Dave, The syllabi were converted alright and should look alright. However, I forgot which section of Socratic Universe didn't send correctly. Just reply to me, and I'll work on it... sorry about that. (I think it was 7, 8, or 9... can't remember which one, though.) Anyway, just let me know here or call at 818 332 4608 See you again PAUL
Which Philosophers Do You Admire?
Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): I admire most of the famous philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Socrates. I admire most of the medieval philosophers like Aquinas. I have great admiration for Descartes. I have immense admiration for Kant. I admire Berkeley for his daring, clarity, style, and his creativity. Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): I admire my wife [Patricia]. I think she's a very good philosopher, but that may not be the answer that you were looking for. Historically, I admire Aristotle because he was a philosopher who knew as much science as it was possible to know. I admire Descartes because he was a philosopher who knew as much physics and mathematics and physiology as it was possible at that time for a philosopher to know. I admire Bertrand Russell for the same reasons. There are many philosophers like this. I guess I don't admire all of them because some of them have come up with theories which I don't think are successful. Philosophers should know as much science as possible and that's science in a very broad sense. That includes psychology, sociology, and includes the human sciences and also the legal sciences--jurisprudence and political theory. Cohon (Stanford): [Among living philosophers] there are many I admire without necessarily agreeing with them: Donald Davidson, G.E. Moore, Anscombe, Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, John Rawls. I admire them for the originality and depth of their thought; some for the clarity with which they express it as well (although this is not the case for Anscombe and Williams). Copp (U.C. Davis): John Rawls. He attempts to deal with central philosophical problems. He provides a strikingly original approach. Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I admire Heidegger and Merleau Ponty most. I admire, like anyone would, Aristotle because he is the great philosopher who managed to say many important things while staying close to common sense. I admire Kant because he is the greatest philosopher that ever lived, the most systematic and most original and certainly one of the most influential. But my [primary figure is] Heidegger because I think he is not only close to common sense, but deeper than Aristotle, righter than Kant. He has got the advantages of both of them but he has also got a deeper understanding of the human condition than either. Friedman (U.C. Davis): Socrates, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Russell, Quine, Kripke, and Van Krassen because all these were radical philosophical innovators and all are breathtaking. Griesemer (U.C. Davis): I admire William Wimsatt (my dissertation advisor at the University of Chicago) because he is creative. He sees new and interesting philosophical problems about science that other people don't see. He probably doesn't produce the best answers or the most readable essays, but neither do I. I tend to value creativity and insight more than "correctness" or even "clarity." I admire Nelson Goodman and his work in art, representation, and individuals. His work is clear as well as creative. He's the sort of philosopher I find myself reading to get me jazzed up about a problem again after I've not thought about it for a long time. I admire Nancy Cartwright, a philosopher of physics. She's written a lot on abstraction, causation and laws on physical science. She is also very innovative as philosophers go. I especially like her collection of essays, "How the Laws of Physics Lie." Jolley (U.C. San Diego): Spinoza, Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume; they were intellectually fearless, and (with the possible exception of Spinoza) clear, incisive writers. Jubien (U.C. Davis): I admire most of the eight or ten frequently mentioned great philosophers of history. Among contemporaries, I especially admire Saul Kripke, David Lewis, W.V. Quine, and Roderick Chisholm. I admire all these philosophers because they have done very important work in what I think of as the most central problems of philosophy. Of course I often disagree with their views. (I admire lots of other philosophers as well.) Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): I admire my teacher Rudolph Carnap. I admire Sal Kripke. Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): Hegel and Aristotle. I admire Hegel because he had such a strong sense of history. And I admire Aristotle because he had such a strong sense of the natural world. Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Aristotle. Epicurus, for his fundamentally right world-view and his hostility to superstition. Hobbes, for his incomparable style and his feistiness. Spinoza, who outlined the essentials of a scientific view of the universe and of man and the human good. Hume, for his Christianity bashing. Nietzsche, ditto, and for reviving the Aristotelian ethic for self-realization. McCann (University of Southern California): I can name a few. Locke is the person I am most interested in because Locke is one who I think did more than anyone else to lay foundations for a mechanistic theory of science. I also very much like Hume's work, another empiricist. I am also interest in Kant who has a problematic relation to both rationalism and empiricism. As for modern philosophers, the one I am most interested in is Wittgenstein. He has a complex relation to philosophical theorizing. I do not read him negatively as a lot of people do. I do not think his aim is to just say you can not have any appropriate philosophical theorizing about things at all. I think he performed an important service in reigning in some of the more ambitious speculations about the nature of mind and about the workings of language, showing that one had to be extremely careful and pay a lot of attention to detailed examples in arriving at general claims about mind and language. It is that tendency that I admire in Wittgens ein. I am pretty much a hard empiricist. What you see is it. This is another thing which Wittgenstein has done a lot to bring out. What you see is very much controlled by conceptual presuppositions and things which you have that sometimes work to the good to help structure your experience. Other times it can work to the bad, to distort what evidence is. McGray (University of San Diego): Wittgenstein, Mill, Kant, Hume, and Russell. They treat questions in a critical and ruthlessly honest way. Needleman (San Francisco State): Plato, Maimonides, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Kant. Shalinsky (U.C. San Diego): "Admiration" is probably too strong a word to describe my attitude toward philosophers. I think, personally, that it's important to be somewhat of an iconoclast: one shouldn't cower in the face of even the most imposing philosophers. In the first place, outright devotion tends to undermine (what I think is) the essentially critical spirit of philosophy. In the second place, students frequently find themselves paralyzed when confronted with the difficult text by a philosopher they idolize. I suspend my iconoclasm only in the case of Kant. His arguments are unbelievably complex (as well as, if you ask me, right) that one cannot help but feel admiration. Smart (U.C. Santa Barbara): As I said before, Popper, because of his ability to see the importance of democracy and freedom. Buddha, because he was a very subtle mind; he was very intellectual. Indians: Shankara and Ramanuja. On the Western front, David Hume, the Scottish empiricist, who in some ways has beliefs similar to those of the Buddhists. And Immanuel Kant, who was concerned with the reconciliation of science and human freedom, gearing science towards human values. Suppes (Stanford University): Among the modern philosophers I admire William James and John Dewey. James has a lot of flair that Dewey doesn't and Dewey has other virtues that James does not have. I think highly of Quine's writings. Wollheim (U.C. Davis): Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein. Woodruff (U.C. Irvine): Well, I have a license plate that has the name of a philosopher on it--Rudolph Carnap. He was [besides being a pioneer in logical positivism] a wonderful person. Which Philosophers Do You Admire? Which Philosophers Do You Admire? page \* arabic PAGE18 Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): I admire most of the famous philos€ From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:26:10 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [184.108.40.206]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA05790 for
; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:26:08 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [220.127.116.11]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA16546 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:23:56 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:22:38 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09697431.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: SU 4 Status: RO Û¥ Chapter Four Which Ethical System Do You Admire Most? Arntzenius (University of Southern California): Utili-tarianism, mainly because you can distinguish between rights based attitudes and procedural based systems and happiness based systems. I'm more interested in happiness based systems because it seems to me that no matter what your rights based system is, according to it, it is always possible to find some situation which is justified [by rights based systems], e.g., where half of the world is starving and you just can't see that it is. I can't accept a moral theory that in some circumstances it is okay that people in the world are starving; it seems to me that roughly speaking the thing that I really care about is unhappiness of people, because it is clear that people who are starving are not happy. The ultimate standard of a just society is how happy the people are in it. Beckman (Harvey Mudd): Aristotle's; it avoids Christian moralizing by preceding it and it addresses the concept of living well in a general and well balanced way. Blake (Loyola Marymount University): It's funny to talk about ethical systems as being admirable. I'm not quite sure how I'd answer that question, whether there is one I find most admirable. Aristotelian philosophy strikes me as profoundly common-sensible. . . I find that very admirable. Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): I find the ethical views of Aristotle most admirable. Aristotle felt that to become a morally good person is to become practically wise, wise in the affairs of interacting with other people. I think becoming wise is a matter of learning to get along with your friends; learning to take care of your family; learning to help others to thrive; learning to depend or lean on others when you are in trouble; and it is part of a flourishing community and that is something that you cannot write down in a basic set of laws of what the universe is and where mankind comes from. I think that we will do better if we can disengage these things to a certain degree. Religion isn't the only institution that engages in this question. The legislature in any given state or the House of Representatives in this country, or the Parliament in England, these are the bodies designed to address moral and political questions, trying to lay down rules that we are all supposed to follow. And we have some happy traditions there. I think the English history and the American history are positive and encouraging history. I think the English common law and the English legislative system similarly with the American have done rather better than some of the world's major religions in coming up with the system of rules by which to live. Whoever does it, religion or political bodies or clubs or universities, it has to be done, pursuit of moral questions is entirely consistent to the pursuit of science. I think the two will be with us for a long time. An interesting moral question and an interesting theoretical question are entirely compatible. Cohon (Stanford University): Well, I don't think any one system has the whole story right when it comes to the moral life. I like certain aspects of Kant's ethics and certain aspects of Aristotelian ethics, if we update them. But how can these be made compatible? I also believe that there are such things as moral rights, although I am not a complete Lockean about them. Copp (U.C. Davis): Kant. I admire the sentiment behind the ends-in- itself formulation of the categorical imperative. Davis (Claremont Scripps College): I have always liked Kant's ethical system. [However] I don't think it's without difficulties; I think it can be criticized. Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I find Aristotle admirable who thought that ethics isn't a theory or system, but it's learning how to behave skillfully so you can do the appropriate thing in your culture which means in effect to do whatever makes you and other people lead fulfilled lives. It is the only kind of skill that you get gradually as you live; make choices, make mistakes, and have courage to learn from them. So, as Aristotle says, if you want to know what is right and wrong don't try to find a theory (he doesn't say that but he means that). He says ask a wise old man; it's people like Plato and Kant who try to have an ethical theory and I don't think that any ethical theory which tries to give you universal pictures for acting holds up. You have to learn to do in every particular situation what's appropriate in that situation and that's the kind of skill you can't derive from a theory. Dumont (Mt. Saint Mary's College): It's not really a system, but what has inspired me the most in the last few years and led me to a better understanding of the ethical domain and the problem solving is the work of Carol Gilligan. Fischer (U.C. Riverside): That is hard because I see problems with everything. I would probably have to say Kant's system because the importance of dignity and respect are owed to individuals on their own free will. Friedman (U..C. Davis): Spinoza's naturalistic ethics and Mill's utilitarianism. Griesemer (U.C. Davis): I don't know anything about ethics so I don't admire any ethical systems. Jolley (U.C. San Diego): I am attracted by Spinoza's moral theory. For one thing I share Spinoza's implicit view that morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives. I am also attracted by the central role that Spinoza gives in his philosophy to the analysis of the emotions. Jubien (U.C. Davis): I believe that some sophisticated version of utilitarianism has the best chance of ultimately winning the ethical systems sweepstakes. The most sophisticated effort to date that I am aware of is presented in Fred Feldman's Doing the Best We Can. Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): I would call myself a secular humanist. I have no theistic view. I am Jewish so I am strongly culturally identified with Judaism as a cultural thing. I am not religious in the sense of having theistic beliefs and so on. I think of myself as being very humanistic; as my teacher used to say, everyone has the obligation to try to develop their own gifts to the maximum degree possible. I think we have obligations to ourselves, our families. Critics of secular humanism claim that it is a very relativistic point of view, without absolute ethical principles. [Nevertheless] we must realize our own potential. Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): I guess I would find virtue ethics the most admirable. Well, because I think being a good person is its own reward. And I think that ontological views rely too heavily on guilt to really work well. And utilitarian views tend to be heartless. Matson (U.C. Berkeley): The Aristotle/Spinoza idea of self- realization. Its concept of the Good is the right one, and it is free of "moralic acid" (Nietzsche). McCann (University of Southern California): I think the Kantian view, or some version of it, is the most promising theory. Utilitarianism has, in my view, insufferable problems dealing with questions of justice, personal integrity, and so on, whereas virtue theories do not provide enough in the way of philosophical foundations for morality. The Kantians, however, have a tough set of problems in making their views intuitive and plausible, and getting rid of the daunting metaphysics Kant connected to the view. Still, it is the one I would most like to be true. Needleman (San Francisco State): Christianity. Ring (C.S.U. Fullerton): I'm not terribly pleased with any system, especially of ethics. But if I had to answer, I would say Aristotle. He sees a moral life as embedded in a community and not as something transcendental or as individualistic. Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside): I admire utilitarianism, because I believe it's practically implacable and provides the most morally balanced, reasonable conclusion. Ross (Claremont Scripps College): Socratic, because it doesn't leave much out. Never repay harm with harm, and don't just say it--you argue it, etc. Scott-Kakures (Claremont Scripps College): I'm going to assume admirable doesn't mean defensible. So, the one I find most admirable is one which may not turn out to be an ethical system or theory at all--it's virtue. That is what Aristotle makes fundamental: not what I could do, but what sort of person should I be. As I say, that may not even turn out to be an ethical theory. Shalinsky (U.C. San Diego): I don't happen to be interested in ethics, and I find meta-ethics particularly tiresome. I must also say that I find the use of the word "admirable" even less reasonable in this context than I did with the respect to the other question which used the term. The choice of an ethical system, it seems to me, ought to be guided by distinctly philosophical considerations: the "best" one ought to be the one which is the simplest, the most intuitive, the most coherent, and so on. It ought not, I think, be the most "admirable." Use of this word suggests that one should have some sort of attitude toward the system with regards to that which is most plausibly based on philosophical grounds. This just strikes me as wrong. Having said all of this, I guess I would have to answer the question simply by saying the best ethical system, whatever it is, should be the one that best allows us to feed, flee, fight, and reproduce. [I hope this doesn't sound really flip; it's as much a reflection of the despair I've always felt canvassing (what I regard as) the various implausible ethical systems that abound.] Smart (U.C. Santa Barbara): Christianity and Buddhism both speak of love and compassion. Those should be the guiding attitudes. Negatively I believe, as do the Buddhists, that we as humans have deficiencies we must address: greed, hatred, and delusion. An example of greed would be cutting down on the money for the homeless and poor. Hatred is seen daily expressed through issues between groups, be it whites against blacks, blacks against hispanics. By delusion, I think our vision is clouded. Suppes (Stanford University): Well, I am sympathetic to utilitarianism but I am pluralistic. I think utilitarianism has difficulty accommodating everything. [Utilitarians] do a good job for social questions, association of goods, handling of what are called public goods, theory of the market, but not as good when it comes to rights. And I think it's possible to work a theory of rights in utilitarianism but it may very well be that ultimately we will think of that as a separate system. Wollheim (U.C. Davis): I do not believe that anything systematically written about ethics is really admirable. I believe that what philosophers talk about in "ethics" is partly an invention of philosophers cobbled up out of certain fragmentary attitudes we have, which are part benign, part malign. The moral philosophers I most like to read are: Montaigne, John Stuart Mill, Nietzsche, F.H. Bradley. Woodruff (U.C. Irvine): Well, I don't think of the question in that way. I think of it as, "What is right?" I'm not an ethicist and I can't claim to have views on that subject quite the way I do on some other things we've talked about. My general views about ethics go back to those of Wilfred Sellars, as so many of my views do. . . . Which Ethical System Do You Admire Most? Which Ethical System Do You Admire Most? page \* arabic PAGE26 [speaker.drv] CPU Speed=28 Volume=500 Version=774 Enhanced=1 Max seconds=3 Leave interrupts enabled=0 *biosxlat device=*vcd device=*vmcpd device=*combuff device=*cdpscsi local=CON FileSysChange=off PagingFile=C:\WINDOWS\WIN386.SWP MaxPagingFileSize=32768 [standard] [NonWindow Chapter Four Which Ethical System Do You Admire Most? Arntzenius (University of Southern California): Utili€ From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:29:02 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [18.104.22.168]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA05888 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:29:01 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [22.214.171.124]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA44192 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:28:28 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:27:29 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09697715.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: email@example.com Subject: SU 8 Status: RO (Dave, this section isn't loading for some reason... I'll wrok on it later and list it as SU 8 revised) PAUL From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:30:15 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [126.96.36.199]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06054 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:30:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [188.8.131.52]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA12388 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:26:01 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:24:52 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09697557.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: SU 6 Status: RO Û¥ Chapter Six Does God Exist? Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): Yes. If the question is "Do we know that God exists?" or "What sorts of reasons would we have to have to believe in God?" well then the answers get pretty complicated. But the question is "Does God exist?" I believe that God exists. Arntzenius (University of Southern California): I respond that I have no idea how you can decide such a question; you can have your opinion one way or the other. My [sense] is that I'm not exactly sure what it means to say that God exists. I just can't say how you could argue for or against it. Beckner (Pomona): Well, my view is that God does not exist. So, I would classify myself as an atheist. However, I cannot prove that he doesn't exist. Blake (Loyola Marymount University): Yes! Yes, he does and I think that there are grounds for believing that which are not simply matters of faith. I guess I do think there are good indications in human nature and physical reality to indicate there is a Creator. I think there are good indications here in the very nature of human history to [suggest] that there is some kind of personal God, who is benevolent. Now what might I believe beyond that I would attribute more to faith than reason, but I do think there are rational grounds for thinking there is a God. Cohon (Stanford University): I don't know. It would be nice if God did exist. But I don't think there are any successful proofs of God's existence, nor are there other sorts of objective evidence, so the only grounds for belief are personal religious experiences, and I have not had any of these. Copp (U.C. Riverside): No, unless the context and considerations of politeness dictate otherwise. Davis (Claremont Scripps College): I will respond by saying yes; I believe God does exist. Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I would say that the old God is dead, what Heidegger calls the Ontotheological God, which means a god which is outside of the world and is the ground of the world and explains what caused it and makes it intelligible. Dumont (Mt. Saint Mary's College): I believe in God but not in the traditional Western European male sense. I think there is a power or force greater than myself. I think of it in very female and earthly terms. Fischer (U.C. Riverside): I do not believe that there is a god. I don't know if he does exist; he might. I just don't know. You might want to say that I am an atheist or agnostic. Friedman (U.C. Davis): Agnostic toward Judeo-Christian God. Favorable toward God as Nature as God. Griesemer (U.C. Davis): I respond by asking what is God? And why do you capitalize the word (if you're not even sure God exists, aren't you presuming an answer by capitalizing the word as if God were a person)? Also, there are various things one might mean by existence (physical objects and concepts might both exist, but not in the same way), so I'm not sure which sense applies to God because I don't know what sort of thing God is supposed to be. Jubien (U.C. Davis): I don't know whether God exists but, unlike Pascal, I would bet against it. Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): Well, the first thing I would say is that's a very difficult question. There are a number of different ways to decide. Some people think that whether God exists should be decided by reason; some people think it should be decided by faith. I think that reasons can't prove the existence of God, and I also think that that's not a reason to believe. Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Negative. McCann (University of Southern California): What I am interested in knowing is why somebody wants to know or what they think hinges on the answer. One of the reasons I am especially interested in Kant, one of the reasons why I think he is an important transitional figure, is that by contrast with Newton and Locke and others Kant was trying to lay the foundations for mechanistic science in a way which would not require any appeal to God, to God's actions and attributes at all. In fact, he showed that no such claim can be rationally defended. So let's say for the purposes of developing a metaphysical model that is going to be the foundation of natural science, you should not have to worry about the question whether God exists or does not exist. For any purposes in philosophy you should not ask or wonder about the question at all. It should not play a role in any kind of philosophical debates. If you want to get a good theory of morality, you better get one that does not depend on there being a God or not bein a God. If it is a matter of personal belief then I would just be as interested to know what the person who wonders about this, what they are looking for, or what need they feel they have that is settled one way or another by an answer to that question. I find it interesting that a lot of people ask the questions without context, out of the blue. That does not, even to me, make sense to start talking about unless you know why you want to know and what difference it would make what the answer would be. McGray (University of San Diego): Of course God exists. The interesting question is what kind of being God is. Needleman (San Francisco State): Yes. Pippin (U.C. San Diego): In my view the answer is no. But that can be confused with a commitment to scientism and naturalism which I disagree with. The right answer is probably something like: it depends on what you mean by God. Ring (C.S.U. Fullerton): I am rarely asked, but if I were I would say, "Don't be silly." Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside): I believe I would say no. Shallinsky (U.C. San Diego): No. First, there's no empirical data; second, hypothesizing God's existence serves no explanatory end. Sircello (U.C. Irvine): No. Just no. Smart (U.C. Santa Barbara): God exists, but isn't at all what people think. It depends on who you listen to. If you listen to preachers on television it would seem as if they had a telephone line connection with God. God isn't as crude as that. Wollheim (U.C. Davis): No Does God Exist? Does God Exist? page \* arabic PAGE42 Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): Yes. If the question is "Do we know that God exists?" or€ From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:30:17 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [184.108.40.206]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06057 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:30:15 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [220.127.116.11]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA39270 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:26:46 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:25:37 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09697604.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: email@example.com Subject: SU 7 Status: RO Û¥ Chapter Seven What Do You Thinks Happens To Us After Death? Aebischer (C.S.U. Los Angeles): No one can answer the question of our state after death, but I would like to think we could look forward to being reincarnated again and again--exploring many forms of being and consciousness. Failing this, I take solace from the past that my body is practically immortal, though it will undergo a million transformations, in that there is a conservation of all matter and energy. Likewise, I think one's mind, heart and character live on in the results they create in others and their environment. It matters little whether the "ego" known as "Scott Aebischer" continues or not, but one would hope that one's achievement of consciousness or love is not lost to the wider world. Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): Well, I don't seem to know in any detail. I do believe in life after death. I think we just have to believe that it's good. Arntzenius (University of Southern California): Nothing. Beckner (Pomona): Nothing. When you die, you decompose. That can be proved. Blake (Loyola Marymount University): I'm not sure about that. I mean on religious grounds I think there is life after death. On the basis of faith, I believe in life after death. An interesting question is, "What's the form or character of life after death?" I guess a lot of people think of it in terms of some sort of spiritual non-physical existence. I'm not sure about that. There's an ancient Christian scripture that [states] there will be a resurrection of the body and the life after death is eternal. That seems to me to make sense. There seems to be nothing contradictory about that possibility. Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): I think that we disintegrate. I think that structures which make up our consciousness and mind and our moral consciousness. . . these can survive in a sense that they are recreated to a degree in our children, or in our friends or in our students. But that isn't really a survival of me, merely the survival of something that I stood for or some features I had. I am a complex matrix of molecules and when that matrix falls apart and disappears, I fall apart and disappear, so I am determined to do as much good as I can while I'm still here. Cohon (Stanford University): The evidence shows that we decompose. I admit it is hard to believe that a personality can abruptly cease to exist, but that seems to be the case. Our influence on each other is all that remains of us. Copp (U.C. Davis): To us? Our bodies decompose. Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I think nothing happens to us after death. Once we are dead we stay dead. But I think that like another one of my favorite philosophers that I forgot to mention, Soren Kierkegaard, that one can achieve eternity in time. That is you can get a meaning in your life that gives it stability and is remembered after you. And that I am afraid for better or worse is the only kind of eternity we get. Dumont (Mt. Saint Mary's College): I'm really not sure. Since my metaphysics is not dualistic the answer is not at all clear. I hope that some of the good that we all do and achieve lives on after us, even if only as it contributes to a force or positive power in the universe. I am leaning more toward reincarnation, though I would not explain it from a dualistic perspective of the migration of souls, but more as the rebirth of one's spirit. Fischer (U.C. Riverside): I think my sense is that we go out of existence and experience a blank and our consciousness ends. Friedman (U.C. Davis): Either death is a blackout for us, or else we are "housed" in mind-fields. Griesemer (U.C. Davis): This is a trick question. I think we rot after death. I don't believe there is a non-material substance (soul) that will persist after bodily death, but I don't have any better argument for my position than the dualist does for his/hers. Jubien (U.C. Davis): We cease to exist. Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): Nothing. I am an atheist and I think we are part of the natural world. I think the same thing happens to us after death as happens to dogs, cats, and frogs. When the body shuts down, we shut down. Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): Basically, I think that we are animals that we die and that's it. Our chemicals go off into the world. They're either burned if we are cremated, or if we are buried the chemicals gradually change and we decompose and that's the end of the body. Spiritually I'm not sure; I guess I find it hard for me to believe that what remains of us spiritually will be identifiable as us. I don't think that what remains would be any kind of consciousness that would be particular to us. Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Nothing. We're dead. McCann (University of Southern California): Basically I would respond to this similarly to the question about the existence of God. I would be interested to know why this is supposed to be a significant question. It often comes us in the context of morality, or the hold morality is supposed to have on us, but it very rarely gets beyond a very crude sort of schedule of rewards and punishments. It is a question that can have some interest in terms of the nature of thinking things or persons, but that is not the interest most people have in it. McGray (University of San Diego): Either heaven or hell. Needleman (San Francisco State): It depends on our life before death. Neumann (Claremont Scripps College): Other than fertilizer--nothing. Let me ask you this, "Where were you before you were born?" Well, it's the same thing when we die. Pippin (U.C. San Diego): Nothing. Ring (C.S.U. Fullerton): If we're lucky, we are buried or cremated and remembered for some time. Ross (Claremont Scripps College): I don't know. I haven't died yet and come back to tell anyone about it. You have to have "faith" to know what will happen. Although it will be the best sleep you ever had. Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside): Oh nothing. We die. I mean, annihilation is the right thing to say. Scott-Kakures (Claremont Scripps College): Nothing. We just die. Shallinsky (U.C. San Diego): Our bones rot. Smart (U.C. Santa Barbara): I believe God dwells inside everyone, that He's working in each one of us. So if God continues after death, then I suppose you can consider your self part of God when you die. Wollheim (U.C. Davis): I do not think we exist after death so nothing good, bad, or indifferent could happen to us. Sometimes I wish that this were not so. What Do You Think Happens To Us After Death? What Do You Think Happens To Us After Death? page \* arabic PAGE48 Aebischer (C.S.U. Los Angeles): No one can answer€ From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:30:24 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [18.104.22.168]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06073 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:30:23 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [22.214.171.124]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA39262 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:25:09 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:23:38 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09697496.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: SU 5 Status: RO Û¥ Chapter Five Are Science And Religion Compatible? Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): Certainly they are compatible. There's a lot of scientists who are religious. Science is a human activity which proceeds on certain principles, has certain institutions, and serves certain functions of human life. It has produced a large body of beliefs which are widely held among our society. There are also some beliefs on the frontiers of research that are more controversial. And religion is a very different sort of set of practices, institutions, and beliefs. The religious beliefs and practices have obviously quite different functions from those of the scientific beliefs and practices. They have, generally speaking, different subject matter. There are different motives involved in pursuing the subject. The beliefs and practices have different relevance in human life. I'm not sure if a onelevel answer is desired to that question. There are all sorts of ways in which one can compare religion and science. Arntzenius (University of Southern California): The major difference is that scientific claims can be assessed in the light of mathematical deduction and experimental evidence, i.e., objective criteria for deciding if scientific claims are true or false. Religious claims I think by their very nature are not so sensible, that is what I take to be the major difference. Their compatibility depends a bit again on what you mean by religion (it used to be the case that religion was taken literally). I take it that the evidence goes against them and that they are not compatible. After the middle ages, most people became convinced that the world had more objective grounds to believe the scientific claims than the religious claims, and such claims should not be taken literally. Beckman (Harvey Mudd): Scientists devote a great deal of time to observing the world around them and to constructing highly technical and precise languages for communicating their observations. I think they do this to a far greater degree than do theologians. Like theologians, scientists propose theories which are pictures or models they claim to represent the real world (whatever that is). They have in common the fact that these theories are articulate, coherent systems of thinking that communities of people take seriously and utilize in organizing and understanding their observations and experiences. If there is any sense in which scientific theories are "better" than theological ones, I would say it lies in the fact that science has substantially more practical success in predicting future events and properties in the observable world. I do not take this to be a devastating point to theology; that is, they have a perfect right to continue practicing their theoretical under tanding of the world. There is an interesting side question of whether separation of church and state should also require separation of science and state. I won't jump into that one; but it is clear that we unblushingly pour huge amounts of economic support into science. Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): That's a complicated question. I'm going to deliberately make it simple. I think that religion has two sides to it. One of them good, one of them unfortunate. The two sides are this: First of all, all of the world's religions attempt to give a cosmological theory of the origins of the universe and the human race's place in it and the significance we have. Christianity does it. Buddhism does it. Islam does it. Hinduism does it. Judaism does it. All of the religions do it. And I think that 2,000 years ago, when we were very ignorant, it was entirely permissible. Indeed, I would have done this thing, to try and come up with theories that could explain these things. So, in some respect religion attempts to function as science. On the other hand, the second thing that religion does is to attempt to engage in moral questions; to find basic principles on which answers can be given to new moral problems. And, this kind of activity I think is essential to human happiness I don't think that it will ever go away. I think that it is unfortunate to some degree that this necessary activity has been the principal property of the world's religions because I think they tied it to false theory. Cohon (Stanford University): Science aspires to discover truth by means of a thoroughly objective, empirical method that is repeatable and available to all, and to detect and root out erroneous beliefs by using such a method. It is not the aim of science to console people or to make them good or to bring them happiness, although its discoveries are sometimes very useful for these purposes (as well as for frightening people, corrupting them, and bringing them miseryalso not the purposes of science). Religion takes many different forms, of course, but all those that I know of also aim at some truth, at least, although their method of getting it is usually not empirical and often not available to everyone. But most religions I know about also have further aims: to give people hope, or to improve them morally, or to lead them to eternal salvation (happiness, I take it), or to provide inner peace. Some religions are compatible with science. Some are not, e.g., the sort of Christ an fundamentalism that denies that evolution occurred or sets the age of the earth as very young. It is incompatible with science because it rejects the empirical methods of science for finding out such things in favor of appeals to revelation. Not all religions make pronouncements about such things; some say that God exists (and this is not empirically testable), and then go on to provide consolation and moral guidance. Davis (Claremont Scripps College): Well I suppose that the major difference between science and religion. . . has to do with subject matter and mythology. Subject matter religion deals with questions like God and the after-life, and the way in which human beings ought to live which are not questions that are directly addressed typically by scientists. Scientists as human beings are of course perfectly free to talk about this question like any others, but they don't. They aren't the kind of topics that scientists deal with. A scientist will accept something only if it seems that the claim is empirically verified or verifiable. They can conduct a crucial experiment that proves it or fits into a very successful theory. But a typical religious person is quite prepared to accept something on authority because the Bible or a certain clergy person said so, and that is a myth that would not be accepted by a scientist. Are they compatible? Well, yes or no. I mean it is clear there are claims made in religion that is compatible to some claims made in science and vice versa. Are they incompatible? Yes I think they are. Believing in God as I do, I think both scientific and religious truth are aspects of the overall universal truth which God is responsible for. So I think they do fit well together. It's just that we don't see how they fit together very well. Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I think that the major difference is science is trying to find out the causal properties of natural kinds which refers to water and electrons and they do have causal properties and our science is getting it right, but finding out about the ultimate particles doesn't tell us anything about the meaning of life. Since religion only talks about meaning and science only talks causality there shouldn't be any conflict providing that science doesn't try to make pronouncements about ultimate reality as some people do who are called naturalists or reductionists and that are claiming more that they can do on the basis of science. Dumont (Mt. Saint Mary's College): Frankly I see both as relying heavily on faith in the unknown. Both are human disciplines/activities, expressing human aspirations and subject to human limitations/faults. Both are institutions and belief systems. I see many problems with both as they are practiced today. At its best science is humble before its limitations and honest in its claims. At its best religion provides comfort, consolation, inspiration, and motivation without claiming to have all of the answers nor to order people around. I see no reason to think that they should in principle conflict, since to me they are both human pursuits of truth. There is a lot of bad religion around (arrogant and unloving) but the good religion that is there could do a great deal to support and limit (through true humility before nature and our limitations and through a proper sense of responsibility for life) the aspirations of science. Fischer (U.C. Riverside): That is a very complicated question. The main difference is in the methods. In science, methods are used proportional to belief and evidence. We remain skeptical and we are not going to form conclusions for which there is no strong evidence. In religion, there is none of the same evidence. People accept on faith and not on concrete facts. Religion involves a leap of faith, accepting that it can be proved. They are and they aren't compatible; that depends on religion. If religion says God created the world in six days, etc., then science is probably incompatible. There are forms of religious belief that don't make those kinds of claims. Friedman (U.C. Davis): Science is a traditional enemy of traditional religion. However, science is compatible with enlightened religion. Griesemer (U.C. Davis): Science by common consent of practicing scientists is revisable in the face of experience (observation, experiment, calculation). Religious beliefs typically (though not universally) are not. Now the nature of the revisablity of science is a difficult set of problems that I can't address briefly (I don't subscribe to a simple "falsifiability" concept of what distinguishes science from religion), but whatever it is, it seems implausible to me that we would find practitioners of a religion using them to revise the tenets of their religion. I do think science and religion are compatible in the sense that we all live with logically incompatible beliefs, so science and religioneven if they entail a contradiction like, evolution says humans evolved from primitive ancestors and religion says we were created by Godare compatible in a practical sense. And this practical sense is the sense that goes in science, too. A contradiction that is never noticed or never invoked in a argument can't do much damage, so it doesn't matter too much if some of our beliefs are logically incompatible. This fact allowed many famous evolutionary biologists and other scientists to also practice a religion. However, there are certainly some sciences (e.g., evolutionary biology, geology) and some religions (e.g., the form of biblical literalism that goes by the name of creation science) that are incompatible in both logical and practical senses. One can't believe and practice both together. Jolley (U.C. San Diego): The short answer is that the claims of science are empirically falsifiable, those of religion (at least on one interpretation) are not. Whether religion and science are compatible depends on how religious claims are interpreted. Jubien (U.C. Davis): The major difference is that they generally have distinct goals (e.g., theorizing about the nature of the physical world versus saving souls). To this extent they are compatible. Of course, some religions make claims that are in conflict with science (not to mention common sense). Such claims may be an essential part of certain religions, but they aren't an essential part of religion per se. Lambert (U.C. Irvine): I think there are two major differences. In science, you can strive to be able to predict phenomena. Predictions are different than prophecies. In science, you also try to find corroborative explanations. Those are explanations which can be corroborated by appeal to experience. In short, I think these are two segments of rational activity. There are characteristics of science that are simply not characteristics of religion. So I think the difference is in these two activities. Predicting on the one hand and producing corroborated explanations on the other, that's scientific. I don't think that's part of religion. I think that science is a kind of rational activity. Those are two segments that I do not think of religion as a rational activity. Though there is a tradition in which it would be nice if somebody actually produced proof that God exists. In fact, one of my friends by the name of Robert Meyer, a mathematical logician, has written a paper entitled "God Ex sts." He proved the existence of God by using some of the materials in mathematics. Surely, religious activity I regard as not irrational but other than rational, outside what we pretend to be rational. I don't mean every part of it. Its goals are not those of science and its activities. Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): Well, in religion you have a lot more scope. You have a lot more freedom to believe what you believe. In science there is a certain amount of play, but according to the nature of science, people have to agree that the evidence offered supports the conclusion. It tends to be much more restricted. Scientific knowledge is more restricted. I think that religion and science are compatible, but I think that they are about different things that we can observe and run into, and manipulate, and build things with and understand. And I think that religion is about everything else. Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Science is based on beliefs that have been tested (note: I do not say, "are in principle testable") in experience. Evolution favors believers whose tested beliefs are true. Religion is based on untested beliefs that are held on account of their social usefulness. Evolution does not tend to eliminate such beliefs on the ground of factual falsity. Thus, science and religion are fundamentally incompatible, insofar as science is able to extend the scope of experience to the point of putting religious beliefs to experimental tests (as has happened with Christianity and Islam at least). McCann (University of Southern California): The major difference is that science looks to empirical evidence as the touchstone of truth, whereas many religions see themselves as resting on faith rather than evidence. . . I also point that, again historically, the scientific claims in these disputes have been the only one vindicated. McGray (University of San Diego): I fail to see any real conflict. The questions are different. Needleman (San Francisco State College): Yes. Neumann (Claremont Scripps College): It can or can't mix; it depends. The problem is that religion is very mythical, most of it doesn't change, which in turn is completely the opposite of science. In reality science and religion are only man's way of finding a reason for existence. Pippin (U.C. San Diego): Yes, I think they are compatible. Religion seems to be an expression of some sense of a deep human finitude, an ability to direct or orient all or our most fundamental activities on the basis of well grounded reasons. Since this is not itself an empirical claim about anything, it is not inconsistent with anything in science. Roth (Claremont McKenna College): Religion operates with certain categories that don't enter into science. The main one would be something like the category sacred. Science can have a relation to that idea, but when it does it's really beyond the parameter of science to some extent and starts being religious. We know people who study science can often have religious sensitivity that is increased because of what they know scientifically, but I think when they are expressing their religious or spiritual views that they are probably leading outside the realms of science. So I think that would be the biggest difference, that religion has attention focused on things (we might use the words sacred or divine), and science does not. That leads to some other differences that we have to deal with. The ways communities are formed and the way rituals occur you could argue that science has its communities and rituals and practices and religion has its own as well. In other ways are science and religion compatible? es, I would say certainly they are. Partly for reasons I mention that they are not operating as competitors, but as a way of organizing and looking at experience as different dimensions. Some people would argue that the dimensions are incompatible. I don't find that myself. Schwyzer (U.C. Santa Barbara): They can be compatible. A good Christian can still believe in science. He can believe in Genesis as a myth. I don't believe that religion can swallow the evolutionist theory, just as I don't believe that science disproves religion. Religion has a different origin than science; it is not from an intellectual motivation. They both answer different questions. They have different realms of inquiry. Religion deals with the fate of mankind and is not straightforward curiosity as is science. Shalinsky (U.C. San Diego): The major difference is faith, while the other is required to meet a stringent set of requirements. That is, a scientific theory has to meet a number of criteria: it has to explain empirical data, it has to accurately predict events, it has to be internally coherent. Religion need not meet any of these criteriait need not, by definition, be confirmed. Even so, it had an interesting feature: any evidence, even countervailing evidence, can be used in its support. Thus one can point to the absence of God as proof of His existence, the presence of evil as proof of His existence, the presence of flowers and bees as evidence of His existence, and so on. The question of the compatibility of religion and science depends upon some characterization of the religious doctrines involved: if the religious claim is that humankind started with Adam and Eve, then such a claim obviously clashes with evolutionary theory; if the religious claim is that humans ought to observe the various c mmandments, then such a claim might clash with scientific theory. The question really depends upon the scope of the religious theory: if it makes claims about the ultimate nature of reality, then there may very well be conflict; if it simply concerns questions about morality, then there may not be. Sircello (U.C. Irvine): Science and religion are compatible, but they don't have anything to do with one another. In other words, they answer the same questions, but in a different way. Where science is a controlled means, religion is not. Suppes (Stanford University): I think that religion of course in many ways has helped form the setting for modern science and that there are forms of religious beliefs that people can have which are very inconsistent with good evidence. A good example would be the creationist movement. Creationists are against teaching evolution as a scientific theory. Now I think that the creationist viewpoint is naive and a bad example of the interaction of religion and science. Wollheim (U.C. Davis): Science offers explanations. I do not see how religion can, because what religion proposes goes beyond what we look to for making things explicable. God could not be constrained by our categories. Woodruff (U.C. Irvine): I think originally religion was a substitute for science. That is, as a method of control over the environment or as an explanation of things. So to the extent that that is true there is some competition between them. But certainly my own view of theology, as expressed before, is not incompatible with science. I don't see any reason for them to be incompatible. I mean fundamentalists who believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, of course there will be a conflict there. But I don't see that as a necessary aspect of religion. So I think they are perfectly compatible. They are just addressed to different things. Science tries to describe the way the universe is, and religion tries to give us some kind of emotional relation to the whole. What Is The Difference Between Science and Religion? Are Science And Religion Compatible? page \* arabic PAGE37 From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:30:57 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [126.96.36.199]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06105 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:30:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [188.8.131.52]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA16480 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:29:48 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:28:12 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09697768.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: email@example.com Subject: SU 9 Status: RO Û¥ Chapter Nine Do You Think Artificial Intelligence Will Equal Or Surpass Human Intelligence? Adams (U.C. Los Angeles): I think the first thing I would say is that I do not have a very informed opinion on artificial intelligence. I assume that in some respect artificial intelligence has already surpassed human intelligence. My computer can do some things that I can't. But do I think that someday computers will be able to do every task that humans can handle? No, I don't really think that. But that may be as much of an expression of prejudice as anything else. It's not based on a particular knowledge of what computers can do. That's a question really outside my area of expertise. Arntzenius (University of Southern California): It depends a bit on what you mean by intelligence. If you mean the ability to do IQ tests well then I certainly think that we will be able to design computers that will do the tests better than we can. Why? Well we've been able to program computers to do arithmetic better than we do; they certainly play chess better than I do. In practice we seem to be a very complicated and very efficiently designed machine. I doubt very much if our explicit design will be able to construct something that in almost all areas outperforms us. I'm not even convinced that the hardest problem is to design something that has the mental capacity that we do. Beckman (Harvey Mudd): There are several different issues to be considered in artificial intelligence. As you've phrased your question in terms of "intelligence," we are forced to ask how intelligence should be assessed. If, for example, we accept the idea that intelligence should be measured by how rapidly something can perform complex mathematical tasks or store and retrieve mathematical information, then computers have already beaten the human mind by a long shot. However, if we interpret intelligence in some more complex way--say, translating between human natural languages or making design decisions based on more than technical factors--it's not entirely clear whether computers will ever beat the human mind. If we ask the question in terms of "consciousness" rather than "intelligence," then I don't hold out much hope that computers will ever replicate human consciousness; in other words, I think that artificial intelligence will always be "artificial" in significant ways. Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): I think that it will surpass human intelligence. I think that in some dimensions it surpassed human intelligence twenty years ago. However, it surpassed it in only a very narrow capacity--the capacity for a sheer repetitive computation like doing long division, or multiplication, or addition or things like that but intelligence is a very much broader capacity than that. I think it will take fifty or a hundred years before we understand the human brain fully. When we understand how the human brain works, I think it will then be relatively straightforward, though it will be difficult. It will be conceptually a straightforward technological matter to make an artificial system which can do the things that we do. I don't think we will do that however. It's too easy to make human intelligence already. You only need a loving couple to do it. So we're not going to put up millions of dollars to make artificial humans. What we will do instead is to take arti icial intelligence systems for some scientific purpose that we create some subset of the human capacities or perhaps will show some cognitive feature that we don't have at all. After all there are many more kinds of brains possible than just the human brain. I fully expect in the fairly near future for artificial intelligence to exceed the humans in many dimensions. I don't know how this is all going to come out. I think it's going to be a very exciting and interesting adventure and I'm not entirely comfortable with every aspect of it, but I think it will happen. Cohon (Stanford University): I can't predict what kinds of machines will be built in the future. On the one hand, I am inclined to think that, since the human brain is made of matter and it can think, it is possible to make other things out of matter that do the same things. On the other hand, much of what we classify as intelligent is socially defined and can only occur within a social context; this is especially true of speech. Consequently, it may be that no real machine intelligence is possible in the absence of some sort of machine community or society of machines. Anyway, while scholars are talking about science fiction scenarios, real researchers in machine intelligence are very far from understanding what human intelligence is, so at present it is impossible to predict whether machine intelligence can be made to equal it. For example, it is not understood how human beings recognize faces or understand speech of unknown persons, and psychologists are only beginning to figure out how people make sens of information that is presented to them in written form. Until we know what human intelligence is it is impossible to say whether machines will be able to duplicate it or surpass it. Copp (U.C. Davis): In some respects, yes; in others no, I doubt it will surpass human creativity. But I am only projecting up to 50 years. Beyond that, who knows? Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I have written two books on this subject. There are two kinds of artificial intelligence. The first kind, which started in about 1960, was devoted to using computers that were called physical symbol systems. The computer would have in it symbols that represented features of the world and the programs of the computer would be used to make inferences and deduce conclusions from this representation of features. I said in 1965, and in my book in 1972, that this kind of artificial intelligence would not work because of our way of being in the world is not having in our mind representations and features. It turns out that I think (and lots of other people now are beginning to think) that I was right, that it is failing. There was an article that had A.I. on the cover and quoted me and agreed with me that symbolic A.I. did not succeed. But now there is a new kind of A.I. using computers doing what is called simulated neural networks. I think that that will never produce full human intelli ence, but I think that it is not philosophically wrong like the symbolic A.I. but I do not think that it will work because the brain is too complicated and we do not know how it is wired up, so we can't make a simulated network that is enough like it even if we could. I think that the fact that we have bodies and move around in a world and have a culture is part of the way that our neural network gets tuned the way it is tuned and a computer that just had a neural network and passively took in what is called input vectors and paired them with output vectors [will not] have our kind of intelligence. Fischer (U.C. Riverside): In certain ways, such as calculations, computers are already equal, if not better. They are also continually progressing in mechanics. However, I remain skeptical as to whether computers will ever be as insightful or as creative as the human mind. Friedman (U.C. Davis): No, never! Because we lead from it, and so we will be that much smarter. I've believed in manmachine relations for a long time. Griesemer (U.C. Davis): I'm not convinced that artificial intelligence is intelligence, so I don't think there's yet a question about whether it will bypass human intelligence. I think intelligence is a property of certain biological entities, so whatever computers are capable of, it isn't intelligence (unless computers are capable of being certain sorts of biological entities!). It's merely by analogy that we call what computing machines do thinking. Jolley (U.C. San Diego): I am not well versed in this debate, but no I don't think that artificial intelligence will equal or bypass human intelligence except in very limited spheres (such as the ability to perform calculations at fantastic speed). My reasons are those which Descartes gives in the Discourses of Method, Part V. Jubien (U.C. Davis): If "artificial intelligence" just refers to the capacities of computers, then I think it already exceeds the capacities of human intelligence in certain ways (e.g., speed of computation). I don't think computers will ever have fully "human" intelligence because I don't think they will ever have mental experiences akin to those that humans have. Kalish (U.C. Los Angeles): There are things which computers can do now which human beings can't do and the speed with which you can do computations and things like that are incredible. Also computers can store an enormous amount of information in its memories and you can get it back. On the other hand, it is quite well known that there are problems which you cannot prove and that there is no algorithm which will ever solve them. Human ingenuity is the only way they will ever be solved. So these are two entities where the human mind and the artificial machine differ. They both have enormous qualities and it is not a matter of trying to say that there are two things in which one is a little better than the other. There are certain things that one can do that the other can't and we are getting better and better. My gosh the things that can be done now and the way you can communicate with people is fascinating. So let me put it this way, I don't think that any person of your generation who doesn't become comput r competent is going to be able to compete in this life. There are mathematical problems that only the human mind will be able to answer because we can prove that there is no way we can program a machine to answer the question. Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): There is the so called Turing test. When you carry on a conversation and you can't tell if it's a machine or a person. I don't really have a view as to whether we will be able to create machines that will pass the Turing test. It's clear that machines can already do tasks which require a kind of intelligence, much better than we can. I use a spell checker because it is a better speller than I am and quicker. I don't know of any machine that is as creative as I am. I am very skeptical to whether we will be able to do it, unless we start to build biological machines. Lambert (U.C. Irvine): Well, there are several things to think about it. First, it's a difficult thing to say what human intelligence is and it's hard to tell whether artificial intelligence will surpass human intelligence or not. We are not even clear what human intelligence is. But if it means, for example, that machines will be able to do certain things better than human beings would do intellectual things, well they can already do things better than humans. For example, machines, the new computers, put in parallels, can solve differential equations infinitely faster than human beings can do. Now, whether you're going to call that a case of surpassing human intelligence, I don't know. It certainly can do things faster. There are respects in which computers just don't even come close to human beings. So I'm inclined to say or view the whole question of, will computers ultimately surpass human beings' intelligence not to be a clear question. As I've suggested, if you look at intelligence in one way, they're not. So it's not a well formed question for me. Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): I will give you a typical philosopher's answer for this. I depends in what you mean by intelligence. Already computers are able to do certain tasks which we take to be cognitive tasks much better than we can. I don't think this makes them more intelligent. I think that there are many kinds of human intelligence. There is artistic intelligence, there is mathematical intelligence, there is a kind of verbal ability, there is the ability to see the whole picture, the ability to see both sides of an issue. There are just so many aspects of human intelligence which are vital. I don't see artificially constructed machines as being able to perform all of the functions which we would naturally attribute to human intelligence. I do think that machines will be able to surpass us on some of these tasks, but not on intelligence per say, not on intelligence overall. Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Noat any rate not using any conceivable refinement of the Turing machine (digital computer). Turing machines necessarily follow contextfree algorithms; that is not the way we think. McCann (University of Southern California): I guess it would depend on what factors you have in mind. In terms of calculating lots of big columns of numbers quickly, obviously computers can do that. Although of course whether they are actually computing or calculating as opposed to what is really happening, a bunch of electrical states flip-flopping inside the machine with the results being interpreted in certain ways. The thing that stands most in the way of getting a straightforward yes or no answer is just that I think we do not have much of a hint of what human intelligence is. I am very persuaded by Howard Gardener's work on multiple intelligence. He is claiming that the sorts of capabilities for doing certain tasks quickly, that we called intelligence, get measured on the standard intelligence test, and things like that in our culture are just a very narrow range of human competencies that are artificially selected out or artificially highlighted. In a South Pacific's Island's culture, for example, th ability to navigate by stars is a crucial part of intelligence, but it is not exactly noted by us. In fact, I think there is a big indeterminacy in the notion of intelligence, whether human or artificial. And then once you go on to say what are the comparisons and contrast of human intelligence and artificial intelligence the questions are sort of fatally infected with the multiple ambiguities involved in the notion of intelligence in general. There is no doubt that machines can do some things that we count as intelligent tasks better than we can, but there is no doubt that there are a lot of things that we can do with the results of some of these processes that the machines cannot and maybe would not be able to do. McGray (University of San Diego): The answer is "yes" and "no." Computers are much more adept than we are at certain kinds of consistency tests and certain kinds of expert systems. But some other sorts of questions, even some simple problems in first order predicate logic, cannot be decided by any machine. Pippin (U.C. San Diego): The real question is a philosophical one: What is human intelligence? Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside): Yes, because human intelligence is the result of the operations of a machine. There is no reason why better machines can't be made. Ross (Claremont Scripps College): No, because a computer needs a programmer to teach it what it needs to know. A computer doesn't have an imagination and without an imagination the computer will be unable to form questions and answers itself or ways of solving problems. A programmer has to do these things, so a computer will always be dependent on programmers. Roth (Claremont McKenna College): That's a really interesting question. The first response I would give I think if we are thinking about human intelligence at it's best, my guess is that artificial intelligence will not be capable of surpassing or even equalling human intelligence, especially if we look at the subtlety and the kind of nuances, the imaginative potential that there is of human intelligence. I'm looking more on the side of creativity. On the side of our intelligence that is laced with feeling, with aesthetic qualities, things of this kind and it seems to me to forget it at least as I'm sitting here now. That it would be difficult to imagine that we could artificially create something that would be equal to that kind of subtlety in terms of intelligence. The other part is a little fictitious, but not entirely so. If human beings fail to develop the potential of their own intelligence it's conceivable to me that we might create artificial intelligence that would be superior to ours. We might be more rational in some ways. So I think this is another thing, the human intelligence is not a fixed element; it's something that could become better or worse, depending on what we choose to do with it, how we develop it. Sometimes we are not nearly as intelligent as we think we are, or as we could be, but I guess I'm impressed by when I look at what the human mind has been capable of doing. That it seems to have a range and a scope on one hand and also a subtle dimension of creativity that I find it hard to define. Schwyzer (U.C. Santa Barbara): It's such a frightening concept. Intelligence by itself is not very interesting. I think that some human should go along with that intelligence. It makes no sense to just have intelligence and nothing more. It's like having weight without size. We can have machines, but intelligence is a human attribute. I suppose I am a humanist. I fail to be fascinated with non-human things. I do have a computer in my office; however, it hasn't been used yet. It's good decoration. Shalinsky (U.C. San Diego): It's not precisely clear what this question is asking. To claim that some intelligence "equals" or "bypasses" another is quite vague. It is certainly clear that many forms of artificial intelligence surpass human intelligence: the calculator can perform functions that humans can not, a plain old digital computer can perform functions that humans cannot, and a super computer can perform functions that humans could not even dream of performing. The question ought to be phrased differently: will artificial intelligence equal or bypass human intelligence in the realms in which the latter is now superior? This is an important question, because it applies an important distinction between the kinds of intelligence behavior (e.g., numbercrunching) better performed by a very fast computer processing in serial fashion, and the kinds of intelligent behavior which are best performed by parallel processors. Humans process in parallel, and this accounts for their ability to perform and unders and in complicated contents. Currently, for example, the prospect of writing a computer program which will model even the simplest kinds of human behavior is quite dim. Consider, for example, the human capacity to interpret utterances: while we understand the meaning of "Mr. Smith watched the fireworks go up in his pajamas last July 4th," the computer has considerable difficulty. While we manage to recognize even as many as hundreds of different faces, the computer has considerable [trouble with face recognition]. In my view, there is absolutely no reason to think that parallel computers will not equal intelligence (even in the domains in which the latter currently surpasses the most advanced artificial intelligence)but this is just a bet, after all! . Sircello (U.C. Irvine): Machines will be able to do more, but will not be more intelligent than humans. Suppes (Stanford University): Already in certain respects, of course, computers could do things better than human beings. For example, computation. Other things they that can't do as well. So I think what will happen will be an increasing complicated comparison. Computers will continue to acquire capabilities they don't now have and so the comparison and kinds of tasks they could do, how well they do in comparison to, show how well humans do, will continue to change. Wollheim (U.C. Davis): The problem that confronts us first is how to introduce consciousness and meaning. I don't have any conviction that this can be done. Woodruff (U.C. Irvine): I think that hardware, as well as wetware, as it's called, can do these things, in principle. So artificial intelligence of this sort is possible. I think to some extent it already exists. But what people have in mind, I suppose, when they ask this question is that they imagine it being like an alien coming and saying these things that we just can't understand and saying, "Oh, he's so smart, he's smarter than we could ever. . ." and so on. Do I think that sort of thing will happen? I can imagine it happening. I think that for a long time, humans would understand how it happened. That is that one would have to create some kind of quasievolutionary mechanisms that would allow machines to evolve, so they could go beyond humans actually programming them. Although even now, computers have certain abilities that even though we program them to do these things, what they do is so complex (because it's so large scale) there is a certain sense in which we can't understand what they're doing. I think that we can understand what artificial intelligence is, and that it's not, in principle, different in kind from what humans do. If there are differences, they have to do with the fact that we are different kinds of machines than electronic computers. We are massively parallel, and we have all these interconnections in the brain which people are now trying to understand, stuff called neural net computing. But it's not any kind of ontological difference, not different kinds of stuff or substance in mind and matter. So do I think that artificial intelligence will equal or bypass human intelligence? I'm not sure, but I certainly wouldn't be surprised. The reason I wouldn't be surprised is that we create machines that are much more powerful physically. I don't see any reason why we cannot create thinking machines that are more powerful than we are. In fact, we've already done it in certain respects. I especially don't think that human intelligence is something that is es entially different from machine intelligence. Our brains thinking or electronics thinking are essentially the same thing. Will Artificial Intelligence Equal or Surpass Human Intelligence? Will Artificial Intelligence Surpass Human Intelligence? page \* arabic PAGE71 McGray (Unive€ From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:32:22 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [184.108.40.206]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06151 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:32:20 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [220.127.116.11]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA30678 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:30:35 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:29:22 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09697841.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: SU 10 Status: RO Û¥ Chapter Ten Which Five Philosophical Books Would You Bring If You Were Going To Be Struck On A Desert Island? Arntzenius (University of Southern California): I'd take J.S. Bell's Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, because I haven't read this book and Bell is the most brilliant writer in philosophical physics. I'd take Van Klaus' book of quantum mechanics which I haven't read and should (prove) to be very interesting. Then I might take the three volume series on parallel distributive processing, which describes neuro-network methods, solving certain problems and prime ultimatum which is discovering intelligence in a scientific series. Last I would probably take the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, so that I would learn more about eastern traditions. Beckman (Harvey Mudd): Aristotle's Ethics, Plato's Republic, Nietzsche's Zarathustra, Wittgenstein's On Certainty, and Heidegger's Being and Time. They're all books that you can read many times and they are new, different every time you read them. Churchland, Paul (U.C. San Diego): I don't think I will take five philosophical books. I already know the philosophical books that I might regard as important. I will take something that I haven't read or I will take something like the Encyclopedia Britannica or something like that, so that I will acquire new information. I don't want to reread books that I already read. I think that answer is this, I will not take any philosophical text at all. I will take the biggest book on physics, astronomy, chemistry, geology, and mathematics that I can find. Cohon (Stanford University): Hard question. I know I won't be able to stand by my list for even a day. But here's today's list: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature--there is so much in it to think about and puzzle over. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals-- it is inspiring, deep, also puzzling, worth reading again and again. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice--an enormous amount in it, and maybe I'd finally get it all down. Plato, several dialogues--I suppose this is a cop-out, but I wouldn't want to be limited to just one. Plato is so subtle and clever. The Euthyphro would be one, and maybe the Meno would be another. Copp (U.C. Davis): How long would I be stuck there? Do you mean forever, with no rescue? If so, I would take Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Rawl's Theory of Justice, Hume's Treatise, Grice's Studies of the Way of Words, and Hobbes' Leviathan. Dreyfus (U.C. Berkeley): I would take Heidegger's Being and Time because I think it is so complicated that though I have taught it for 25 years and written a book on it, I still haven't gotten to the bottom of it. I suppose I would take the Brothers Karamozov which I think is the greatest novel ever written. The fact is that on a deserted island I wouldn't want to read philosophy. I would rather take a lot of good novels like Gravity's Rainbow to read over and over, and the Iliad, and Shakespearean plays. Fischer (U.C. Riverside): I would hope that I could bring more than five, but if I had to choose I would pick: The Republic by Plato, Meditations by Rene Descartes, History of Western Philosophy by Bertrand Russell, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the Groundwork of Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. Friedman (U.C. Davis): Meditations, Descartes; Ethics, Spinoza; A Treatise on Human Nature, Hume; Critique of Pure Reason, Kant; Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu. Kalish (U.C. Los Angeles): The first two I would choose are A Treatise on Human Nature and Enquiry Into Human Understanding by David Hume. Second, I would choose the Autobiography of Bertrand Russell. Third, I would choose the Autobiography of John Stuart Mill. The reason I would choose this is because it is a literary masterpiece as well as an extraordinary book. He was probably one of the only major philosophers in the entire western tradition that really took seriously what we know today as feminism. Next I would choose Human Nature and Conduct by John Dewey because it influenced my own development. Kaplan (U.C. Los Angeles): I would take things that kept me occupied. I would take works by Bertrand Russell and things I really enjoy. Things by Carnap and probably something very mathematical and logical, some kind of reason work, and category theory, something like that. And if I was struck on a desert island I would have plenty of time to read many things I don't have the time for now. Lloyd (U.C. Berkeley): I would take Rousseau--writings on human nature and politics, Saint Augustine's Confessions, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and I would take a book on ethics and society, science and society, but I can't decide which one it would be. Matson (U.C. Berkeley): Plato's Republic; I find something new to argue with in it every time I read it. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations; I would have time to puzzle out the hints. Nietzsche's Will to Power--an enormous treasury of insights waiting to be developed. Spinoza's Ethics for inspiration--the greatest single work of philosophy. Hobbes' controversy with Bramhall on free will. The most fun to read. Schopenhauer's World as Will and Idea would console me for being out of the rat race. McCann (University of Southern California): I'd take, first of all, Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Hume's A Treatise on Human Nature, and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, not only because they are the books I am professionally concerned with and have a lot more to learn, but because they are the most important philosophical works of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rounding out, I would take Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and some of Quine's writings, including Word and Object, as these are among the most fruitful contemporary writings. McGray (University of San Diego): I would probably want the works of Wittgenstein, Russell, Quine, and Putnam, plus some logic texts and stuff on artificial intelligence. Right now I am more interested in certain questions and areas of philosophy rather than specific authors. Needleman (San Francisco State): The Dialogues of Plato, Ethics of Spinoza, Tao Te Ching. Pippin (U.C. San Diego): Plato's Republic; Descartes' Meditations; Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit; Heidegger's Being and Time. Rosenberg (U.C. Riverside): Well, the first thing I'd choose is "Boat Building Made Simple." I would also take Hume's Human Nature, an article on logics-amatics and metamathematics, Quine's Word and Object, and Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ross (Claremont Scripps College): First, five books is not very many when there are so many books to choose from. I would take a book on the works of Plato and Aristotle, Dostoyevsky, any book by Dewey or Kant or Spinoza because they are very religious and deal with pantheism. Scott-Kakures (Claremont Scripps College): I don't think I'd take any philosophy. But, I wonder how I got into such a nightmarish state. I don't know. I guess you're going to force me to answer. I guess Aristotle's Ethics, that's one. Spinoza's Ethics, and Kant's Second Critique. That's all I take. Shalinksy (U.C. San Diego): The best I can do is four: 1) The Critique of Pure Reason (because it's the most important worthwhile hard text in philosophy. 2) The Critique of Practical Reason (because it's the second most worthwhile hard text in philosophy); 3) Neurophilosophy (because I believe human behavior must be explained in neurobiological terms, and because I am mentioned in the prefatory remarks); and 4) any logic textbook (because while away, the long desperate hours by doing logic problems would at least be somewhat distracting). Sircello (U.C. Irvine): Plato's Symposium and Spinoza's Ethics because they deal with my own philosophical interest. Suppes (Stanford University): I would take the collective works of Aristotle; the single volume of Treatise on Human Nature by David Hume; the three critiques of Kant, hopefully in volume--Critique of Pure Reason, and Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgement. Then I might take something of a different sort in science, perhaps a superb text in classical physics partly because I might find it very useful and a superb text in electrical engineering because I would like to set up my own generator. Wollheim (U.C. Davis): Montaigne's Essays, Freud's Introductory Lectures, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Plato's Dialogues, and Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. They are 1) long; 2) interesting and amusing to read; and 3) I haven't read them all. Which Books Would You Bring if Stuck on a Desert Island? Which Books Would You Bring If Stuck On A Desert Island? page \* arabic71 PAGE77 @PJL COMMENT 31.V1.27 for Windows 3.1 @PJL SET RESOLUTION=600 @PJL SET PAGEPROTECT=AUTO @PJL ENTER LANGUAGE=PCL E&u600D%0BINSP1PP1WU0PW0UL2,12.5,12.5,12.5,12.5,12.5,12.5,12.5,12. 5;UL5,40,25,10,25;UL6,35,15,10,15,10,15;LT0,8.5,1LTTR0LA1,4,2, 1%0A&l1X]ÿ6Ð Chapter Ten Which Five Philosophical Books Would You Bring If You Were Going To Be Struck On A Desert Island? € From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:33:12 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [18.104.22.168]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06182 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:33:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [22.214.171.124]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA19944 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:31:22 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:30:20 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09697890.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: email@example.com Subject: SU aut Status: RO Û¥ CALIFORNIA PHILOSOPHERS Adams, Robert: University of California, Los Angeles Aebischer, Scott: California State University, Los Angeles Arntzenius, Frank: University of Southern California Beckman, T.: Harvey Mudd College Beckner, Morton: Pomona College Blake, David: Loyola Marymount University Churchland, Patricia: University of California, San Diego Churchland, Paul: University of California, San Diego Cohon, Rachel: Stanford University Copp, David: University of California, Davis Davis, Steven: Claremont Graduate School Dreyfus, Hubert: University of California, Berkeley Dumont, Michele: Mount Saint Mary's College Fischer, John: University of California, Riverside Friedman, Joel: University of California, Davis Griesmer, James: University of California, Davis Jolley, Nicholas: University of California, San Diego Jubien, Michael: University of California, Davis Kalish, Donald: University of California, Los Angeles Kaplan, David: University of California, Los Angeles Lambert, Joseph: University of California, Irvine Lloyd, Elisabeth: University of California, Berkeley Matson, Wallace: University of California, Berkeley McCann, Edwin: University of Southern California McGray, James: University of San Diego Needleman, Jacob: California State University, San Francisco Neumann, Harry: Claremont Scripps College Pippin, Robert: University of California, San Diego Ring, Merrill: California State University, Fullerton Rosenberg, Alexander: University of California, Riverside Ross, Ralph: Claremont Scripps College Roth, John: Claremont McKenna College Scott-Kakures, Dion: Claremont Scripps College Schwyzer, Hubert: University of California, Santa Barbara Shalinsky, Allison: University of California, San Diego Sircello, Guy: University of California, Irvine Smart, Ninian: University of California, Santa Barbara Suppes, Patrick: Stanford University Wollheim, Richard: University of California, Davis Woodruff, Peter: University of California, Irvine California Philosophers California Philosophers page \* roman page \* roman ˆ CALIFORNIA PHILOSOPHERS Adams, Robert: University of California, Los Angeles Aebischer, Scott: Californi€ From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:33:57 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [126.96.36.199]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06207 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:33:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [188.8.131.52]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA21068 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:32:22 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:31:21 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09697952.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: SU preface Status: RO Û¥ PREFACE In the Fall of 1991 students enrolled in Introduction to Philosophy classes at Mount San Antonio College conducted interviews with some of the most prominent philosophers in California. Ten questions were asked of each philosopher, including queries about the existence of God, life after death, and the interface between human and artificial intelligence. The interviews ranged from personal one on one conversations, to telephone interviews, to mailed written responses. There were originally over fifty interviews that were transcribed. >From these the editors selected between twenty and thirty of the most representative and insightful responses. Moreover, it was not required that each question be answered; thus, some philosophers chose to respond to only a few of the posed questions. The overall result is a fascinating study of the rarefied world of professional philosophy which provides a glimpse into how philosophers deal with questions that have held a perennial interest to humankind, regardless of time and place. What is perhaps most revealing in this study is how often philosophers from different research backgrounds agree, especially when dealing with questions concerning the existence of a Supreme Being or the possibility of life after death. Although the philosophers represented in this book reflect a wide variety of interests (a significant number, for instance, were chairpersons of their respective departments), it should be noted that this selection is a small one and not necessarily indicative of the majority of professional philosophers in California. Introduction Preface page \* romanix PAGEix PREFACE In the Fall of 1991 students enrolled in Introduction to Philosophy classes at Mount San Antonio Colleg€ From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:35:29 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [184.108.40.206]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06338 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:35:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [220.127.116.11]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA30612 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:34:02 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:32:34 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09698019.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: email@example.com Subject: chapter 1 (?) Status: RO Û¥ It is often recounted that the first meeting of the two famous Sufi saints, Malauna Rum and Shams-i Tabriz, was anything but ordinary. The most popular version of this story recounts that the former, an intense devotee of the Lord, had earnestly prayed: "Please give me some dear friend of Thine to be my companion, with whom I may share the agonies of diving separation and the joys of meeting." God then sent him off to Kuniya where he soon came upon a renowned scholar and philosopher, sitting beside a pool of water. Seeing that this gentlemen was perusing some lengthy manuscripts, Tabriz enquired: "You appear to be busy. May I ask what is so seriously engaging your attention?" Malauna responded: "These are priceless works and in them are some deep and divine mysteries, insoluble to many of the best scholars. I am now in the process of solving them....of course, these works are far beyond your comprehension, for only a highly trained intellect could ever hope to understand them." A smile lit upon Shams- i Tabr z's face, and he immediately jumped forward, grabbed the books and threw them in the water. True knowledge, he told Malauna, "does not reside in books." The shocked scholar, not believing what had just occurred, sadly replied: "Oh dervish, you don't know what you have just done. You do not understand what a loss the world has suffered from your actions. There were rare treasures in these works, and now they are lost forever." Shams-i smiled again, and then, putting his hand in the water, retrieved the manuscripts and returned them to Malauna in their original condition. He then remarked: "Don't break your heart over such children's toys." Not surprisingly, this was a tremendously cathartic experience for Malauna, and he soon discarded all his books and went on to become both a most devoted disciple and celebrated sufi mystic. This story, obviously, is of questionable credibility (as are many of the putatively miraculous events with hagiographical literature tries to associate with the object of their idolatry). This need not overly concern us, however, for whether or not this narration accurately portrays the initial meeting of these two saints, it does nevertheless correctly communicate a very important message about the difficulty encountered when one attempts to study or describe a mystical religion. That is, the study of such is always, by way of very definition, explicitly reductionistic. Stated simply, such a dimunition is endemic to each and every methodology--whether it be primitivization (Freudian, for e.g.) theory, functionalism, hermeneutical enquiry, structuralism, or developmental appraisal--which the investigator currently has at his or her disposal (with the exception of actually adopting a meditative discipline and experiencing the mystic state for one's self). Any attempt at analysis of the sacred through the mundane is simply bound to fail in some respect. And while the possibility of a sociology of empathetic-participation (or internal gnosis) is a provocative suggestion, it cannot satisfy my stated purpose, namely: to complete a thesis which pretends to illuminate one or more aspects of the explicitly mystical religion of the Radhasoami satsang. First, such a methodology, which I would argue is actually the only proper avenue for understanding those movements which continually remind us of the meaninglessness of conceptual knowledge, is clearly quite beyond the capabilities of this author (who is currently so far away from the attainment of internal gnosis that it seems all but impossible). And even if one more disciplined and qualified than myself were to succeed in such an endeavor and gain true knowledge for himself, we can confidently presume that he would, as all those before him, remind us that this enlightenment was beyond all expression. Finally, in a worse case scenario--one in which this radical methodology was combined with the more conventional approaches those findings which might have been articulated prior to internal gnosis would probably be irretrievably lost (unless, of course, the scholar under whose tutelage one initiated the investigation had, as Shams-i, the ability to re-create destroyed manuscripts!). This would, of course, be immensely satisfying at a personal level, but even the more liberal academics at this institution tend to desire something a little more palpable prior to the awarding of degrees. All students (in this world of "publish or perish") of mystic religion, then, have constructed for themselves a pathological paradox: they have chosen to investigate that which, when fully understood, precludes all recapitulation. We can, obviously, escape the dilemma by studying the secular side of these movements exclusively; analyzing, if you will, only the dimension of "religion, " and arbitrarily excluding the "mystic" aspect. But while this may be enlightening in its own ways, it fails in a fundamental regard, since both sides of the expression must clearly be posited simultaneously if we are to correctly understand the tradition as an organic whole. Moreover, when we choose to investigate truly other- worldly individuals, the sants become prime instances, such an approach is of negligible utility, for we quickly discover that they generally disregard the secular in favor of an exclusive emphasis upon the sacred. We must begin our study, then, cautiously, noting that we can never hope to successfully enunciate that which for us remains wholly other. Ironically, however, those mystics whom we will analyze are confronted by precisely the same dilemma. It is here we find the opening through which we can try to peek into these spiritual communities, for though we may never be able to adequately describe the sacred, neither can even the "greatest" among our vast heritage of religious prophets. Indeed, we might even go so far as to postulate that the degree to which a saint is able to express his experience is inversely proportional to the ultimacy of his enlightenment. The fact remains, however, that most mystics do try to convey in various ways their intuitions or apprehensions. We may not fully comprehend the ground of this communication but we can successfully investigate and appraise the description itself, as long as we keep this caveat--that what we are studying is at best an imperfect and limited view of the ineff ble--constantly at the fore of our minds. The question which arises in this atmosphere is How to best examine this communication? Van Baaren reminds us that the systematic science of religion, is distinguished from other systematic disciplines...by its lack of normative character. It only studies religions as they are empirically and disclaims any statements concerning the value and truth of the phenomena studied...[the inevitable convictions of the scholar] are irrelevant for scientific work and [he] must rule them out as much as possible in his research...As the truth of religion cannot be scientifically demonstrated, science of religion refrains from any judgement. Our self-appointed task will be, then, pseudo-phenomenological; we will try to simply reproduce the teachings enunciated within the Radhasoami movement as precisely as possible, all the while excluding, to the extent that we are able, our own socio-cultural prejudices. To facilitate this, we shall attempt to comprehend religion and religious activities as meaningful to the individuals involved int eh spiritual community. Furthermore, in order to prevent what would be an incorrectly exclusive correlation of the term "individuals" with the disciples within this movement, we shall also engage in a hermeneutical analysis (as far as is cognizable) of the mystics' attempted communication of trans-mundane "truth." We concern ourselves, then, primarily with the interpretation of subjective meaning, or in the parlance of the phenomenologists among us, the "intentionality" of religion. As a corollary, we will strenuously attempt to avoid compromising our ability to reveal this meaning by rejecting at the outset the always- seductive tendency to evaluate the group according to any of the critical dimensions which we no doubt possess a priori: thus, our methodology admittedly has very few "teeth," indeed we will actually endeavor to remove most of them. We will, in other words, engage a Weberian or verstehen approach to the scientific study of religion. Like Weber, however, we will combat the potential radicalization and subjectivism of our methodology by supplementing this with yet another distinct approach, namely: causal inquiry or explanation. Among those influences which we can identify, probably the most important and yet misinterpreted is the history of the Radhasoami movement. My goal in this essay, then, first and foremost, is to produce a comprehensive though concise description of the formative (i.e., early) history of this group. Above all else, I am concerned with the synthesis and introduction of the facts pertaining to these significant years, particularly those which pertain to the various succession crises, for only if we begin to understand this aspect can we ever hope that Radhasoami studies will evolve from its present stage of stagnant infancy and claim its rightful position as an immensely productive field of scholarly research into the sociology, psychology, philosophy, etc. of religion. I begin my work, therefore with a short articulation of the sant tradition, clearly the major anterior influence upon the Radhasoami movement. Here we find the earliest manifestation of the three distinguishing characteristics of the Radhasoami faith, the exclusive emphases upon shabd, satguru and bhakti. Moreover, it is in this section that we first encounter what will become a recurring dualism, namely: the internal and external aspects of each of these foci. We trace our examination from the formative stages of this movement through to the times of Tulsi Sahib, according to all current evidence the last sant prior to the real object of our study, Shiv Dayal, the founder of the Radhasoami satsang. We then provide what little information is available about the life of the latter, emphasizing what we know of his direct and indirect relations with the sants. After this, I will provide a summary of the major tenets of the Radhasoami faith as articulated by Shiv Dayal, and though this section is severely limit d due to necessary brevity, I will again briefly allude to the soteriological dualism so characteristic of the sants. I commence chapter three by introducing a heuristic concept of paradox and demonstrating that much of Shiv Dayal's teachings can only be appreciated through a proper understanding of this notion. >From here we will delineate some theoretical hypothesis about the structure and content of religious paradox, asserting that it is not only necessary but also immensely beneficial in various respects. In many ways, Radhasoami paradox is best understood as an expression of the sant dualism remarked upon earlier. Appreciation of the assets of paradox, however, should not prevent one from remarking about the tensions associated with it. Let's be frank: no one likes to accept that he is being given apparently contradictory instructions, even if he does understand why this is necessary. Moreover, we will even briefly suggest that paradox is successful to the extent that it does exert constant pressure upon the disciple by pulling him or her in opposing directions. This is probably very hard to live with, and thus there is a constant tendency to try to solve the inherent contradictions of the teachings. We will argue that during the times of Shiv Dayal, though, these tensions were both rooted in and alleviated by the central and most fundamental paradox within Radhasoami: the guru. After the death of this remarkable mystic-prophet, however, there manifested simultaneously a need to eliminate the tensions of paradox and an understandable desire to routinize succession to the guruship. We will describe two fundamental approaches to the latter question, and associate each with one of the two major sub-lineages which developed after Shiv Dayal. Both of these factions, we will argue, attempted to resolve the paradoxes we will posit, and it is when we examine this that we come upon the primary thesis I am trying to advance. We can and, I believe will demonstrate that each group resolved the tensions of doctrinal contradiction in a manner which they explicitly (though not necessarily intentionally) derived from the way they resolved the problem of succession. We indicate this by examining first the history of each sub-lineage, then enunciating (both concretely and abstractly) the method which they used to identify and legitimize successorship, and finally by noting the effects of such upon t e evolution of doctrine. Finally, in an effort to standardize this work by giving my introduction, as is so popular these days, the tone of an apologia, I conclude by telling the reader that my opinions and interpretations, like my errors, are my own, and though I have tried throughout to provide an empathetic articulation these need not and should not be taken as necessarily accurate expositions of the teachings I am trying to reveal. From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:37:47 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [18.104.22.168]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06413 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:37:45 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [22.214.171.124]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA28386 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:36:11 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:34:23 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09698135.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: chapter 2 (?) Status: RO Û¥ The "path of the saints," commonly referred to as sant mat or nirguna bhakti, represents perhaps both the most important and least understood religious development within india during the last Christian millennium. Though Ramanand and Jnanesvar are often considered the founders of this school of thought, its original articulation, systematization and widespread expansion are properly traced to the influence of Kabir in the north and Namdev in the south. Their fertile legacy, the sant tradition which was to inspire an unprecedented emergence of sublime mystic-poets (among them: Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism; Raidas; Paltu; and Dadu), represents from a diachronic perspective, a spiritual lineage without being parampara in the conventional sense of the term. From a synchronical point of view, they form kinds of loose confraternities made of intensely pious and other-worldly laymen and women, belonging mostly though not exclusively, to the lower strata of Indian society. It can thus be stated that sant mat does not constitute a religion in the traditional sense of the word, indeed it cannot even be properly described as a distinct, precise or homogenous philosophical school; rather, the term accurately denotes a diverse spiritual "movement" of sorts, one which manifested a common religious "attitude" by adhering to generally similar metaphysical and soteriological notions. As the tradition evolved, this spiritual milieu became more structured and elaborate, conveying a cultural identity upon its adherents by communicating a latent disciplinary matrix, representing a broad constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and moral injunctions. By virtue of these similar religious, theological, soteriological and social orientations, however, this tradition also manifested a quasi- communal identity which was maintained by, some principles of cohesion fundamental to many aspects of Indian cultural reality. Underlying their perception was the common South Asian world view which sees the varied orders of the created universe as forming a continuous, substantial whole. Within this substantial universe were distinguished two basic principles of cohesion. The first depended on a concept of the organic relationship between guru and disciples, which generated self-perpetuating lineages; the second derived from a sense that "true" sants of any lineage formed a vaguely related spiritual clan.... The sant philosophy (for want of an appropriate neologism) which these mystics share appears, upon cursory glance, to be fundamentally syncretic, at its core apparently consisting in the nexus of a subtle wedding of virtually every dominant Indic religious tradition of the time. Among the components of this synthesis, movements of dissent-- particularly Sufism, Vaishnava bhakti, and (after Kabir) the yoga of the Nath cult--against the external and conventional religious sensibilities of the time seem to have had the most significant influence. In the works of virtually all of the sants, therefore, we find attacks (often fierce) and explicit denunciations of idolatry, caste-distinction, ritualism, etc. And yet their teachings, though at times they resemble on the surface any number of these more prominent traditions (they have been, for e.g., recurringly categorized as reformist vaishnavites), when viewed as an organic whole cannot be properly classified among any of them. These mystic-poets remain first and foremost neither social reformers nor even religious prophets, but rather true bhakts constantly absorbed in a relationship of love with the transcendent divine they apprehend as immanent to their very being. Admittedly, much of the confusion arises from their repeatedly endowing vaishnava names to the Supreme Being, but the fulcrum of their attention is neither worship of the lord Vishnu nor any of his avatars (incarnations; Krishna and Rama, for e.g.). Similarly, the authority of Puranic lore is denied and their strict monotheism explicitly repudiates the Hindu pantheon. Instead, sant bhakti is characteristically an individualized extension of saguna bhakti which is most often distinguished by the orientation towards the essentially nirguna (formless and impersonal) Supreme Being which they intuit within the interior recesses of their own hearts. Though this theological bent has seduced many to classify the sants as Vedantic advaitists (lit., "non-dualists"), with whom they at times do have much in common, they unanimously defy such compartmentalization. Their descriptions of the Supreme Being were neither limited to realms of saguna or the nirguna, nor to theism or monism, nor to any other aspects, which they consider simply arbitrary and man-made limitations given to the ultimate. The divine as apprehended by these mystics defies all logical or rational conceptionalization and accordingly, despite their very own articulations, remains for the unenlightened ganz andere and wholly ineffable. Generally members of the lower castes, these uneducated and other- wordly saints sought not only to communicate this experience of the sacred (inevitably in the vernacular) but also to make such an internal gnosis readily accessible to all those who truly yearned for true and ultimate moksa (salvation). It should not be inferred from this that sant bhakti, as is the case of more conventional bhakti movements, was portrayed by these mystics as an easy path or one which could be followed by the masses. Although bhakti was primarily conceived of as a path of bliss, it has been simultaneously described as an arduous and difficult journey, full of suffering from the pain of separation from the beloved. The bhakti of the sants is further characterized by the fact that it only finds proper expression in two forms: to the satguru (representing both the ultimate Reality apprehended in one's self and the human guru) and through meditation upon his name (lit., "name") or shabd (lit., "word"). Ram or Nam on the one hand and the Satguru on the other constitute for the human jiva the only two possible modes of apprehending the Divine--and ultimately of merging into It. Both have an exterior (voiced or visible) aspect as well as an interior (unvoiced or invisible) aspect; but the first is clearly subservient to the second and it is only the inner sadhana, the interior religion which leads the soul to the mystical experience known as paraca: through paraca, the jiva is reabsorbed into the oneness of Ram 'as water merges into water': suh is the mysterious state of 'Sahaja', which can only be accomplished within. Having noted such, we can now safely assert that sant mat, though it owed much to some of the more traditional religious movements which surrounded it during its infancy, is clearly distinguished precisely by virtue of the uniqueness of the emphasis given to these two exclusive foci for bhakti. There is no doubt that the sant tradition generally, particularly as manifested in the teachings of Nanak, was instrumental in the way Shiv Dayal Singh articulated what came to be known as the Radhasoami faith. Without diminishing the importance of these earlier mystics, however, we can clearly posit that the primary vehicle for conveying the sant heritage to the latter was the 19th century guru, Tulsi Sahib of Hathras. Being both the latest saint (prior to Shiv Dayal), a contemporary for roughly twenty years and a close associate, there can be no doubt that if we are to look for direct influences exclusive of mystic revelation, then it is to him that we must turn. Despite his diachronic proximity to us, though, it is also in Tulsi, ironically, that we encounter a recurring dilemma in the study of the sant tradition. Though he was, no doubt, and remains an important-- albeit controversial--personage in the annals of Indian spiritual history the biographical information which is available to the interested scholar is extremely vague, most of it coming from the putatively autobiographical portions of his writings; these are at best contradictory and certainly of questionable credibility. Proceeding with this obstacle in mind, we can cautiously recount that Tulsi is reputed to have come from the royal lineage of Peshwas in Poona. He was born sometime in the latter half of the 1700s, but early in life decided to renounce the world and fled from the Peshwa's court in approximately 1804. After travelling extensively, particularly in the south, he settled in Hathras and came to be known as Dakhani Baba ("sage from the south"). Though he never acknowledged the identity of his guru (if he indeed adopted one) in his writings, two distinct possibilities have been enunciated. Kirpal Singh, relying upon a volatile contention that the last of the Sikh Gurus, Gobind Singh, did not die in 1708 (as conventional wisdom would have us believe), argues that Tulsi's ministry was simply an extension of the true Sikh parampara: During his extensive travels, he [Guru Gobind Singh's] met and lived with the ruling family of the Peshwas and initiated some of its members into the inner science. It is said that one Ratnagar Rao of the Peshwa family was initiated and authorized to carry on the work by Guru Gobind Singh. Sham Rao Peshwa, the elder brother of Baji Rao, the then ruling chief who must have contact Ratnagar Rao, showed a remarkable aptitude for the spiritual path and made rapid headway. In course of time, this young scion of the royal family settled in Hathras, and came to be known as Tulsi Sahib. Again Prasad Mathur responds, with some justification perhaps, that the presupposition underlying this assertion is both unsubstantiated and of dubious veracity: ...this statement is not historically true. Guru Gobind Singh died in 1708. The same year Sahu, son of Shivaji, became king of Maharashtra and appointed Valaji Vishwanath as the first Peshwa in 1713. Baji Rao became Peshwa in 1720 and he was the eldest son of his father (Balaji Vishwanath). Pandit Pandurang Sharma, a Marathi scholar, contended in the June 31 issue of Vividh Gyan Vistar that Tulsi "was initiated by a guru in the town of Hathras, and under the instructions of his guru he did intense meditation." No evidence in support of this supposition is currently available, however, nor has this reputed guru ever been identified. Indeed, the members of the Tulsi panth (also known as the Sahib panth) which continue to oversee Tulsi's samadh and relics deny that he even recognized anyone as his spiritual master. Finally, one should not overlook a distinctly possible scenario in which Tulsi, if he was indeed initiated, receives updesh (initiation instructions) from an as of yet unidentified guru in the south of India. Tulsi's ministry, narrated in his Ghat Ramayan, Ratan Sagar, Shabdavali and the uncompleted Padma Sagar, represented a broad and highly developed systematization of the philosophy of the earlier sants. He is said to have been the first mystic to employ the term sant mat as a description for the teachings of the movement. In his writings (many of which recount lively encounters with scholars and priests) we can delineate an extremely comprehensive and developed cosmology, the standard rejection of ritual observances, etc. Of particular importance for our purposes, however, is his precise identification of the shabd as a melodious current or manifestation of the divine, and his continuing emphasis on the interiority of both religious devotion and experience. He reminds us, for instance, in the Shabdavali: Who have seen within, the splendor of the celestial region with their inner eye, they alone can show the beginning of the beginning. Who have found the secrets of the supreme state, only they give us hints of that state. Who have merged their souls in Shabd have realized the truth of what Master hath said. Who have permitted the current of spiritual regions above, they know the state of the Inaccessible. Varied aspects of the mystery and the secret of the Unspoken Word are unravelled by them. Who have brought faith and have learned this truth, they alone can look for the Lord. Tulsi attracted a significant following, among whom Surswami, Girdhara Das, Gharib Das and (according to some) Shiv Dayal were the most prominent. The association between Tulsi and the latter shall be dealt with in more detail later in this work, but as we shall repeatedly see the perspectives of this relationship enunciated are often quite contradictory, primarily as a result of the differing doctrinal presuppositions underlying each. By way of conclusion to this section, then as introduction to the next, I will reproduce the little (though enlightening) credible information which is available to us regarding the relationship of these two sants. 1. The manuscript accounts of Baba Surain Singh, the Jeevan Charitra Soamiji Maharaj by Seth Partap Singh, and other accounts mention that Shiv Dayal's parents were devotees of Tulsi Sahib. 2. Tulsi Sahib named the sons of Dilwali Singh; respectively, Shiv Dayal, Bindraban, and Partap. 3. Shiv Dayal held great respect for Tulsi Sahib, often recounting stories connected with his life and work. Also, he had a close association with many of Tulsi Sahib's devotees, including Girdhari Lal, whom he supported during his last years. 4. Shiv Dayal Singh, after the passing of Tulsi Sahib, would visit Hathras to honor the memory of the saint. 5. Gharib Das, one of the earliest disciples of Tuylsi Sahib, stated that Tulsi Sahib passed on his spiritual mantleship to Shiv Dayal Singh (then known as Munshi Ji) before his death in 1843. 6. The writings of Tulsi Sahib were held with great veneration. Shiv Dayal also referred to him as "Sat Sahib" ('True Lord'), as did Dayal's disciples. THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SHIV DAYAL SINGH Prior to any examination for the life of the progenitor of the Radhasoami satsang, Shiv Dayal Singh, known to his followers as Radhasoamiji or simply Soamiji Maharaj, we must issue a caveat which the reader should keep in mind throughout this entire essay: despite his influential position, given the subsequent growth and expansion of his sampradaya throughout both India and a number of foreign countries, Soamiji's biography and the nature of his teachings to this day remain shrouded in the cloak of historical controversy and mystery. Western scholarly attention did not focus upon him or the Radhasoami faith until decades after his death and the initial schisms which ensued, and those early reports which were eventually produced were so strongly influenced by the Christian missionary zeal of their authors that they are of very limited utility to the modern researcher. In addition to this, Soamiji provided no written narrative of his life, and thus academics studying this tradition are compelled to rely upon he brief biographical accounts published in sectarian literature, as well as the larger Jeevan Charitra Soami Maharaj, authored by his younger brother and devoted disciple, Seth Pratap Singh. This absence of reliable third-party accounts is certainly an obstacle, but nevertheless, it should not be overemphasized, for despite the rather limited scope of the available sources general unaninimity regarding the major dates and many of the events of his life does exist, a rare and fortunate occurrence within the Indian sant tradition. Soamiji was born on August 25, 1818 at Panni Gali, three miles from the heart of Agra. Little information regarding his family lineage is available, abut it is known that both of his parents, Seth Diwali Singh and Maha Maya, as well as most of his extended family were well- versed in the sant mat tradition. His father, and perhaps certain other relations, were originally members of the Nanak panth; and as a result, Nanak's writings (the Jap Ji, for e.g.) were recited by the family on a regular basis and clearly played a significant formative role in his early spiritual development. The other major mystical influence within his family was the aforementioned Tulsi Sahib of Hathras, the primary satguru in the shabd yoga tradition of the time. Both Diwali Singh and Maha Maya were initiates of this sant, as were numerous other members of the family. This association remained very close throughout Tulsi Sahib's life, as it is recorded that Soamiji's family often visited Hathras, and likewise would be visited in Ag a by their satguru. Indeed, it is suggested by some that being particularly pleased with the devotion of the family during one of these latter occasions he foretold the coming of Shiv Dayal, as well as his divine status, as Puri narrates: Seth Dilwali Singh's mother [Soamiji's grandmother] replied, "I have everything through your grace and need nothing. But," pointing to her daughter-in-law, she submitted, "Mahamaya wants something." Mahamaya, the wife of Seth Dilwali Singh, had no son. Tulsi Sahib, in the same vein of compassion and kindness said, "Yes, she will have a son. But do not look upon the child as a mere human being." [i.e. he will be a perfect Saint]. At the age of five Shiv Dayal began his formal education, and attained the proficiency in Hindi, Urdu, Gurmukhi, Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit. His apparently remarkable scholastic success notwithstanding, his religious tendencies, coupled perhaps with the mystical atmosphere which had permeated his infancy asserted themselves when he was only six years old; at this young age he began to perform daily meditation (abhyas) while continuing with his studies. Evidently, the observation of his predisposition toward spiritual activity (parmarth), coupled with Tulsi's augury, impacted the family's perception and treatment of the youth: even this early in life he seems to have been accorded the reverence and "prestige" usually reserved for one's satguru alone. Not only did he receive respectful treatment, but Pratap Singhji recollects that, Even during his school days, Soamiji Maharaj used to impart religious instructions of the highest order to His parents and the members of His family, acquaintances and ascetics who came to Him. Though this inclination towards spiritual practices continued to assert itself, Soamiji's early life followed, for the most part, the traditional grihashtri (householder) pattern, though it seems that his worldly actions were often performed only in deference to his parents' wishes. He was, for instance, married at an early age to Narayan Dei of Fairdabad--later known as Radhaji Maharaj when she began to play a role in his public satsang--at the request of his father. The emphasis on dutiful performance of swarth (wordly work) and parmarth, which came to figure prominently in his later discourses and teachings, can thus clearly find precedent and perhaps a degree of inspiration in his own early childhood experiences. Upon the completion of his formal education, Soamiji began to work for a governmental officer in Banda as a Persian translator. Feeling, however, that the duties of this position were too onerous to permit sufficient devotional exercises (sadhana) he left the post and began to serve as a Persian tutor with the raja of Ballabhgarh for a few hours daily. He served in this capacity for a time, but upon his father's illness and eventual death Soamiji returned to Panni Gali where he was to spend the rest of his life. Very little is known about the next phase of his life, except that he disapproved of the family's money-lending business and put an end to it. Having done so, it seems that Soamiji began to devote himself fully to intense spiritual activity, sitting in continual meditation for lengthy periods, as well as giving private discourses and initiations to a small group of disciples. This persisted for approximately fifteen years until 1861, when the foundations for what came to be known as the Radhasoami Satsang were established, as described by Pratap Singh: For more than a year, some satsangis and satsangins had been praying to His august graciousness for the establishment of general satsang. Soamiji Maharaj accepted their prayer. He was pleased to start discourses on Sant Mat to Parmathis at his own residence on Basant Panchmi day, Friday, the 15th of February, 1861 A.D. As a result of the regular public discourses and initiations which ensued, his following expanded rapidly: prior to his death on June 15, 1878 he is said to have initiated between eight and ten thousand individuals. In addition to this, he authored a number of devotional hymns in Urdu which were compiled after his death in Sar Bachan Radhasoami Chand-Band, and notes from his discourses were later arranged in Sar Bachan Radhasoami Bartik. Both of these works, covering all the essentials of the faith, served continue to function as elementary texts for virtually every subsequent disciple in the Radhasoami tradition. THE TEACHINGS OF SHIV DAYAL SINGH As all the other mystics who preceded him in the sant tradition, Soamiji Maharaj's spiritual ministry and teachings were premised upon a precise and developed notion of cosmogeny, as well as the theological and soteriological concepts which were abstracted from it. The foundation for all his doctrinal elaborations was, of course, his perception of Supreme Reality in its ultimate state. This formless Lord, totally beyond comprehension or description, is said to exist absorbed within itself (unmun) in a state of sunn samadhi (intense rapture or bliss). Unfathomable, infinite, eternal, and nameless (anami), this radically prior consciousness is described by Shiv Dayal as simply "a wonder, a wonder, a wonder." At some point in his ministry, Soamiji adopted the appellation "Radhasoami" (radhasvami) for this Supreme Being. Wonder, writes Soamiji, "then took on a form," whereupon he outlines an elaborate and comprehensive cosmology. The divine Being initially manifest as a creative urge, a form which he calls mauj. From this, a current descended and created a hierarchy of spiritual levels, corresponding to various planes of consciousness. The cosmological/ontological schema he then outlines is first subdivided into a number of realms or deshes: sat desh, brahmand, and, and pind. These deshes--with the notable exception of pind--are then further subdivided into eight smaller regions, called pads or loks. Beginning from the top, they are: Radhasoami dham (corresponding to the absolute, formless and ultimate state of sunn samadhi outlined above); alakh lok; agam lok; sat lok; bhanwar gupha; daswan dwar (sometimes further departmentalized into sun and maha sunn); trikuti; and, sahans-dal-kanwal. The other desh, pind, corresponds to both the cosmological and physiological; it signifies the entire cosmos in which we currently exist, as well as our physical body, the associated cakras (or ganglia) and the levels of consciousness we experience when our attention operates from each of these centers (waking or dreaming consciousness, for e.g. ). The process of creation itself can be separated into two distinct phases. The first consisted in the Lord directly manifesting himself, in varying degrees of intensity, to effect the divisions of agam, alakh, and sat lok. At this point, however, he projected himself into two forms: the shabd and the surats. The latter, loosely translated as either individuated consciousness or souls, are thus considered to be a part (ansh) of the Supreme Being. This is the fundamental foal of Soamiji's mat, to reveal to the surat that, in its actual and true nature, it is undifferentiated from the Lord. The basic problematic for Radhasoami, then, is identity. Soamiji reminds us of this on numerous occasions: [the malady] is ignorance, for the individual does not know who he is, whose essence he is and where is that Source...The disease of ignorance cannot be got rid of by dogmatic belief...but it will be cured by taking shelter of Sat Guru of the time. He will give the necessary vision; then the Jiva will know itself and its master. Listen thou, from me, O soul, to the secret of thine own being. Thou wert ever one with me. The surat, then, having descended to the bottom of the spiritual hierarchy, is not aware of itself. This unenlightened surat, called the jiva when in this world, is enclosed by mental, astral, and physical sheaths or bodies, must undergo death and rebirth in chaurasi (lit. "the wheel of eighty-four," or transmigration) and experiences the transitory pain and pleasure as a result of the karma it accumulates. Salvation (moksa), for Soamiji, represents a reversal of the process of creation which was responsible for this loss of identity and the concomitant suffering of the surat. Described as the dispelling of maya (or delusion), it consists in the extrication of the jiva from the lower creation, culminating eventually in the recognition of its true identity; this illuminative and unitive revelation is described as a return or a merger with the Lord. The liberation of the soul (jivan mukti) by ascent to its "true and original home" is, then, the ultimate (if not the only objective of Soamiji's teachings, representing as it does the only possible avenue for the attainment of real and permanent bliss. The only method for this God-realization (i.e., self-realization), in Shiv Dayal Singh's view, is the path of devotion or bhakti. In this world, the soul acts as though it is a separate and discreet entity. This "egocentric" view, though incorrect, cannot be dispelled by merely asserting one's consciousness as undifferentiated. Rather, one's entire method of cognition must be altered such that one begins to actually experience and apprehend himself in this manner. And it is only through total surrender to and love for the divine Being that this can be achieved. Consistent with the sant tradition, within the Radhasoami teachings there are two essential foci for the practice of this bhakti--shabd and the satguru--each of which represents a manner in which the formless Lord is said to manifest and mediate himself. THE SHABD As briefly described earlier, the Supreme Being projected himself at sat lok into two forms: the shabd and the surat. The latter represents the individual souls which populate the various levels of lower consciousness. The former, on the other hand, is an audible (and visible) current or sound which is responsible for the creation of these lower planes. It literally permeates and sustains the cosmos, and in a more important sense, it is considered to be identical to the divine; it is a wholly sacred manifestation of the formless ultimate. This shabd has a dual function, however, both creative and attractive. In this purview, the path of illumination, as alluded to earlier, is considered simply a reversal of the process of creation: just as the shabd descended to create the cosmos, so the jiva must ascend through (and eventually transcend) the lower levels of consciousness. This surat, by focusing its attention upon the shabd, is attracted by it and pulled upwards in such a way that consciousness is gradually withdrawn from the lower regions until it eventually comes to recognize itself as a projection of this very shabd. The practice of this shabd-bhakti, called surat-shabd-yoga (lit. union of the surat with the shabd), is the core of the devotional techniques (sadhana) Soamiji taught. To understand it, we must first note the two aspects of shabd (also called nam) which Shiv Dayal Singh describes: My brother! I am going to define nam. It is of two kinds. They are dhunatmak nam and the varna form of the dhunatmak nam. I give out details of both these kinds. What is uttered by tongue may be termed as varna or akshar. What is spoken and reduced to writing is termed varnatmak. The varnatmak is lakhayak [indicator] of dhun. But without perfect guru, nothing can be achieved. From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 17:40:28 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [126.96.36.199]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id RAA06533 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 17:40:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [188.8.131.52]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id UAA44250 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:39:53 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 20:38:54 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09698418.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: email@example.com Subject: notes about documents... Status: RO Dave, Chapter 9 didn't import... I'll check it out and try to send it soon. I e-mailed two documents called chapters 1 and 2... I don't know what they were for, but I mailed them anyway. I tried to senf everything in order, but then I noticed the preface was missing... sorry I mailed it out order. Also, the class syllabi didn't import. I'll check them out and see what's up. I'm going to e-ail Dennis from MSAC about how to get a comment feature for the page... hopefully he'll give me the html codes and I'll just give them to you. I think I sent you my MSAC account address, right? Well, just in case, it's firstname.lastname@example.org Thanks, Dave, and I'll try to have everything else done soon. See you... PAUL From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 18:11:43 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [184.108.40.206]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id SAA08152 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 18:11:41 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [220.127.116.11]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id VAA24530 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 21:10:56 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 21:09:44 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09700391.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: email@example.com Subject: philo Status: RO Introduction to Philosophy Class Outline: Spring 1996 1 Professor: David Christopher Lane, Ph.D. Office: 26-D 211-G Phone: 909 594-5611 (4593)--off campus only On campus: dial 4000 then 4593 Fax: 909 594-7661 E-mail address: firstname.lastname@example.org Web site: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane Office hours: 12:45 to 2:15 p.m. (Monday and Wednesday) 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. (Friday) Subjects currently teaching: Introduction to Major World Religions; Introduction to Philosophy; and Introduction to Sociology. REQUIRED BOOKS: 1. Looking at Philosophy by Palmer. 2. Schrodinger's Kittens and the Search for Reality by John Gribbin. 3. Darwin's Dangerous Idea by Daniel Dennett 4. Why I Don't Eat Faces by MSAC. 5. The Trial and Death of Socrates by Plato. 6. The Socratic Universe edited by MSAC. 7. Talks with Sri Ramana Maharshi 8. Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality by Ken Wilber. 9. Gentle Godlessness by Paul O'Brien. 10. Portable Nietzsche edited by Kaufmann. 11. The Razor's Edge by W. Somerset Maugham. 12. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul by Paul Churchland. 13. The Science of Superconsciousness by Tony Kassir 14. Da: The Strange Case of Franklin Jones RECOMMENDED (but not mandatory) TEXT: 1. The World Treasury of Physics, Astronomy, and Mathematics edited by Ferris. OVERALL CLASS REQUIREMENTS (mandatory): 1. Perfect class attendance. 2. Absolutely no tardies. 3. All reading completed on time. 4. Up-to-date record of class/test progress and monthly e-mail updates. 5. Consistent in-class participation and engagement. 6. Weekly e-mail progress reports on reading/analysis. 7. Two questions on assigned reading each week. 8. Periodic meetings with class T.A. WEEKLY READING ASSIGNMENTS (All reading assignments must be done on the required date; absolutely no exceptions) Monday, Week Two: Looking at Philosophy by Palmer (entire book). Monday, Week Three: Schrodinger's Kittens and the Search for Reality by John Gribbin (entire book) Monday, Week Four: Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1/2 of book) Monday, Week Five: Darwin's Dangerous Idea (2/2 of book) Monday, Week Six: Why I Don't Eat Faces and The Socratic Universe (both in their entirety) Monday, Week Seven: The Trial and Death of Socrates by Plato (entire book) Monday, Week Eight: Talks with Sri Ramana Maharshi (assigned portions) & The Science of Superconsciousness Monday, Week Nine: Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality (1/2 of book) Monday, Week Ten: Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality (2/2 of book) & Da: The Strange Case of Franklin Jones Monday, Week Eleven: Gentle Godlessness by Paul O'Brien (entire manuscript) Monday, Week Twelve: Portable Nietzsche (1/2 of book) Monday, Week Thirteen: Portable Nietzsche (2/2 of book) Monday, Week Fourteen: The Razor's Edge (entire book) Monday, Week Fifteen: The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul (1/2 of book) Monday, Week Sixteen: The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (2/2 of book) Monday, Week Seventeen: Finals SCHEDULED TESTS (All tests must be taken on the assigned dates; absolutely no exceptions.) REQUIRED TWO QUESTIONS PER WEEK Each student is required to write two questions each week (due Mondays). Be sure to write them out and bring them to class as well as e-mail one copy to your T.A. INTERNET Each student will be assigned a computer account (during the second week of school) which will allow them access to the internet and to e-mail. Each student is required to e-mail the professor at least once a month about his/her progress in the class; additionally each student is required to read in a internet newsgroup each week. This semester the assigned newsgroup is comp.ai.philosophy GRADING POLICY In order to pass Dr. Lane's class (with a "C" or higher) you must do the following minimum requirements (absolutely no exceptions): 1. Perfect attendance (Any class that is missed must be made up by reading one of the extra books in its entirety mentioned below. After reading the book thoroughly, the student will then e-mail the Professor with his/her one page analysis. Any student missing more than 4 or more classes must immediately drop the class or receive an "F" for the entire semester. There are no exceptions to this rule. Why? Because I consider perfect attendance a cornerstone to the class. If you must miss a class for whatever reasons, you must read one extra book per missed class and e-mail your critique within two weeks. Each student is also required to keep an accurate record of his/her attendance. One of the following books may be read to make-up for a single class session. Keep in mind that three missed classes is the terminal limit and therefore three extra books are the limit allowed. A. Biology as Ideology by Lewontin. B. Matter and Consciousness by Paul Churchland. C. The Screwtape Letters by C.S. Lewis. D. Darwin for Beginners. E. Einstein for Beginners. F. Nietzsche for Beginners. G. Foucalt for Beginners. 2. No Tardies Any student who enters the classroom 5 minutes or more after the class starts is required to make up that tardy by reading one of the following short books. There are no exceptions to this rule. Four or more tardies and the student is required to drop the class or receive an "F" for the semester. Below is the list of books one may read if one is tardy (one book per tardy): A. The Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx; B. The Gospel of John. C. The Way of a Pilgrim. D. A Grief Observed by C.S. Lewis. 3. Do All of the Assigned Reading Each student is required to thoroughly read each week's assignment. There are no exceptions to this rule and the student is advised that unless the reading is done by the required time he/she should seriously consider dropping the class. Each Monday the student will be asked if he/she did the reading; it is assumed that any student who attends class has a priori met the reading requirement. 4. Two Questions Each Week Each student must write two questions each week on the assigned reading. These questions form the basis for the Socratic lecture/discussion which commences each Monday. Any student who does not do the necessary two questions should seriously consider dropping the class. There are no exceptions to this rule. 5. Pass Each Scheduled Test Every test is an important one and each one reflects, more or less, the effort the student has put into the class. Each test must be taken at the scheduled time. There are no make-ups given. 6. Complete All Assigned Internet/Computer Tasks TO RECEIVE AN "A" IN THE CLASS YOU MUST IN ADDITION TO THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS DO THE FOLLOWING: 1. Receive a "B" average or higher on your test scores. 2. Listen to one book on tape (from the following list: The Hot Zone; The Physics of Immortality; Black Holes and Baby Universes; Genius; and/or The Tenth Dimension. 3. Watch one video (from the following list: A Brief History of Time; The Double Helix; A Hairdresser's Husband (French); The Apu Trilogy (select one or more from this famous Indian series of movies); and/or Mindwalk. 4. Post one well-reasoned article on a pre-assigned Internet newsgroup. 5. Read one extra book (from the following list: Einstein: His Life and Times by Ronald Clark; Surely Your Joking Mr. Feynman by Richard Feynman; Shadows of the Mind by Roger Penrose; Neurophilosophy by Patricia Smith Churchland; Rediscovery of the Mind by John Searle; The Blind Watchmaker by Richard Dawkins; Ramana Maharshi and the Path of Self-Knowledge; Autobiography of a Yogi by Paramahansa Yogananda; The Interior Castle by Teresa of Avila; The Confessions by St. Augustine; and/or Uncertainty by David Cassidy. PERSONAL NOTE TO THE STUDENT FROM YOUR TEACHER: If you do the necessary work I can guarantee you that you will excel in this class. I am not asking for brilliance; I am not asking for you to understand difficult things; I am not asking you to be a great writer. I am asking that you give me your fullest effort. With that I can assure you that you will pass with flying colors. MAY THE KANTIAN FORCE BE WITH YOU! notes: Introduction to Philosophy Professor David Lane, Ph.D. Class Outline 1996 "Check ou the Web: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane" QQQ From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 18:14:25 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [18.104.22.168]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id SAA08340 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 18:14:24 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [22.214.171.124]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id VAA35878 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 21:11:50 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 21:10:40 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09700444.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: email@example.com Subject: socio syllabus Status: RO Introduction to Sociology Professor: David Christopher Lane, Ph.D. Office: 26-D 211-G Phone: 909 594-5611 (4593) off campus On campus: dial 4000 then 4593 Fax: 909 594-7661 E-mail address: firstname.lastname@example.org Web Site: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane Office hours: 12:45 to 2:15 p.m. (Monday and Wednesday); 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. (Friday) Subjects currently teaching: Sociology, Philosophy, and World Religions REQUIRED BOOKS: 1. Sociology by Calhoun. 2. Down and Out in Paris and London by George Orwell. 3. Civilization and Its Discontents by Freud. 4. The Social Construction of Reality by Peter Berger. 5. The Denial of Death by Ernest Becker. 6. The Autobiography of Charles Darwin. 7. The Naturalist by Edward O. Wilson. 8. Creating Minds by Howard Gardner. 9. The Sexual Brain by Simon LeVay. 10. Being Digital. 11. Real by Dodie Bellamy 12. Amusing Ourselves to Death by Neil Postman OVERALL CLASS REQUIREMENTS (mandatory): 1. Perfect class attendance. 2. Absolutely no tardies. 3. All reading completed on time. 4. Up-to-date record of class/test progress and monthly e-mail updates. 5. Consistent in-class participation and engagement. 6. Weekly e-mail progress reports on reading/analysis. 7. Three questions on assigned reading each week. WEEKLY READING ASSIGNMENTS (All reading assignments must be done on the required date; absolutely no exceptions) Friday, Week Two (1/3 of Sociology) Friday, Week Three (2/3 of Sociology) Friday, Week Four (3/3 of Sociology) Friday, Week Five (Down and Out in Paris and London; entire book) Friday, Week Six (Civilization and its Discontents; entire book) Friday, Week Seven (The Social Construction of Reality; entire book) Friday, Week Eight (The Denial of Death; entire book) Friday, Week Nine (Autobiography of Charles Darwin; entire book) Friday, Week Ten (The Naturalist by Edward O. Wilson; entire book) Friday, Week Eleven (The Sexual Brain; entire book) Friday, Week Twelve (Real; entire book) Friday, Week Thirteen (Creating Minds; entire book) Friday, Week Fourteen (Amusing Ourselves to Death; entire book) Friday, Week Fifteen (Being Digital; entire book) FINAL SCHEDULED TESTS There will be a test given every week based upon the assigned reading for that week. Each test must be taken; there are no exceptions and no make-ups. REQUIRED THREE QUESTIONS PER WEEK Each student is required to write three questions each week (due Friday) on the assigned reading. Absolutely no exceptions. The student besides bringing one copy into class must also e-mail a copy of the three questions to the class T. A. each week. INTERNET Each student will be assigned a computer account (during the second week of school) which will allow them access to the internet and to e- mail. Each student is required to E-mail the professor at least once a month about his/her progress in the class; additionally each student is required to read in an internet newsgroup. WEB SITE A proto-typical web site has been developed for this class. The following is the address: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane Students will be required to access this web site for further information about the Net. GRADING POLICY In order to pass Dr. Lane's class (with a "C" or higher) you must do the following minimum requirements (absolutely no exceptions): 1. Perfect attendance (Any class that is missed must be made up by reading one of the extra books in its entirety mentioned below. After reading the book thoroughly, the student will then e-mail the Professor with his/her one page analysis. Any student missing 3 or more classes must immediately drop the class or receive an "F" for the entire semester. There are no exceptions to this rule. Why? Because I consider perfect attendance a cornerstone to the class. If you must miss a class for whatever reasons, you must read one extra book per missed class and e- mail your critique within two weeks. Each student is also required to keep an accurate record of his/her attendance. One of the following books may be read to make-up for a single class session. Keep in mind that three missed classes is the terminal limit and therefore three extra books are the limit allowed. A. Biology as Ideology by Lewontin. B. On Human Nature by Edward O. Wilson. C. The Bell Curve. D. Ever Since Darwin by Stephen Jay Gould. 2. No Tardies Any student who enters the classroom 10 minutes or more after the class starts is required to make up that tardy by reading one of the following short books. There are no exceptions to this rule. Three or more tardies and the student is required to drop the class or receive an "F" for the semester. Below is the list of books one may read if one is tardy (one book per tardy): A. The Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx. B. Alice in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll. C. Animal Farm by George Orwell. Island by Aldous Huxley. 3. Do All of the Assigned Reading Each student is required to thoroughly read each week's assignment. There are no exceptions to this rule and the student is advised that unless the reading is done by the required time he/she should seriously consider dropping the class. Each Friday the student will be asked if he/she did the reading; it is assumed that any student who attends class has a priori met the reading requirement. 4. Three Questions Each Week Each student must write three questions each week on the assigned reading. These questions form the basis for the Socratic lecture/discussion which commences each Friday. Any student who does not do the necessary three questions should seriously consider dropping the class. There are no exceptions to this rule. Remember to e-mail a copy to the class T. A. 5. Pass Each Scheduled Test Every test is an important one and each one reflects, more or less, the effort the student has put into the class. Each test must be taken at the scheduled time. There are no make-ups given. 6. Complete All Assigned Internet/Computer Task TO RECEIVE AN "A" IN THE CLASS YOU MUST IN ADDITION TO THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS DO THE FOLLOWING: 1. Receive a "B+" average on your tests. 2. Post a reasoned article on the Internet (newsgroup to be assigned). 3. See one movie and listen to one book on tape (to be announced). PERSONAL NOTE TO THE STUDENT FROM YOUR TEACHER: If you do the necessary work I can guarantee you that you will excel in this class. I am not asking for brilliance; I am not asking for you to understand difficult things; I am not asking you to be a great writer. I am asking that you give me your fullest effort. With that I can assure you that you will pass with flying colors. MAY THE WEBERIAN FORCE BE WITH YOU! Notes: INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY Professor: David Christopher Lane, Ph.D. Spring 1996 Class Requirements Introduction to Sociology Introduction to Sociology "Surf the Internet" Q From FGFN33D@prodigy.com Sat Jan 27 18:14:26 1996 Return-Path: FGFN33D@prodigy.com Received: from pimaia2w.prodigy.com (pimaia2w.prodigy.com [126.96.36.199]) by weber.ucsd.edu (8.7.3/8.7.3) with SMTP id SAA08341 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 18:14:25 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.prodigy.com (mail.prodigy.com [188.8.131.52]) by pimaia2w.prodigy.com (8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id VAA34176 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 1996 21:12:43 -0500 Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 21:11:32 EST From: FGFN33D@prodigy.com (MR PAUL P O'BRIEN) X-Mailer: PRODIGY Services Company Internet mailer [PIM 3.2-334.50] Message-Id: <013.09700513.FGFN33D@prodigy.com> To: email@example.com Subject: world religions syllabus Status: RO Introduction to Major World Religions Class Outline: Spring 1996 \ Professor: David Christopher Lane, Ph.D. Office: 26-D 211-G Phone: 909 594-5611 (4593)---off campus only On campus: dial 4000 then 4593 Fax: 909 594-7661 E-mail address: firstname.lastname@example.org Web site: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane Office hours: 12:45 to 2:15 p.m. (Monday and Wednesday) 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. (Friday) Subjects currently teaching: Introduction to Major World Religions; Introduction to Philosophy; and Introduction to Sociology. REQUIRED BOOKS: 1. The Enchanted Land by MSAC 2. Da: The Strange Case of Franklin Jones 3. Autobiography of a Yogi by Yogananda 4. Many Peoples, Many Faiths by Robert Ellwood 5. Tao Te Ching by Lao Tzu 6. The Analects of Confucius by Confucius 7. The Way of a Pilgrim 8. Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography 9. The Rubaiyyat of Omar Khayam 10. Delicious Laughter by Rumi 11. The History of God by Karen Armstrong 12. Thus Spake Guru Nanak 13. Meetings with Remarkable Men by G.I. Gurdjieff 14. Thus Spake the Buddha 15. Radhasoami Reality by Mark Juergensmeyer 16. The Bible (Old and New Testament) 17. Kali's Child 18. A Brief History of Everything by Ken Wilber 19. Why I Don't Eat Faces 20. Exposing Cults (to be handed out in class) RECOMMENDED (but not mandatory) TEXTS: 1. The Encyclopedic Handbook of Cults by Melton 2. The Making of a Spiritual Movement 3. Monkey on a Stick OVERALL CLASS REQUIREMENTS (mandatory): 1. Perfect class attendance. 2. Absolutely no tardies. 3. All reading completed on time. 4. Up-to-date record of class/test progress and monthly e-mail updates. 5. Consistent in-class participation and engagement. 6. Weekly e-mail progress reports on reading/analysis. 7. Two questions on assigned reading each week. 8. Periodic meetings with class T.A. WEEKLY READING ASSIGNMENTS (All reading assignments must be done on the required date; absolutely no exceptions. Ellwood's book, Many People, Many Faiths, should be read alongside the assigned texts. Relevant pages will be assigned in-class) Monday, Week Two: The Enchanted Land Monday, Week Three: Da: The Strange Case of Franklin Jones Monday, Week Four: Autobiography of a Yogi Monday, Week Five: Kali's Child Monday, Week Six Thus Spake the Buddha & Why I Don't Eat Faces Monday, Week Seven: Thus Spake Nanak & Radhasoami Reality Monday, Week Eight: Tao Te Ching & Analects of Confucius Monday, Week Nine: History of God Monday, Week Ten: Delicious Laughter & Rubaiyyat of Omar Khayam Monday, Week Eleven: Old Testament Monday, Week Twelve: New Testament & Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography Monday, Week Thirteen: The Way of a Pilgrim Monday, Week Fourteen: Meetings with Remarkable Men Monday, Week Fifteen: A Brief History of Everything Monday, Week Sixteen: Exposing Cults Monday, Week Seventeen: Finals SCHEDULED TESTS (All tests must be taken on the assigned dates; absolutely no exceptions) REQUIRED TWO QUESTIONS PER WEEK (After each book the student must bring two questions relating to that text, usually on Mondays. There are no exceptions. The questions must be both e-mailed to the T.A. and written/typed out before the class session. INTERNET Each student will be assigned a computer account (during the second week of school) which will allow him/her access to the internet and to e-mail. Each student is required to e-mail the professor at least once every two weeks about his/her progress in the class. The student must e-mail their weekly questions to the T.A. after reading the required book. THE WEB PROJECT A proto-typical web site has been developed for this class on the INTERNET. Students are encouraged to make use of it, since many important books, articles, and documents are online. At a future date, a web-related assignment will be assigned. The following is the web address: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane [remember there are no spaces between any of the above words.] GRADING POLICY In order to pass Dr. Lane's class (with a "C" or higher) you must do the following minimum requirements (absolutely no exceptions): 1. Perfect attendance (Any class that is missed must be made up by reading one of the extra books in its entirety mentioned below. After reading the book thoroughly, the student will then e-mail the Professor with his/her one page analysis. Any student missing more than 4 or more classes must immediately drop the class or receive an "F" for the entire semester. There are no exceptions to this rule. Why? Because I consider perfect attendance a cornerstone to the class. If you must miss a class for whatever reasons, you must read one extra book per missed class and e-mail your critique within two weeks. Each student is also required to keep an accurate record of his/her attendance. One of the following books may be read to make- up for a single class session. Keep in mind that three missed classes is the terminal limit and therefore three extra books are the limit allowed. A. Call of the Great Master; Eunuchs for the Church; A Marginal Jew; Siddhartha; The Life of Mohammed; Conference of the Birds; and/or The Interior Castle 2. No Tardies Any student who enters the classroom 5 minutes or more after the class starts is required to make up that tardy by reading one of the following short books. There are no exceptions to this rule. Four or more tardies and the student is required to drop the class or receive an "F" for the semester. Below is the list of books one may read if one is tardy (one book per tardy): A. Any volume (if not already read) from C.S. Lewis' The Chronicles of Narnia; B. Any volume of poetry (if not already read) from Rumi, Hafiz, Sarmad, Kabir, Nanak, St. John of the Cross. 3. Do All of the Assigned Reading Each student is required to thoroughly read each week's assignment. There are no exceptions to this rule and the student is advised that unless the reading is done by the required time he/she should seriously consider dropping the class. Each Monday the student will be asked if he/she did the reading; it is assumed that any student who attends class has a priori met the reading requirement. 4. Two Questions Each Week Each student must write two questions each week on the assigned reading. Any student who does not do the necessary two questions should seriously consider dropping the class. There are no exceptions to this rule. Remember that you must type/write your questions out and also e-mail them to the T.A. 5. Pass Each Scheduled Test Every test is an important one and each one reflects, more or less, the effort the student has put into the class. Each test must be taken at the scheduled time. There are no make-ups given. 6. Complete All Assigned INTERNET/Computer Tasks TO RECEIVE AN "A" IN THE CLASS YOU MUST IN ADDITION TO THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS DO THE FOLLOWING: 1. Receive a "B" average or higher on your test scores. 2. Watch one video (The Lost Horizon/black and white version; Gandhi; The Last Temptation of Christ; The Little Buddha; Mohammed; Meetings with Remarkable Men; and/or a new choice chosen by your teacher) 3. Write a comprehensive term paper, utilizing the web, on a new religious movement. Details on this will be provided in class. PERSONAL NOTE TO THE STUDENT FROM YOUR TEACHER: If you do the necessary work I can guarantee you that you will excel in this class. I am not asking for brilliance; I am not asking for you to understand difficult things; I am not asking you to be a great writer. I am asking that you give me your fullest effort. With that I can assure you that you will pass with flying colors. NOTES: Introduction to Major World Religions Professor David Lane, Ph.D. Class Outline 1996 "Visit the Web: http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlane" QQQ