Six (Civilization and its Discontents; entire book)
Friday, Week Seven (The Social Construction of Reality; entire book)
Friday, Week Eight (The Denial of Death; entire book)
Friday, Week Nine (Autobiography of Charles Darwin; entire book)
Friday, Week Ten (The Naturalist by Edward O. Wilson; entire book)
Friday, Week Eleven (The Sexual Brain; entire book)
Friday, Week Twelve (Real; entire book)
Friday, Week Thirteen (Creating Minds; entire book)
Friday, Week Fourteen (Amusing Ourselves to Death; entire book)
Friday, Week Fifteen (Being Digital; entire book)
FINAL

SCHEDULED TESTS
There will be a test given every week based upon the assigned reading 
for that week. Each test must be taken; there are no exceptions and 
no make-ups.

REQUIRED THREE QUESTIONS PER WEEK
Each student is required to write three questions each week (due 
Friday) on the assigned reading. Absolutely no exceptions. The 
student besides bringing one copy into class must also e-mail a copy 
of the three questions to the class T. A. each week.

INTERNET
Each student will be assigned a computer account (during the second 
week of school) which will allow them access to the internet and to e-
mail. Each student is required to E-mail the professor at least once 
a month about his/her progress in the class; additionally each 
student is required to read in an internet newsgroup.

WEB SITE
A proto-typical web site has been developed for this class. The 
following is the address:
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane
Students will be required to access this web site for further 
information about the Net.

GRADING POLICY
In order to pass Dr. Lane's class (with a "C" or higher) you must do 
the following minimum requirements (absolutely no exceptions):
1. Perfect attendance 
(Any class that is missed must be made up by reading one of the extra 
books in its entirety mentioned below. After reading the book 
thoroughly, the student will then e-mail the Professor with his/her 
one page analysis. Any student missing 3 or more classes must 
immediately drop the class or receive an "F" for the entire semester. 
There are no exceptions to this rule. Why? Because I consider perfect 
attendance a cornerstone to the class. If you must miss a class for 
whatever reasons, you must read one extra book per missed class and e-
mail your critique within two weeks. Each student is also required to 
keep an accurate record of his/her attendance. One of the following 
books may be read to make-up for a single class session. Keep in mind 
that three missed classes is the terminal limit and therefore three 
extra books are the limit allowed. A. Biology as Ideology by Lewontin.
 B. On Human Nature by Edward O. Wilson. C. The Bell Curve. D. Ever 
Since Darwin by Stephen Jay Gould.
2. No Tardies
Any student who enters the classroom 10 minutes or more after the 
class starts is required to make up that tardy by reading one of the 
following short books. There are no exceptions to this rule. Three or 
more tardies and the student is required to drop the class or receive 
an "F" for the semester. Below is the list of books one may read if
one is tardy (one book per tardy): A. The Communist Manifesto by Karl 
Marx.
B. Alice in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll. C. Animal Farm by George 
Orwell. Island
by Aldous Huxley.
3. Do All of the Assigned Reading 
Each student is required to thoroughly read each week's assignment. 
There are no exceptions to this rule and the student is advised that 
unless the reading is done by the required time he/she should 
seriously consider dropping the class. Each Friday the student will 
be asked if he/she did the reading; it is assumed that any student 
who attends class has a priori met the reading requirement. 
4. Three Questions Each Week
Each student must write three questions each week on the assigned 
reading. These questions form the basis for the Socratic 
lecture/discussion which commences each Friday. Any student who does 
not do the necessary three questions should seriously consider 
dropping the class. There are no
exceptions to this rule. Remember to e-mail a copy to the class T. A.

5. Pass Each Scheduled Test
Every test is an important one and each one reflects, more or less, 
the effort the student has put into the class. Each test must be 
taken at the scheduled time. There are no make-ups given.
6. Complete All Assigned Internet/Computer Task

TO RECEIVE AN "A" IN THE CLASS YOU MUST IN ADDITION TO THE MINIMUM 
REQUIREMENTS DO THE FOLLOWING:

1. Receive a "B+" average on your tests.
2. Post a reasoned article on the Internet (newsgroup to be assigned).

3. See one movie and listen to one book on tape (to be announced).

PERSONAL NOTE TO THE STUDENT FROM YOUR TEACHER:

If you do the necessary work I can guarantee you that you will excel 
in this class.
I am not asking for brilliance; I am not asking for you to understand 
difficult things;
I am not asking you to be a great writer. I am asking that you give 
me your fullest
effort. With that I can assure you that you will pass with flying 
colors.

MAY THE WEBERIAN FORCE BE WITH YOU!

Notes:
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
Professor: David Christopher Lane, Ph.D.
Spring 1996
Class Requirements

Introduction to Sociology

Introduction to Sociology
"Surf the Internet"
Q




From FGFN33D@prodigy.com  Sat Jan 27 18:14:26 1996
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Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 21:11:32 EST
From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN)
X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50]
Message-Id: <013.09700513.FGFN33D@prodigy.com>
To: dlane@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: world religions syllabus
Status: RO

Introduction to Major World Religions
Class Outline: Spring 1996
\




Professor: David Christopher Lane, Ph.D.
Office: 26-D 211-G
Phone: 909 594-5611 (4593)---off campus only
On campus: dial 4000 then 4593
Fax: 909 594-7661
E-mail address: dlane@ibmmtsac.edu
Web site: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane
Office hours: 12:45 to 2:15 p.m. (Monday and Wednesday) 7:00 to 8:00 
a.m. (Friday)           
Subjects currently teaching: Introduction to Major World Religions; 
Introduction to Philosophy; and Introduction to Sociology.

REQUIRED BOOKS:

1. The Enchanted Land by MSAC
2. Da: The Strange Case of Franklin Jones
3. Autobiography of a Yogi by Yogananda
4. Many Peoples, Many Faiths by Robert Ellwood
5. Tao Te Ching by Lao Tzu
6. The Analects of Confucius by Confucius
7. The Way of a Pilgrim
8. Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography
9. The Rubaiyyat of Omar Khayam
10. Delicious Laughter by Rumi
11. The History of God by Karen Armstrong
12.  Thus Spake Guru Nanak
13. Meetings with Remarkable Men by G.I. Gurdjieff
14. Thus Spake the Buddha
15. Radhasoami Reality by Mark Juergensmeyer
16. The Bible (Old and New Testament)
17. Kali's Child
18. A Brief History of Everything by Ken Wilber
19. Why I Don't Eat Faces
20. Exposing Cults (to be handed out in class)

RECOMMENDED (but not mandatory) TEXTS:

1. The Encyclopedic Handbook of Cults by Melton
2. The Making of a Spiritual Movement 
3. Monkey on a Stick

OVERALL CLASS REQUIREMENTS (mandatory):

1. Perfect class attendance.
2. Absolutely no tardies.
3. All reading completed on time.
4. Up-to-date record of class/test progress and monthly e-mail 
updates.
5. Consistent in-class participation and engagement.
6. Weekly e-mail progress reports on reading/analysis.
7. Two questions on assigned reading each week.
8. Periodic meetings with class T.A.

WEEKLY READING ASSIGNMENTS
(All reading assignments must be done on the required date; 
absolutely no exceptions. Ellwood's book, Many People, Many Faiths, 
should be read alongside the assigned texts. Relevant pages will be 
assigned in-class)

Monday, Week Two: The Enchanted Land
Monday, Week Three: Da: The Strange Case of Franklin Jones
Monday, Week Four: Autobiography of a Yogi
Monday, Week Five: Kali's Child  
Monday, Week Six Thus Spake the Buddha & Why I Don't Eat Faces
Monday, Week Seven: Thus Spake Nanak & Radhasoami Reality
Monday, Week Eight: Tao Te Ching & Analects of Confucius
Monday, Week Nine: History of God
Monday, Week Ten: Delicious Laughter & Rubaiyyat of Omar Khayam
Monday, Week Eleven: Old Testament
Monday, Week Twelve: New Testament & Jesus: A Revolutionary 
Biography
Monday, Week Thirteen: The Way of a Pilgrim
Monday, Week Fourteen: Meetings with Remarkable Men
Monday, Week Fifteen: A Brief History of Everything
Monday, Week Sixteen: Exposing Cults
Monday, Week Seventeen: Finals

SCHEDULED TESTS
(All tests must be taken on the assigned dates; absolutely no 
exceptions)

REQUIRED TWO QUESTIONS PER WEEK
(After each book the student must bring two questions relating to 
that text, usually on Mondays. There are no exceptions. The questions 
must be both e-mailed to the T.A. and written/typed out before the 
class session.

INTERNET
Each student will be assigned a computer account (during the second 
week of school) which will allow him/her access to the internet and 
to e-mail. Each student is required to e-mail the professor at least 
once every two weeks about his/her progress in the class.
The student must e-mail their weekly questions to the T.A. after 
reading the required book.

THE WEB PROJECT
A proto-typical web site has been developed for this class on the 
INTERNET. Students are encouraged to make use of it, since many 
important books, articles, and documents are online. At a future date,
 a web-related assignment will be assigned. The following is the web 
address:
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane
[remember there are no spaces between any of the above words.]

GRADING POLICY
In order to pass Dr. Lane's class (with a "C" or higher) you must do 
the following minimum requirements (absolutely no exceptions):

1. Perfect attendance 
(Any class that is missed must be made up by reading one of the extra 
books in its entirety mentioned below. After reading the book 
thoroughly, the student will then e-mail the Professor with his/her 
one page analysis. Any student missing more than 4 or more classes 
must immediately drop the class or receive an "F" for the entire 
semester. There are no exceptions to this rule. Why? Because I 
consider perfect attendance a cornerstone to the class. If you must 
miss a class for whatever reasons, you must read one extra book per 
missed class and e-mail your critique within
two weeks. Each student is also required to keep an accurate record 
of his/her attendance. One of the following books may be read to make-
up for a single class session. Keep in mind that three missed classes 
is the terminal limit and therefore three extra books are the limit 
allowed. A. Call of the Great Master; Eunuchs for the Church; A 
Marginal Jew; Siddhartha; The Life of Mohammed; Conference of the 
Birds; and/or The Interior Castle

2. No Tardies
Any student who enters the classroom 5 minutes or more after the 
class starts is required to make up that tardy by reading one of the 
following short books. There are no exceptions to this rule. Four or 
more tardies and the student is required to drop the class or receive 
an "F" for the semester. Below is the list of books one may read if  
one is tardy (one book per tardy): A. Any volume (if not already 
read) from C.S. Lewis' The Chronicles of Narnia; B. Any volume of 
poetry (if not already read) from Rumi, Hafiz, Sarmad, Kabir, Nanak, 
St. John of the Cross.

3. Do All of the Assigned Reading 
Each student is required to thoroughly read each week's assignment. 
There are no exceptions to this rule and the student is advised that 
unless the reading is done by the
required time he/she should seriously consider dropping the class. 
Each Monday the student will be asked if he/she did the reading; it 
is assumed that any student who attends class has a priori met the 
reading requirement. 

4. Two Questions Each Week
Each student must write two questions each week on the assigned 
reading. Any student who does not do the necessary two questions  
should seriously consider dropping the class. There are no exceptions 
to this rule.
Remember that you must type/write your questions out and also e-mail 
them to the T.A.

5. Pass Each Scheduled Test
Every test is an important one and each one reflects, more or less, 
the effort the student has put into the class. Each test must be 
taken at the scheduled time. There are no make-ups given.

6. Complete All Assigned INTERNET/Computer Tasks


TO RECEIVE AN "A" IN THE CLASS YOU MUST IN ADDITION TO THE MINIMUM 
REQUIREMENTS DO THE FOLLOWING:

1. Receive a "B" average or higher on your test scores.
2. Watch one video  (The Lost Horizon/black and white version; Gandhi;
 The Last Temptation of Christ; The Little Buddha; Mohammed; Meetings 
with Remarkable Men; and/or a new choice chosen by your teacher)
3. Write a comprehensive term paper, utilizing the web, on a new 
religious movement. Details on this will be provided in class.

PERSONAL NOTE TO THE STUDENT FROM YOUR TEACHER:

If you do the necessary work I can guarantee you that you will excel 
in this class. I am not asking for brilliance; I am not asking for 
you to understand difficult things;
I am not asking you to be a great writer. I am asking that you give 
me your fullest effort. With that I can assure you that you will pass 
with flying colors.



NOTES:


Introduction to Major World Religions
Professor David Lane, Ph.D.
Class Outline 1996


"Visit the Web: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane"
QQQ